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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines how lawyers emerged as powerful professionals during the 
period of Japanese colonialism in Korea (1906-1945) even as the legal profession, as a whole, 
remained relatively disempowered. After the registration of the first three Korean lawyers as 
litigation experts in 1906, lawyers became prestigious ones in local politics, business, and society 
in colonial Korea, but the practicing lawyers remained largely inactive and silent as a collective 
for most of the colonial period. Although lawyers were appointed for lawsuits at the highest 
court level and rewarded with both social prestige and high salaries, they remained politically 
and juristically marginalized because of the colonial rule that enabled the attorney system to be 
dramatically implanted onto colonial Korea. 
To explicate the discrepancy between the dramatic rise and prominence of lawyer as 
individual practitioners and their collective disempowerment as bar associations in colonial 
Korea, this dissertation conceptualizes the colonial legal structures by relying theories of social 
structures and legal pluralism within colonial historiographies. I define colonial legal structures 
as hierarchically arranged legal orders that consist of formal procedures imposed by the 
colonizer on substantive legal sources originating from the colonized. I suggest that the legal 
profession be an actor that derived from the colonial legal structures that enable and constrain the 
boundary of its social action. Despite the establishments of educational institutes, qualifying 
examination, and the court system, all of which contributed to training and producing lawyers, 
the lawyers in colonial Korea remained unable to secure their legal expertise, build similar 
experiences, and claim equivalent status to the state. Consequently, the colonial legal structures 
facilitate lawyers to be prominent professionals but at the same time professionalize the lawyers 
to be individually salient but to be collectively silent. 
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Through examining the professionalization of lawyers in colonial Korea under the 
Japanese Empire, I conclude that colonization brings the legal profession into the colony by 
establishing Western courts and procedures but segregates the profession from the field in which 
it is supposed to be. The establishment of a legal education, bar exams, and judicial bureaucracy 
necessitated the production of practicing lawyers who were expected to become prominent 
professionals in the fields of local politics, business, and society. Aside from the establishments 
of these formal institutions, however, the legal profession lacks the ground on which the 
collective entity of individual practitioners secure their expertise based on common experiences. 
I argue that the colonial legal structures professionalized the lawyers to be substantively shallow, 
because colonization deprived them of structural opportunities to employ native legal sources, to 
nurture an identity as a profession, and to contest with the state. 
This dissertation is based on 22 months of archival research that I conduced in Seoul, 
South Korea from October 2011 to July 2013. Of interest were the legislative efforts, enactments 
and the issuance of executive ordinances pertaining to lawyers, all of which were involved in 
constructing the attorney system from the late 1890s to the end of colonial rule in 1945. I also 
looked at governmental documents that recorded lawyers’ registration, transfer, and dropout in 
order to understand who the lawyers were and what their demography was during the period. 
With the governmental documents, I was able to construct a comprehensive survey of the 
profiles of 814 men who had registered as lawyers from 1906 to 1945. In addition to archives 
regarding legislative efforts for and the registration of lawyers, classified documents produced by 
the colonial government revealed how the government viewed and treated the practitioners. I 
also examined classified documents pertaining to lawyers’ registration produced by the colonial 
government to censor lawyers in colonial Korea.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Lawyers are a group of legal experts who engage in lawsuits on behalf of their clients. 
After graduating law school and successfully passing a set of qualifying exams, they become 
esteemed professionals who are deemed to be knowledgeable in law and litigation procedures. 
As a collective body, they are regulated by an association of legal professionals who not only 
oversee the registration and examination of the individual lawyers but also claim their exclusive 
power over their members and external entities. Based on knowledge to certain problem sets and 
social recognition that they solve the problem sets faster and easier than competitors, an expert 
group transforms a collective body of professionals, a profession. The process of transforming a 
group of experts into a collective body of professionals known as “professionalization,” therefore, 
is, a social, cultural, and historical process in which an occupational expert legitimizes their 
expertise based on knowledge and builds a common identity in relation to their competitors in a 
political boundary. In the rise and proliferation of lawyers in Europe, various factors have played 
a role including political regime changes, the rise of nation-states and restructuring of legal 
systems, and the formation of centralized bureaucracies. 
Explaining the rise of lawyers in Korea for the first half of the twentieth century 
confronts remarkably different historical, cultural, and social conditions from Europe. In contrast 
to lawyers in Europe, though their roles and jobs were varied across countries, where lawyers 
were knowledgeable at local customs and played an important role in codifying statuary laws, 
experts in law in Korea were either lower-mid ranked officials or prodigals to raise social 
disharmony. Korea had held little cultural root of civil codes in contrast to its sophisticated state-
penal codes. Not only had litigations been strongly discouraged by the government, but the 
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employment of private agents in lawsuits had been prohibited until 1895. Given that the civil 
codes were nearly absent, or at best scattered to the state-penal codes, law had existed to be a 
secondary tool to Confucian ideals in rule. The central and local governments established judicial 
organs, but the judiciary run under a strict division of labor between Confucian yangban literati 
located at higher positions and chungin technical experts in law assigned to lower-mid positions. 
On the other hand, colonization by the Japanese accounted for the adaptation and subsequent 
development of legal institutions. First Korean lawyers registered to the Korean government and 
started to practice law in 1906, right after Korea fell into Japan’s protectorate in December 1905. 
In less than five years since then, employment of lawyers at the highest level of court in Korea 
became indispensable. While all courts in Korea were Westernized and three quarters of judicial 
officials were recruited by Japanese in 1909, Korea’s judicial sovereignty was enforced to be 
delegated to the Japanese. During the period of Japan’s rule from 1910 to 1945, legal professions 
including lawyers grew in parallel with the changes of the legal institutions of the Japanese 
Empire. Competitive examinations to become a lawyer along with law education into colonial 
Korea gained popularity among Koreans, as remarkable socioeconomic compensation was given 
to individual practitioners. The title of lawyer was a ticket to the upper class socially, 
economically, and politically in colonial and post-colonial Korean society. The rise of lawyer in 
Korea therefore resulted from a radical departure from the traditional but a landing onto the 
modern-yet-colonial legal system.  
My task in this project is to explore how colonization by the Japanese played a role in 
professionalizing lawyers in Korea where the legal traditions had been estranged to the advent of 
the legal expert and the colonial state authoritatively controlled its courts and managed the legal 
profession. The legal traditions of pre-colonial Korea were interpreted by the Japanese colonizers 
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and used to rule cases filed to the courts in colonial Korea. The colonial state that exercised 
administrative, legislative, and judicial power together established separated jurisdictional 
boundary from the metropole Japanese state. While the colonial state monopolized interpretation 
of native legal sources and administered independent qualifying examinations for screening 
lawyers from mainland Japan, the collective body of lawyers existed as loose associations that 
was comprised of two ethnic lawyers who originated from various institutional pathways. 
Although individual lawyers became salient in various social realms, lawyer as a collective entity 
remained silent to political, social, and juristic issues. In other words, lawyers were introduced to 
Korea alongside colonial encroachments and many people in colonial Korea aspired to be a 
lawyer, but few were interested in what lawyers’ associations could and should do in the colony. 
 
Legal Structures by Colonization 
 
Social structures are defined as durable schemas and movable resources that both 
empower and constrain social action (Sewell 1992; Sahlins 1985; Bourdieu 2007). Such social 
structures are not conceptually singular but multiple allowing us to envision a chain of structures 
with relative autonomy and distinctive logics that affect or govern adjacent structures (Sewell 
1992). The multiplicity of structures allows us to envision a chain of structures with relative 
autonomy and distinct logics that affect their adjacent structures. Due to the relative durability of 
cultural schemas that legitimate certain behavioral logics within a structure, some actors may 
belong to multiple structures with intersecting behavioral logics (Bourdieu 2007).  
Colonial historiographies have portrayed the colonial legal system as a plurality of legal 
schemas and resources that originate from both the colonizer and colonized (Benton 1999) and 
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that are, in turn, formally integrated but substantively differentiated. That is, while the 
implementation of Westernized legal systems and practices were praised as civilizing measures 
by the colonizers (Merry 1999), native legal practices and institutions were often preserved to 
maintain colonial stability (Likhovski 2006; Cohn 1996). Therefore, the legal system usually 
consisted of both state-official courts that primarily dealt with secular cases and native courts 
that covered cases involving religious or customary laws (Christelow 1982). Meanwhile, the 
literature on legal pluralism suggests that laws and legal institutions in the colony were plural in 
nature between colonial institutions such as the government and church as well as between the 
colonizer and the colonized (Benton 1999). Such plurality of law and legal institutions in the 
colony, however, by no means implied an equal relationship between the colonial and native 
legal sources. Rather, as Barry Hooker has suggested through his term, “dominant and servient 
laws” (1975: 4), there was often a sharp hierarchy between the two orders. As revealed in 
Katherine Hoffman’s comparative study of French rule in Morocco in the 1930s (2010), 
customary law and judicial officials were regarded as residual in the sense that “[they] consisted 
of what remained after colonial powers fretted out [customary legal sources] (852).” In terms of 
law and legal structures, colonization can therefore be viewed as a process in which the colonizer 
imposes a hierarchical arrangement of legal institutions between the metropole and colony. 
Drawing on these studies, this dissertation articulates the colonial legal structures as an 
integrated legal system of hierarchically arranged colonial and native legal sources imposed on 
the colony as part of a stratified imperial order. Colonial institutions necessary for stable rule, 
such as the court and prison systems, legal educational institutions and their qualifying 
examinations, and the judicial bureaucracy and its personnel, were dramatically implemented 
within the colony. The implementation of the colonial legal system facilitated the growth of legal 
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professions as it meant the formal integration of differing legal systems in the metropole and 
colony. In terms of formal procedures within lawsuits to deal with secular affairs, the colony and 
metropole exhibited little difference. However, behind the formal integration of the metropolitan 
and colonial legal systems, the native legal sources often took a back seat to the formal colonial 
order. Indigenous legal sources such as native customs became the province of either native 
jurists who handled them within native courts or colonial judicial officials assigned to colonial 
courts that dealt with secular and religious affairs (Brown 1995; Roberts and Mann 1991; 
Hoffman 2010).  
Insofar as colonial legal structures encompass plural legal structures that do not 
necessarily become compatible simply through formal integration, these colonial structures 
exhibited two distinguishing features. One was the cultural and structural chasm between the 
colonial and native legal orders that needed to be linked for the sake of colonial rule. As some 
researchers on colonialism have suggested, while the colonial state may have played a 
predominant role within these legal institutions, local colonial authorities still played a key role 
in integrating them into the colony, particularly when unexpected conflicts arose (Go 2000; 
Berman and Lonsdale 1992). Within these hierarchically arranged colonial legal structures, the 
role of cultural brokers became crucial. On the other hand, from the perspective of the entire 
empire, the integration of the colony into the legal jurisdiction of the empire meant the 
marginalization of the former. The colony remained peripheral in that the colonial state existed 
as a subordinated part of the governing colonial apparatus. According to Steinmetz, while many 
colonial governments over the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries exercised autonomy 
(Steinmetz 2008), their autonomy was simply designed to render the governing structure more 
efficient. That is, rather than independence, the colonial state’s autonomy signified less 
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interference from the motherland and therefore a more efficient system of colonial governance. 
The autonomy designed to efficiency in governance and the detachment of legal sources and 
statuary laws characterizes the legal structures in the colony to be formally similar to but 
substantively dissimilar from the metropole. 
 
Professionalization of Legal Experts in the Colony 
 
Existing literature has envisioned professionalization as a process in which an 
occupational group of experts develop and exercise their expertise within certain domains while 
building a corresponding identity based on shared experiences in relation to the state, the market, 
and other competitors (Liu 2013; Freidson 1986; Abbott 1988; Halliday and Karpik 1997). As a 
knowledge-based occupational group (Gorman and Sandefur 2011) that constructs its knowledge 
through “diagnosis-inference-treatment” (Abbott 1988: 35-58), a profession seeks to secure a 
domain of expertise (Abbott 1988). Their collective identity did not derive automatically from 
their shared technical expertise or even their occupational pride, but rather from how they 
successfully aligned their professional interest to those of the public’s (Ramsey 1984). For 
instance, French doctors claimed to be curers for social pathologies thereby consolidating their 
professional identity (Goldstein 1984). Independent of both the market and state, their identity 
building process is involved with making distinction from other occupational groups and 
controlling its members by establishing a strong professional association with rules and 
regulations. Along this vein, the decline of a profession is often associated with the rising power 
of a market or state (Krause 1999). Finally, professionalization often denote a close relationship 
with the state. Like many modern professions, lawyers depend on the legal system of a nation-
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state to define and delimit their areas of expertise and jurisdiction. According to Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer (1986), with the roles and expertise of the lawyers determined by political 
structures, their bar autonomy is not an intrinsic social value for the lawyers. Since Randall 
Collins (1979)’s pioneering study of the Continental versus the Angle-American model of state-
profession relationships, many scholars implicitly assume the dependence of lawyers and legal 
professions on the nation-state (Bailes 1996; Balzer 1996; McClelland 2002; Orlovsky 1996). 
Even within the UK-US tradition (Goebel 1994), their professionalization has taken place 
alongside or under the auspices of the state. Halliday and his colleagues propose that the politics 
is critically important in forming and maintaining lawyers’ role and status through comparative 
and historical analysis on the UK, the US, France, and Germany (Halliday and Karpik 1997). 
With both law a highly localized practice and the lawyers’ social networks deeply embedded 
within local contexts and therefore the legal profession was considered unrecognizable when it 
moved beyond a particular jurisdiction (Michelson 2007; Liu 2011), the single structure premise 
of the state-legal profession was considered to be more powerful in explaining the profession of 
lawyers than others. In short, existing theories of professionalization are grounded in three 
interlocking assumptions of lawyers as: 1) a profession with legal expertise and jurisdiction who 
contributes to nation-building; 2) an autonomous group of professionals with a coherent identity; 
3) a profession with state-mandated jurisdiction over a particular area.1 
While a plethora of studies have examined the processes of colonization and the 
implementation of colonial legal systems, few have explicitly examined the professionalization 
                                                 
1 Of course, these classifications are not clear-cut but rather closely associated with one another. For example, 
Larson asserted that professions’ power stemmed from monopolistic control over their members and knowledge. 
She stated that ‘an attempt to translate one order of scarce resources to another one such as economic and social 
rewards is professionalization’ (Larson 1977: p. xvi). Following Larson’s thesis of professions, Johnson (1995) 
argued that in order to secure their monopolizing power from other occupational groups, professions are likely to 
involve a collaboration with the state in which their knowledge and techniques are used to govern the public 
(Johnson 1995).  
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of lawyers in the colony. In contrast to lawyers in the West where their professionalization 
encompassed a struggle for an area of expertise and jurisdiction, the formation of a unified 
identity through the sharing of common experiences, and reciprocal relationships with the 
nation-state, the colonial context challenges each of these assumptions. The jurisdictional power 
of lawyers in Western Europe originates within specific historical circumstances that determine 
what law students should learn in schools and what expertise they should eventually exercise as 
legal professionals. As described by James Brundage (2010), the historical origin of lawyers’ 
expertise in twelfth century Europe came from conflicting interpretations of canon law. However, 
native legal sources in colonies were selectively interpreted and adopted by the colonial state as 
it tried to construct colonial jurisprudence for colonial rule. The colonial jurisprudence was one 
of the ways to establish colonial Others (Said 1978). Although this process of codifying or quasi-
codifying local indigenous customs looks similar to the enactment of civil laws in European 
countries, it substantively differed in that it was designed to make the native legal orders 
responsive to the institutional needs of the colonial state.2 In other words, the lawyers in the 
colony did not participate in the same process of acquiring expertise in legal sources and winning 
social recognition during the period of modern nation-building. Instead, they became “shallow” 
practitioners of law who were accredited through formal colonial institutions but lacked the 
means to produce their own legal knowledge. Instead, they devolved into consumers of legal 
knowledge imported from the metropole. Within this broader context, it is not a surprise that 
lawyers in the colony often tended to be double agents and cultural translators who worked for 
both the colonizer and colonized (Shamir 2001; Lo 2002). 
                                                 
2 Even in the contemporary world, a similar process takes place in many developing countries. In many developing 
countries around the world today, the conflicts and debates between civil and common laws are similarly observed 
as they seek to model their legal systems (Halliday and Carruthers 2007). 
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Second, the presumption of a profession’s coherent identity is questioned by the multi-
racial and multi-ethnic makeup of the professionals in the colony. The literature on professions 
presumes that one of the ways that a group of experts highlight their power and social prestige 
and protect their profession is by organizing themselves into a group. As Rogers Brubaker (2005) 
points out, however, the forging of “groupness” is hardly possible through the simple sharing of 
one or even multiple attributes. Making a group is a social, cultural, and political project in 
which certain categories are transformed into a sense of groupness. Within the accreditation 
process, professionals are often actively discriminated against in terms of race, gender, and social 
background. For instance, the professionalization often intersects with gendered (Davies 1996), 
racialized (Shaw 1996) mechanisms of exclusion  (Witz 1992), and heterosexualized 
mechanisms of exclusion in order to construct the profession as the province of largely white 
men with degrees from elite law schools. Historical studies suggest the segmentation of 
professional groups which appeared along with racial/ethnic lines characterized a racially or 
ethnically divided society created by external conquerors (Lo 2002; Reid 1974; Sharafi 2007). In 
this vein, Lo (2005) proposes that profession is a site of professionals’ identity formation. 
Third, the assumption of a legal professional’s single jurisdiction within the existing 
literature speaks little to their professionalization process within the empire and colony. Empire 
is defined as a transnational political formation in which one state exerts political power and 
control over a subordinated territory and its peoples (Go 2008a). Despite the integration of the 
legal system between the metropole and the colony, empires maintained a great deal of 
exemptions and exclusions for the sake of efficient rule in colony. Although the metropole and 
the colony engaged in reciprocal interactions, they were grounded in unequal chains of 
knowledge production where the former produced while the latter consumed. The colonial state 
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also differed from the nation-state in that it lacked an embedded context where the governmental 
organizations are responsive to the needs and demands of the society within which various social 
actors construct and enable or disable a set of political institutions within an embedded context 
(Skocpol 1985; Stepan 1985; P. Evans 1995). On the contrary, the colonial state can be viewed as 
an extremely autonomous organization with little intervention of the society. As an autonomous 
organization, the colonial state can be viewed as a bundle of hierarchical structures 
unconstrained by social interests which implement policies and construct administrative orders. 
As a field, however, the state can be viewed as a social configuration lacking a clear 
understanding of their subjects. Colonial policy makers often misrepresented their subjects and 
engaged in faulty policies that resulted in, for instance, the creation of two competing 
administrative organizations (Wilson 2013). The colonial policies of the colonizer could have 
very different consequences depending on how they were received by the colonized subjects (Go 
2008b). Given that the colonial state was a periphery organization in the politics of an empire 
and existed to be over-autonomous yet under-embedded, the legal profession tended to have few 
institutional places for their politics. As far as the colonial state remained simply an 
administrative organization for the entire empire, lawyers in the colony had little space to voice 
out their demand and venue to advance.  
The professionalization of lawyers in the colony occurred under two types of 
marginalization. On the one hand, lawyers in the colony were marginalized by the center-
periphery topology of the empire. Located in the periphery, they became technical practitioner 
who consumed knowledge that was imported from the metropole. As far as lawyers in the colony 
are able to secure their expertise at knowledge on native legal sources, they stand along with the 
metropole practitioners. If they lost the control of the knowledge on local customs, they were 
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relegated to merely a technician of law. On the other hand, the lawyers were marginalized by the 
colonial state that tried to monopolize the interpretation of native legal sources. Even though the 
colonial laws and legal institutions implemented by the colonizers resulted in a favorable 
environment for their growth, the lawyers in the colony remained excluded from the process of 
interpreting and applying the indigenous legal sources. In other words, the professionalization of 
colonial lawyers through the establishment of modern institutions such as law schools, bar 
examinations, and the courts hardly resulted in the deployment of native laws, customs, and 
other legal practices with significant indigenous content. Challenging the conventional definition 
of professionalization as a process in which a group of experts becomes an occupation simply 
through institutional arrangements, these two types of marginalization resonate with Frederick 
Cooper (2005)’s assertion on colonial modernity that “positing a colonial modernity reduces the 
conflicting strategies of colonization to a modernity perhaps never experienced by those being 
colonized” (Cooper 2005: 16). 
 
Japan’s Deviation, Korea’s Particularity: A Historical Comparative View 
 
Japan’s Deviation 
The historical particularity of the Korean legal system shaped by Japanese imperialism 
heightened the decoupling of lawyers as individual practitioners from their grouping as experts 
in comparison with other colonies in the era of colonialism from the nineteenth to the early 
twentieth century. Like many Western imperial powers at the turn of the twentieth century, the 
Japanese empire maintained two major colonies with large colonial governments in Korea and 
Taiwan. Unlike their Western counterparts, though the colonial government attempted to be 
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autonomous from the interventions of the metropole government (Steinmetz 2008), the 
autonomy of Japanese colonial governments was designed to maximize the efficiency in rule by 
politicians and military officials in mainland Japan from its earlier periods. While the Japanese 
government established hierarchical bureaucratic organizations in Taiwan and Korea (Chen 1970; 
Wang 2001), the power and authority of the Governor-General of colonial Korea not only served 
as the head officer of the administrative office but also covered both legislative and judicial 
branches.3 In terms of the legislative control, the Governor-General issued executive ordinances 
that were equivalent to the enactive laws in metropole Japan. Annexed to imperial Japan after 
1910, colonial Korea became part of the Japanese Empire where the enactment of the 
Constitution of Rights specified in Japan was postponed and no laws that were passed by the 
Imperial Diet went into effect unless authorized by an executive ordinance by the Governor-
General known as seirei4. In terms of the judicial power, he controlled the judiciary through the 
Bureau of Justice.5 The head of the Bureau of Justice, occasionally exchanged with one of 
highest judges or prosecutors in colonial Korea, engaged in the personnel management practices 
of judicial officials assigned to colonial Korea. Designed to maximize the efficiency of colonial 
governance, the strong autonomy of the Governor-General and his colonial government resulted 
in colonial courts with a separate area of jurisdiction from mainland Japan. 
                                                 
3 Until 1920, the Governor-Generals of Korea and Taiwan enjoyed nearly similar amounts of autonomy from the 
metropole government. The Governor-Generals were answerable not to the Japanese government but to the Japanese 
emperor. After 1920, as the metropole government started to intervene in colonial affairs, the power of the 
Governor-General in Taiwan started to be shrunk. However, the intervention of the Japanese government into 
colonial Korea did not occur in a full-scale until just a few years before Japan’s loss in World War II. 
4 Chen (1984) reported that there were 676 seirei were promulgated in the 35 years of Japanese rule by nine 
governors-general of Korea and that the Criminal Code, Criminal Procedure, Civil Code, Civil Procedure, 
Commercial Law, Maritime Law, Law regarding Real Estate, and Census Registration Act were all seirei (261-262). 
5 As one of the highest level of generals in the Japanese Army, the Governor-General was even authorized to deploy 
Japanese military units that were stationed in Korea. 
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The separation of the legal jurisdictions thereby challenged the constitutional status of the 
judiciary and its officials and lawyers in colonial Korea.6 Constituted by an executive ordinance 
on the court system in colonial Korea in 1911, the courts and prosecutor’s offices existed as 
affiliates of the colonial government—raising the broader question of whether the colonial 
judiciary was really grounded in the Japanese constitution. While the majority of Japanese judges 
and prosecutors were appointed by the Japanese Prime Minister before they came to Korea, they 
fell under the supervisory control of the Governor-General in colonial Korea and not the 
Ministry of Justice in metropole Japan after they arrived in the colony. Through a seirei 
promulgated in 1911, the Governor-General in Korea had the authority to appoint, discipline, and 
dismiss any judicial official who belonged to the colonial court. In 1921, the colonial 
government enacted another seirei to constitute the Korean Bar Examination and its 
accompanying regulations. With the executive ordinances valid only within the boundary of 
colonial Korea, however, those lawyers defined by this ordinance were not authorized to practice 
law in any other region of the Japanese empire (e.g., Japan or Taiwan). In other words, those 
judicial officials and lawyers who obtained their legal qualifications in colonial Korea became 
sharply differentiated from those who had passed their bar or higher civil service examinations in 
the metropole.  
Another significant difference of Japanese colonial rule in Korea from that of Western 
colonial powers at the time lay in the single court structure. Since colonial Korea constituted a 
separate area of jurisdiction from metropole Japan, the cases that were filed in Korea were not 
                                                 
6 The colonization of Korea began in August 1910, but the Japanese colonizers started to intervene in domestic 
politics only in 1906 with the signing of the Second Japan and Korea Treaty, which transformed Korea into a 
Japanese protectorate. It is noteworthy that major reforms in laws and legal institutions that lasted during the 
colonial and even post-colonial periods were established during this period. For instance, the First Lawyers’ Law 
was enacted in November 1905 and the separation of judiciary from administration was completed at the local level 
when the Japanese judicial officials were assigned to the courts of towns and villages in July 1908. 
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transferred to the Japanese courts. Instead, The High Court of Colonial Korea became the final 
arbitrator of a court rule or decision. Neither were the courts in colonial Korea divided according 
to litigation. In March 1912, the colonial government issued an ordinance on civil matters upon 
which Korea’s basic legal order was constituted throughout the colonial period. While the 
Japanese civil code became the governing law in colonial Korea, the Governor-General insisted 
that private law matters among Koreans be regulated by Korean customary rules. This dual 
system was very different from some British and French colonies where native and religious 
matters were filed or transferred to the native courts to be adjudicated by native jurists and legal 
professionals (Roberts and Mann 1991). Instead, Japanese judges were three times more likely 
than Korean judges to discuss and rule upon Korean customs. With a handful of elite Japanese 
judges interpreting Korean native customs (M. S. Kim 2009), the native lawyers lacked authority 
to assess these customs. 
A third distinctive feature of lawyers in colonial Korea lay in the fact that the lawyers--
despite their ethnicity and various qualifications--were equally entitled to practice law within the 
jurisdictional boundary of the colonial government. The qualifications of the lawyers varied 
depending on where they had obtained their license. In addition to dividing their legal 
jurisdiction between metropole Japan and colonial Korea, the colonial government created two 
avenues for becoming a practicing lawyer: the judiciary and the bar. The judicial officials 
(judges and prosecutors) of the colonial judiciary became eligible to practice law after 
resigning/retiring from their former posts. The colonial judicial officials also became divided 
into two groups: those who had migrated to Korea from Japan after passing the qualifying 
examinations or graduating from imperial universities and those who had been recruited under 
special criteria to fill in the court vacancies in colonial Korea. In addition to the successful 
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candidates of the two bar exams, lawyers who had already practiced law before colonization 
were entitled to practice law in colonial Korea. Further adding to the diverse backgrounds of the 
practicing lawyers in colonial Korea was their ethnicity. According to an ordinance on lawyers in 
colonial Korea promulgated in 1912, all lawyers in Korea had to register in one of the eight bar 
associations that were located in the local courts of eight cities. Seoul lawyers, who comprised 
about one third of the practicing lawyers in the country, were divided into the two Japanese and 
Korean associations.  
Fourth and last, the large transnational mobility of legal professionals from Japan to 
Korea, which was enabled by the geographical proximity of the two countries, characterized the 
lawyers in colonial Korea. Covering the 700 miles from Tokyo to Seoul by ship took about three 
days in the 1920s. The port in Pusan, which served as the main gateway for Japanese migrants to 
Korea, was only 130 miles from Fukuoka in Kyushu. Within less than 40 years of colonial period, 
Japanese companies and colonial government offices sponsored the migration of more than one 
million Japanese and their families to colonial Korea. The geographical proximity of the two 
countries also facilitated the study abroad of Korean students in Japan. Before the colonial 
authority’s resumption of the Korean bar exam in 1922, passing the Japanese bar exam was one 
of the two routes to practicing law in colonial Korea. Therefore, studying abroad in Japan in 
order to become an official of the colonial government remained popular even after 1922. The 
migration of Japanese and Korean lawyers who had passed their qualifying exams in Japan to 
colonial Korea not only added the complicating factors of ethnicity and qualifications to the 
Korean bar association’s membership but also made it difficult for the bar to forge a coherent 
stance against the colonial government or address issues of whether the colonial government 
should defer its judicial authority to the metropolitan government. Similar to traditional Chinese 
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and Japanese societies, Korea retained its civil laws as a subordinated element of the public-state 
law system. 
 
Korea’s Particularity 
In addition to the deviance of Japan as a colonial power, pre-colonial Korea―the 
Chosŏn-Korea dynasty (1392-1910), had no explicit body of written private law except for some 
provisions scattered across the state-penal codes. The Japanese colonial officials had to find the 
source of laws in order to regulate Koreans’ private relations. Of course, this did not mean that 
no legal codes regulated individual relations. However, the absence of custom or customary laws 
that could later evolve into codified civil laws in pre-colonial Korea often resulted in the 
misinterpretation of Korean customs and the creation of colonial customary laws in 
contemporary Korea (M. S. Kim 2009). In deciding cases, Japanese jurists and elite judicial 
officials had to struggle to make sense of Korean customs by drawing upon their personal 
understanding of these customs. In the absence of codified private laws, the Japanese judicial 
officials’ interpretations of the existing customs resulted in the over-representation of colonial 
judicial authority. Given their legal authority to enact laws through court rulings and decisions, 
the colonial judiciary and government often served as a quasi-Congress. 
The emergence of the legal profession came with the retreat of traditional state structures 
and functions that had subjugated the judiciary under the general administration. This resulted in 
limited expertise and jurisdiction for the legal profession until the state structures became 
dissolved. Compared to another major Japanese colony—Taiwan (Wang 2001)—another 
particularity of the Korean nation was its people’s sharp ethnic and national consciousness. 
Although the nation-state imaginary of Koreans did not emerge until various colonial 
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encroachments in the late 1890s (Schmid 2002), the country maintained its status as a distinctive 
unit with exclusive jurisdiction over its populace for more than five centuries. This 
distinctiveness was supported by its own bureaucracy and legal institutions based on state-penal 
codes. Ironically, with the intrusion of Japanese colonizers into Korea, lawyer also began to 
emerge as a nationalistic profession. Its emergence occurred in 1906, one year after the 
promulgation of the Lawyers Laws in Korea when the establishment of the Resident-General’s 
Office in Korea enabled the Japanese to engage in extensively internal affairs of Korea. Until 
1909, lawyers became a greater part of the system of litigations in Korea even as the Korean 
state continued to defer its judicial sovereignty to Japan. Following Japan’s annexation of Korea 
in 1910, the lawyers in pre-colonial Korea became fully integrated into the Japanese empire’s 
legal sphere, enabling judicial officials and lawyers from mainland Japan to work in Korea. 
However, the deferral of its legal authority to and its annexation by Japan did not mean that 
Japan and Korea enjoyed a perfect legal union. Rather, colonial Korea was governed by special 
ordinances and regulations which could supersede enacted laws by the Japanese Diet. These dual 
systems of jurisdiction characterized the legal systems of both Taiwan and Korea. Working 
within a different area of jurisdiction, judicial officials and lawyers with different qualifications 
were, therefore, produced in these two countries. In short, colonization had the contradictory 
effect of both enabling the rise of lawyers and the founding of a weak legal profession in Korea. 
 
Research Questions from the Legal Structures in Colonial Korea 
Japan’s deviation from the trajectory of Western colonial powers and Korea’s own 
historical particularity, therefore, produced a unique legal system in the world history of 
colonialism. The uniqueness of the Korean case, first of all, lies at the temporal radicalness in 
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implementing the attorney system. Although the attorney system was introduced in 1906 and 
Western courts throughout the Korean peninsula were established in 1909, the use of lawyer in 
the highest court became nearly taken for granted before colonization. Such drastic changes in 
the attorney and the legal systems raise questions of what the existing structures and cultural 
schemas did in time of the rapid transition. More specifically, why and how lawyering became 
institutionalized so rapidly in Korea where there had long been little socio-cultural root for 
lawyer and who or which social status group advanced to the legal profession. Second, Korea’s 
uniqueness also resides in the complex composition of the body of practicing lawyers. Few 
things differentiated the lawyers with qualifications from the metropole from those with 
qualifications from the colony insofar as both were able to practice law in colonial Korea. 
However, the profession, as a whole, failed to take a unified stance, as various institutional 
pathways were aligned to get the license of lawyering. Pertaining to the complexity of 
associational composition yet the equal treatments by the colonial state, I address a question of 
what the fragmented stances and/or attitudes of lawyers did in forming a professional identity 
vis-à-vis the colonial and the metropole states. Third, lawyer in colonial Korea is unique from 
other historical cases in that the lawyers were hardly accessible to producing and securing 
knowledge on native legal sources, as the colonial courts seized power to interpret them. Since 
Korea had maintained a very sophisticated public-state code system that had regulated the 
relations both among individuals and between government organizations until the early twentieth 
century, there were few experts on civil laws. Moreover, the Japanese colonizers, unlike Western 
colonizers, did not separate courts in Korea into secular and religious. While native customs and 
practices usually fell into the jurisdiction of native jurists and lawyers, it was the colonial 
judiciary that played the role of a quasi-Congress that codified indigenous customs through court 
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rulings. Given the circumstance, I ask what roles were assigned to the lawyers in the 
stratification of the legal professions.  
 
Research Design and Data 
 
Research Design 
Taking into account the Japan’s deviation from the trajectory of Western imperial powers 
and the particularity of Korea’s historical context, this dissertation is organized into two 
interrelated themes. One examines the effects of Japan’s colonial encroachment on colonial legal 
structures in Korea in order to explain why and how Korean lawyers arose as a profession in the 
early 1900s. Given that lawyers are a group of experts in law and litigation and their 
professionalization relies on how they secure expertise, build identity, and make a relationship 
with the state, I focus on the effects of Japan’s colonization on the legal system in Korea. Above, 
I noted how Chosŏn-Korea (1392-1910) carried out reforms from 1894-95 that brought into 
being Western-style courts and law schools. Even so, due to conservative reforms from 1897 to 
1905 which subordinated the judiciary to the absolute monarchy and his administration, these 
institutions became virtually ineffective. Japan’s efforts to create modern-yet-colonial courts 
created a “structural chasm” between the two cultural practices in Korea in the early 1900s. The 
notion of structural chasm refers, on the one hand, to the traditional views of court and practices 
of litigation and, on the other hand, to modernized litigation practices that remained reliant upon 
Japanese laws. In other words, the Japanese encroachment into the Korean legal system put into 
place a legal structure that operated with modernized procedures and professionalized legal 
experts. With the new legal structure introduced by the Japanese reliant upon different 
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operational logics, Korean subjects also needed agents to link them to the new courts and 
practices.  
This dissertation also focuses on the pattern of social mobility through the emergence of 
law as a prestigious occupation in the early twentieth century. In contrast to the relatively low 
social status of legal occupations in pre-colonial Korea, modern judicial officials and practicing 
lawyers started becoming promoted to prestigious positions. What factors account for such 
dramatic change in the status of legal occupations? Focusing on the regime changes brought 
about by the Japanese colonizer in 1905, this dissertation analyzes both the effects of the law 
education on the professionalization of the legal occupation and the backgrounds of early Korean 
lawyers who had registered from 1906 to 1910. 
The other theme explored by this dissertation is the discrepancy between the powerful 
position of individual lawyers and the disempowered position of bar associations. Although 
Japan’s colonial encroachment into Korea introduced the attorney system and contributed to the 
rise of lawyers as important actors within litigation procedures, the bar associations in colonial 
Korea remained largely inactive and silent. In contrast to the standard understanding of 
professionalization as a process in which a group of experts is authorized to produce a particular 
form of specialized knowledge and eventually organizes itself into a powerful association, the 
professionalization of lawyers in colonial Korea occurred in such a way that the bar associations 
remained nominal with little political and juristic leverage.  
To understand this discrepancy, this dissertation first examined the diverse backgrounds 
of the practicing lawyers shaped by the unequal relationship between the metropole and colony. 
Aside from an oppressive colonial state, the independent jurisdiction maintained by the colonial 
government produced practicing lawyers with different qualifications and ethnicity. This 
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dissertation also investigated the structural conditions in which the lawyers in colonial Korea 
were pushed to the periphery of the Japanese Empire’s jurisprudence and denied access to the 
production of legal knowledge. These two themes are complementary in the sense that each 
addresses the crucial dimensions of the rise and institutionalization of lawyers in the colony. 
 
Data 
The data analyzed for the present dissertation consists of two types. One type originates 
from archives both before and after the colonial period from 1906 to 1945. Prior to colonization, 
the Chosŏn-Korean government tried to establish Western-style judiciary and courts as a way to 
resist the wave of imperialism. Though a series of legislative efforts, the Korean government 
established courts and law schools, appointed judges and prosecutors, and set regulations on law 
examinations, etc. Examining official records including The Official Gazette of the Taehan 
Empire (1897-1910), The Diary of the Royal Secretariat, and The Resume of the Officials of the 
Taehan Empire enabled me to understand the historical context within which the rise of lawyers 
in Korea was situated. To trace the family backgrounds of the early lawyers and judicial officials, 
I also looked at the lists of national examination passers (Pangmok).  
In addition to the pre-colonization records, I also looked at archival data published during 
the colonial period. The primary source for identifying practicing lawyers in colonial Korea was 
The Official Gazette of the Colonial Government (j: Chousēn soutokufu kampou; k: Chosŏn 
ch’ongdokbu kwanbo). This official gazette (1910-1945) included detailed information of 
registered lawyers including their hometown (j: honseki; k: ponchŏk), registration site, a record 
of transfers and withdrawals and reasons for withdrawal (submitter’s request, disciplinary action, 
or death). Another important source of archival data was classified documents regarding lawyers 
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in colonial Korea (j: bengoshi kankeishoru; k: pyŏnhosa kwankyesŏryu). While most classified 
documents pertaining to the lawyers’ registration from 1927 through 1939 were available 
through the National Archives of Korea in a digitized form, some had to be requested through 
personal visits or letters. These classified documents contained personal information about the 
lawyers including their hometown, date of birth, qualification types, family registry, resumes and 
self-evaluation of their personality as well as inspection reports by local police officers and 
village heads. The classified documents were of two types: requests for registration with the 
colonial authority by neophyte lawyers and requests for transfer by the more established 
practitioners. 
Another important source of data came from The Official Gazette of the Colonial 
Government through which I reconstructed the profiles of all registered lawyers. With the aim of 
understanding how the colonial legal structures were shaped by the lawyers’ ethnicity and 
qualifications, I reconstructed the profiles of 814 registered lawyers including their name, 
ethnicity, qualification, education, in-office career, registration site, date of their transfer, 
registration and withdrawal, and other significant career moves. To verify the accuracy of my 
profiles, I compared them with the information gleaned from other secondary sources including 
the chronicles published by The Korean Bar Association and The Supreme Court of Korea. 
These chronicles included lists of registered lawyers and judicial officials from 1895 and 1906. 
These chronicles also contained a list of Korean lawyers registered under Japanese names.  
Biographies, autobiographies, alumni reflections, and government reports were also 
useful in cross-checking the accuracy and reliability of my data. In particular, I looked at The 
List of Pro-Japanese and Anti-National Collaborators published by The National Committee of 
Republic of Korea for Investigation into Pro-Japanese and Anti-National Collaborators and their 
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Behavior (Ch’inil panminchok chinsangkyumyŏng wiwŏnhoe) which contained detailed sections 
on judicial officials. Those who had passed The National Civil Service Examination or Bar 
Examination and reached high positions in Korea after independence also published biographies 
and autobiographies, which became another source of data. I examined these materials not only 
to check the demographic information, schools, and in-office careers of the lawyers but also to 
understand what inspired them to become judicial officials and lawyers. 
 
Scholarly Contributions 
 
In addressing the sharp discrepancy between the high prestige of lawyers as individual 
practitioners and their relative insignificance as a professional group, this dissertation pushes the 
boundaries of the three scholarships. First, it contributes to profession studies by linking it with 
historiographies of colony and empire. In contrast to the literature based on a set of specific 
assumptions, this research suggests that professionalization in the colony was and is a multi-
layered process in which the institutionalization of law schools, legal examinations, and the court 
system do not necessarily lead to a substantive change in the underlying logics, identity, or 
prioritization of the legal profession—all hallmarks of professionalization. Rather, the present 
study argues that professionalization depends on socio-legal conditions that differentiate and 
integrate its members. This dissertation also contributes to colonialism studies by delineating the 
colonial modernity of the attorney system. Demonstrating the ways in which the colonial rule has 
produced lawyers as powerful individuals while leaving the bar association relatively 
disempowered, this research draws attention to the unequal division of labor within knowledge 
production between the metropole and colony. In contrast to the scholarship on colonial 
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modernity that have highlighted the material and infrastructure developments within a colony 
(Shin and Robinson 1999), this research highlights how Korean subjects during the Japanese 
Empire became empowered as legal practitioners while being simultaneously deprived as 
knowledge producers. Finally, mirroring the thrust of recent transnational studies of the two 
Koreas and East Asia this study highlights the unequal interactions between the metropole and 
colony. In focusing on the formation of a transnational legal system, this study demands that 
careful attention be paid to the historical specificity of Korea and its reliance on Japanese 
colonial rule to build a hybridized attorney system. The legal profession can be considered one of 
the critical sites for social mobility in Korea in the early twentieth century. By synthesizing the 
diachronic and synchronic aspects of this transformation within the Korean attorney system, this 
study thus contributes to comparative studies of colonial legal systems. 
  
25 
CHAPTER 2: LAWYERS AS CULTURAL HOLES 
The Rise of Lawyers and the Fall of the State in Korea Circa 1895-1909 
 
 
Chapter Summary 
 
In this chapter, I argue that lawyers in Korea became professionals by playing the role of 
“cultural holes” during a period of political transformation from 1906 to 1909. By “cultural 
holes,” I mean exercising agency that arises from structural disparities and therefore gaining 
empowerments that originate from the brokerage role. After demonstrating the creation of a 
structural chasm between the traditional and the modern-yet-still-colonial legal systems during 
this transformation through archival research circa 1895 to 1909, I explain why lawyers, who did 
not become professionals until 1906, quickly became prominent through their role as cultural 
brokers who claimed both the need and legitimacy of legal knowledge. This study recommends 
the importance of understanding the rise of a profession in its proper historical context, drawing 
on the classical theses on professions. 
 
Introduction 
 
Andrew Abbott’s seminal work, “The System of Professions (1988),’ defines a 
profession as an occupational group with an exclusive control over the (re)production of 
knowledge vis-à-vis outsiders by applying its abstract knowledge to specific cases. Such 
ideological understanding of professions is useful for explaining how lawyers vanquish their 
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competitors to emerge as a profession, but leaves explored the processes by which their expertise 
is historically constituted and their exclusive jurisdiction shaped by non-professional entities 
(e.g., the state and the market). Addressing these missing elements is the more critical for 
explaining the constitution of legal professions, as the legitimacy of their expertise and its 
application to various legal domains stems from the historical configuration of the legal system 
(Rue 1986). Insofar as the bulk of the work of lawyers’ and judicial officials’ lies in the 
excavation and interpretation of abstract legal codes, their rise as a legal profession depends on 
several factors including 1) a legal system that carves a separate realm of law out of the general 
administration; 2) the codification of norms and customs into laws; and 3) the legalization and 
legitimization of legal knowledge. At issue then is not whether an occupational group is able to 
solve a problem faster and better than its competitors, but to understand the historical process 
that a problem becomes socially recognized under a certain legal system. In other words, the rise 
of lawyering as a profession is not simply a matter of the absence or presence of a certain 
occupation but the emergence of a legal system including, for instance, the proliferation of law 
schools and bar associations alongside the emergence of modern lawyers. 
Examining the emergence of lawyering as a profession in Korea at the turn of the 
twentieth century, however, confronts the irony of witnessing the collapse of traditional state 
functions precisely during the same period. One year after the proclamation of the Lawyers Law 
and the introduction of legal services in November 1905, three Koreans registered to the 
Ministry of Justice and started to practice law in 1906. By the end of the decade, lawyers stood 
as prominent experts in lawsuits. Their rapid rise marked a decisive step towards a Westernized 
legal system where professional judicial officials, independent of administration rule, presided 
over the property disputes of individuals within the courts. However, the rise of legal 
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professionals cannot be simply attributed to the series of legislative reforms that occurred 
between 1895 and 1905. Despite the reform of the legal institutions during this period, Korea 
maintained a legal system that was remarkably old-fashioned until 1905. In fact, it was not until 
the forcible intrusion of the Japanese colonial system into Korea in 1908 that the judiciary and 
courts in Korea experienced irreversible change. Certainly, while the years from 1906 through 
1909 witnessed the dramatic appearance of lawyers, they were also filled with many preliminary 
steps towards the full colonization of the country by Japan in 1910. In 1907, the Korean 
government revoked the absolute authority of the monarchy over the judiciary—a legal principle 
which it had been dedicated to from 1897 to 1905—preparing for the ceding of its judicial 
sovereignty, including the Ministry of Justice, the courts, and prison to Japan in 1909. Over the 
period from 1907 to 1909 for which the modern-yet-still-colonial courts started to be established 
throughout the Korean peninsula, Japanese judges ruled over private cases with Japanese civil 
laws in Japanese in Korean courts.  
Within this context, this chapter explores how Korean lawyers became radically 
integrated in the fabric of traditional Korean society through their role as “cultural holes” 
(Pachucki and Breiger 2010). In his pioneering work on “structural holes,” Ronald Burt refers to 
structural holes which connect two or more groups of actors otherwise disconnected and 
described advantages that originate from the controlling position (Burt 1992). Expending and 
complimenting structural holes, the notion of “cultural holes” highlights the roles of certain 
actors or groups of actors in connecting two or more structural practices or networks that would 
otherwise remain unconnected. They do so, however, by foregrounding the cultural 
contingencies and institutional logics of this “hole-building” or “functioning” which contrasts to 
the structural hole that implicitly assumes that the advantage is structurally and automatically 
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given to the node at the hole (Pachucki and Breiger 2010; Xiao and Tsui 2007; Podolny 2001). 
Rather, the cultural holes focus on the interactions between social structures and social agency, 
drawing on structural accounts in sociology and other social sciences. As structuralists have 
proposed, social structures consist of multiple sets of relations, practices, meanings, and 
networks that sometimes converge and merge (Sewell 1992; Bourdieu 2007; Sahlins 1985; Hays 
1994). Structural understanding does oppose a binary approach between structure and culture; 
which is typically stated that structures are fixed, stable, and durable, whereas cultures are 
malleable, unstable, and subjective, but proposes that social structure can be viewed as consisting 
of two central interconnected elements: systems of social relations and systems of meaning 
(Hays 1994; Sewell 1999).  
Such structural accounts are particularly useful in understanding legal structures within 
colonial contexts. Legal historiographies of colonies have envisioned colonization as a 
transformative process that hierarchically rearranges existing legal orders by integrating native 
laws into a stratified imperial order as a servient legal source (Benton 1999; Merry 1999; 
Likhovski 2006; Cohn 1996). In addition to differentiating between “dominant and servient laws” 
(Hooker 1975: 4), the colonial legal structure usually consisted of two courts: the state-official 
courts that primarily dealt with secular cases and native courts that mostly covered cases 
involving religious or customary laws (Christelow 1982). As revealed in Hoffman’s comparative 
study of French rule in Morocco in the 1930s (Hoffman 2010), customary laws were regarded as 
a residual in the sense that “[they] consisted of what remained after colonial powers fretted out 
(852).”  
Such dual judicial structure in the colony can be viewed as originating in the nature of the 
colonial state. In addition to an understanding that colonization meant the monopolization of 
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physical forces by external conquerors, the colonial state creates political, economic, social, and 
cultural gulfs within the colony between the colonized and the colonizer through the “rule of 
colonial difference” (Chatterjee 1993: 17). In doing so, the colonial state reproduces a system of 
differentiation and inequality among the very people that it incorporates (Cooper 2005). Similar 
to the functioning of the normative state (Scott 1999), the colonial state and its system of 
administrators abstract social relations from their local circumstances and remap them onto a 
standardized grid. Among the many projects administered by the colonial state along these 
standardized grids in order to govern were sanitation and medicine as well as urban planning 
(Henry 2005; Cohn 1996; Manderson 2002; Arnold 1993). While a central feature of colonial 
rule and its many projects was the knowledge of the colonized (Said 1978; Steinmetz 2008; 
Steinmetz 2003), this knowledge was always incomplete at best and downright wrong at worst. 
As Hoover Wilson has proposed (2013), the organizational forms of the colonial states and their 
rulers were always built on the limited knowledge and understanding of the colonizer, 
necessitating the role of a cultural mediator who works as an interpreter between the colonizer 
and colonized (Lo 2002; Sharafi 2007). To rephrase the colonial state in regard of the structural 
accounts, the colonial state is comprised of different networks of meanings Harrison White (1992, 
315) or an island of meanings Eviatar Zerubavel (1991) between the colonizer and the colonized. 
In other words, the colonial state can be defined a state of governance that seizes physical 
coercion through implementing modern institutions but seeks cultural and symbolic power by 
developing discourses of differentiation and integration. 
These structural and cultural conditions in the colony elevates the lawyers to their 
cultural interpreter position. Colonization served as an impetus to change to a new legal system 
that necessitated the legal profession. Structural conditions and individual agency presume each 
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other (Sewell 1992). If no structural and cultural opportunities were available to the lawyers, 
they would have had few chances to demonstrate their legal prowess. Likewise, if they held no 
expertise appropriate for such structural and cultural change, the opportunities would have been 
useless. Therefore, the particular arrangement of structural and cultural opportunities arranged by 
the colonization facilitates the legal profession and experts in law to rise.  
In the meantime, the literature in the study of professions has highlighted the importance 
of expertise and jurisdiction for a profession to secure their jurisdiction against external 
competitors and social institutions. However, the literature has not paid attention to the process 
in which the expertise is historically and socially (re)constructed. The negligence to the historical 
reconfiguration of the expertise is critically important to study legal professions in the non-
Western context, because colonization marginalized, replaced, or even destroyed the indigenous 
legal system that had served as a foundation of the expertise before the advent of Western 
lawyers. In explaining the rise of legal professions in most colonies, it is imperative to 
investigate the historical juncture that changed the legal systems. 
Drawing on the notion of cultural holes to explain the surge in the number of lawyers in 
Korea in the early 1900s, I explain how cultural holes enabled the legal profession’s knowledge 
of law to be significant and granted lawyers an exclusive control over litigations. At the turn of 
the 20th century, the legal system of Korea barely recognized nor allowed the expertise of 
lawyers to prevail within its jurisdiction because it had long maintained the state-penal codes 
used occasionally to rule private litigations. The lack of civil codes regulating individual 
relations and contracts hindered the rise of experts proficient in in interpreting civil codes. 
Ironically, the legal profession was established as the Japanese colonizers usurped the judicial 
sovereignty of Korea in the late 1900s. During this period, with the recognition of lawyers’ 
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knowledge of modern law, the legal profession gained exclusive control over application in 
lawsuits, because the traditional state’s judicial functions were dissolved and replaced with the 
colonial judiciary.  
 
A Brief Description on the Legal System in Korea before 1905 
 
The Traditional System before 1895 
The legal systems of Northeast Asian countries (China, Japan, and Korea) were less 
favorable than European countries for private practitioners to conduct lawsuits on behalf of their 
clients. In European countries, the sources of civil codes had existed independently of the state-
penal codes until the sixteenth century and the collection of legal sources and their codification 
into a system of unified state codes was, therefore, one of the main tasks of building a modern 
nation-state. Customary laws, which evolved from customs scattered across regions, went 
through processes of enactments by the state and judiciary. In contrast, the legal systems in 
Northeast Asia, which were dominated by a highly centralized bureaucracy armed with 
sophisticated state-penal codes, subordinated civil code elements into penal codes. Although the 
Chinese state took the cases filed in courts very seriously and private lawsuits were adjudicated 
by the court (Huang 1998), lawsuits among individuals depended on stipulated state-penal codes, 
social customs, or the understanding of local magistrates. Local customs had remained an 
uncodified behavioral guide among individuals but had hardly been legally enforceable. Instead, 
the local magistrate’s understanding of a case, chori (naturalis ratio), was much more important 
than the customs. Moreover, civil matters such as relations among individuals were easily 
transposed into public/penal matters punished by state codes since there was little distinction 
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between civil and criminal cases. While existing customs evolved into laws or legal sources in 
France, there was no such transformation of customs into customary laws in Chosŏn-Korea 
(1392-1910).  
In Chosŏn Korea, the Grand Codes of the State Governance (Kyŏngguk taechŏn) were 
proclaimed in the 15th century based both on earlier national codes (Kyŏngche yukchŏn) passed 
in 1397 and the Great Ming codes. While Korea’s bureaucracy had maintained judicial 
organizations to handle judicial affairs, the judiciary existed as part of the main administrative 
body of the central and local governments. In the bureaucratic structures of Chosŏn-Korea, 
judicial affairs were conducted by multiple agencies including Hyŏngjo (the Board of 
Punishment), Ŭgŭmbu (the Royal Tribunal), Sahŏnbu (the Censorate), and Hansŏngbu (the 
Bureau of Seoul). Aside from these central offices, local magistrates ranging from Hyŏn (village 
or town), the lowest local administrative unit, to To (Province), the highest local unit, exercised 
their judicial authority over their respective jurisdiction. Since adjudication was considered part 
of administration, it was taken for granted that magistrates ruled over both civil and criminal 
cases. 
Many governmental agencies exercised judicial power but the majority of officials in 
charge of these agencies were not legal experts. From Hyŏngjo of the central government to 
Hyŏn in villages, most officials at higher posts were recruited from the yangban literati-
aristocrats who had passed the national civil or military exam. Officials who specialized in law, 
called yulkwan, came from the successful candidates of the technical exam that covered multiple 
branches of knowledge including foreign language, medicine, astronomy, accounting, painting, 
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and law.7 After passing the national exam, the yulkwan officials were primarily assigned to 
several sub-departments of Hyŏngjo before being reassigned to other agencies as needed (To 
2014). Although yulkwan officials specialized in law and its interpretation, their positions were 
limited to mid-low ranking ones with limited room for promotion within the bureaucracy. In 
other words, they received limited social respect. In the bureaucracy, their promotion was limited 
to the lower echelon (12th out of 18 ranks) even though they had passed the national exam 
alongside other successful candidates (N. Yi 1999). Even within the Chapkwa exam passers, law 
officials were more marginalized than interpreters or doctors. Although the successful candidates 
of the foreign language and medical exams were limited to the upper 3rd of the bureaucracy that 
consisted of 18 ranks (the fifth out of the 18 ranks), the monarchy and the aristocrats occasionally 
recognized the distinguished achievements of some officials by promoting them to the highest 
rank in the bureaucracy. 
Social respect given to private agents was almost negligible. The activities of private 
agents or deputy-representatives in litigations had been illegalized from the mid sixteenth 
century. Agents specializing in litigation, called oijibu, existed as a counterpart of the 
Tokwanjibu (aka Changyewŏn) or chibu.8 Retired lower ranked officials of the agency, oijibu 
played the role of brokers linking litigants to lawsuits by assisting them to prepare documents to 
offices. But, their activities remained illegalized until 1895 under the Confucian belief that 
litigations unnecessarily stirred up social disharmony (Cho 2002). 
Laws were not a source of arbitration to be publicized among the people nor a medium to 
regulate their individual relations, but a source of instrumental instruction for officials involved 
                                                 
7 Two officials of these organizations were recruited from national exams. One was the yangban, the Confucian 
literati armed with Confucian learning, who passed Munkwa (the National Civil Service Exam), whilst the other was 
the chungin technocrats specializing in law who passed Chapkwa (the National Technical Exam). 
8 Oijibu means outside of chibu in Korean. Chibu referred to Changyewŏn, an organ that handled the registry of 
slaves. 
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in judicial functions. Originally, the Korean legal system, which had adopted and modified the 
Chinese system, did not separate the civil and criminal codes. The confessions of accused were 
regarded as an important piece of evidence not because they served as proof of the crime but 
because they represented the criminal’s self-conscience for guilt (Moon 2010). Not only were 
lawsuits ideologically discouraged but the lack of a clear distinction between the civil and the 
penal codes also blurred the distinction between private lawsuits and criminal ones so that the 
former was often judged as part of the latter. Private debt issues were often transposed into a 
crime that was accompanied by corporeal punishment or imprisonment. Since there were few 
civil code elements and violations of individual relations were punished by the criminal codes, 
the learning and teaching law became limited to a few officials in the local or central 
governments. In a civil lawsuit during the Chosŏn period, the plaintiff and the accused physically 
appeared in front of a district magistrate who held both administrative and juridical power in his 
hand. As in a criminal lawsuit, the dependent had no right to an advocate (Lee 1999). 
Under the traditional Korean legal system, the expertise of legal professions lacked social 
recognition in either the public or private sector. Despite their important knowledge of law, 
judicial officials remained at the periphery of bureaucracy. Both the absence of civil codes and 
the lack of institutions to teach and train legal experts discouraged the rise of lawyers in Korea. 
Given the state of the legal system, it was difficult to expect the rise of legal professionals armed 
with legal knowledge who could enjoy exclusive rights over litigation. 
 
Legislative Efforts and Reforms on the Legal System in 1895-96 
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The legislative efforts and reforms for the judiciary and courts between 1895 and 1896 
occurred in two directions.9 On the one hand, the Korean government established two Western-
style courts in Seoul by promulgating the first Court Constitution Laws (CCL) in 1895. The 1895 
CCL stipulated five kinds of courts: the Court of Seoul (Hansŏng chaep’anso), the Local Courts 
(Chibang chaep’anso), the Circuit Court (Sunhoe chaep’anso), the Special Court (T’ŭkbyŏl 
chaep’anso), and the Higher Court (Kodŭng chaep’anso).10 Although the Korean government 
allowed the local magistrates to occupy the position of judicial official in the Local courts for a 
while, it soon established the Court of Seoul and the High Court in Seoul, both of which began to 
recruit new judges and prosecutors in greater numbers. One significant recommendation of the 
1895 CCL was that the two kinds of modern-style courts—the Court of Seoul and the Higher 
Court—be separated from the administration (P. Park 1974). Along with the promulgation of 
CCL, the Codes on Procedures for Civil and Criminal Lawsuits (Minhyŏngsosong kyuchŏng) 
were also proclaimed on April 29th, 1895. Dividing civil cases from criminal ones, these codes 
enacted 25 articles for civil cases and 19 articles for criminal ones. The regulations allowed 
litigants to hire agents in litigation if necessary, by legalizing the participation of private agents 
in lawsuit that had been banned since the mid-sixteenth century. As a result of these legislative 
efforts between 1895 and 96, two types of agents (taeŏnin and taesŏin) started to provide their 
clients with services for both oral representation (taeŏnin) and the preparation and filing of court 
documents (taesŏin). 
The other direction of reforms lay with legal education. The Korean government 
established a state-run school to train judges and prosecutors. Paralleled with the establishment 
of the new courts in 1895, the Jurist Training School (K: Pŏpkwan yangsŏngso) opened its doors 
                                                 
9 Chosŏn-Korea’s self-reliant reforms began in 1894. However, the reforms on the judicial system began in 1895. 
10 Although the 1895 CCL declared that the government shall establish the Circuit Court and the Special Court in 
sooner future, both courts hardly operated. 
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in Seoul in April 1895. According to class schedule published in 1895, three Japanese instructors 
taught civil law, civil law procedures, and criminal law on top of traditional law from 10:00 AM 
to 2:00 PM every weekday (The Centennial History of Law School of Seoul University). Since 
the school’s goal was to produce judicial officials in a relatively short period of six to even three 
months, the school produced its first graduates in the following year. In addition to training 
judicial officials at the national institute, the Korean government also strived to produce them by 
sending a group of students to law schools in Japan. As a part of a study abroad program to Japan, 
about a dozen students studied law and returned to Korea between 1900 and 1904. 
The Kwangmu Conservative Reforms from 1897 to 1905 
Despite these legislative reforms of the legal system, the outcomes were less fruitful than 
expected. The reforms in 1895-96 were fragile in the sense that the key figures of the cabinet 
who propelled the reforms were too politically dependent on Japan. Neither was the Korean 
monarchy supportive of the reforms designed for a constitutional monarchy that challenged his 
authority. Various domestic and international political events such as the assassination of Queen 
Min in 1895, the subsequent fleeing of the Korean monarchy to Russian embassy in 1896, and 
international relations around Korea and China contributed to the collapse of the pro-Japanese 
cabinet in 18u96 and left Korea in a political vacuum until 1905 when the Japanese colonizers 
made the country its protectorate. The King of Chosŏn-Korea employed this short term of peace 
to reinforce his power and authority and to secure national independence. The so-called 
Kwangmu Reforms from 1895 to 1905 declared his absolute power by nullifying the outcomes of 
reforms made between 1895-96 (To 2014). With a declaration of the empire’s independence in 
1897, the Korean Emperor, first of all, nullified the division between adjudication and 
administration by reinstating the courts under the supervision of the administration in 1899. The 
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Court of Seoul and the Higher Court became affiliated with the Bureau of Seoul and the Ministry 
of Justice respectively. With the chief and the vice-chief of the Bureau of Seoul (Hansŏngbu 
P’anyun and Hansŏngbu Soyun) concurrently holding the positions of both the chief judge and 
one of the two judgeships of the Court of Seoul, plans to produce an independent and specialized 
corps of judicial officials were also cancelled. The chief justice of P’yŏngriwŏn was occasionally 
appointed from the position of either the Minister of Justice of Vice-Minister of Justice until 
1904.11 The Jurist Training School closed in 1897 after producing only two cohorts of about 80 
graduates. While ten graduates were appointed to the Ministry of Justice and the new courts, the 
rest became assigned to unrelated departments or disappeared from the government offices. 
Even though the reforms in 1895-96 had divided the judiciary from the administration, 
most intellectuals in Korea of both conservative and progressive backgrounds encouraged the 
close monitoring of the courts by the Ministry of Justice. Conservative officials, in particular, 
believed that the division of administration and judiciary to be inefficient and ineffective. In 
1898, Yi Yuin, the Minister of Justice, sent a petition to the King insisting that the judiciary be 
integrated into the administration in order to make the fulfillment of judicial duties more 
efficient.12 Such conservative understanding towards the status of the judiciary converged with 
the King’s desire to strengthen his authority vis-à-vis international powers and domestic 
aristocrats. Even the strong critics of absolute monarchism, the Independent Society (Toknip 
Hyŏphoe), did not believe the establishment of an independent judiciary to be an urgent task. 
                                                 
11 1904.1.11 (a memorial of Yi Kŭnmyŏng: the Prime Ministry of Korea in 1904; The Daily Records of the Royal 
Secretariats) 
12 In my opinion, the trials of Kyŏnggi Province should be placed under the jurisdiction of the governor and the trials 
of Seoul be placed under the jurisdiction of the chief insofar as both positions should be established and not 
dissolved. If the work related to the two courts is important and therefore should be expanded and not shrunk, the 
governor and the chief should exercise their jurisdiction in the courts (January 26, 1898, The Diary of the Royal 
Secretariat). 
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Rather, the society insisted that the judiciary should be monitored and censored not by the 
monarchy but by the administrative government (The Independence, November 6, 1897). 
During the Kwangmu period, the appointments of judicial officials were by and large 
unstable as the absolute monarchy became deeply involved in the personnel management of 
judicial officials. The traditional qualifying system of judicial officials was replaced by 
whimsical criteria in favor of the monarchy. According to the Codes Regarding Appointments of 
Military and Judicial Officers promulgated on April 27, 1900, judicial officials were to be 
selected from law school graduates who had passed the jurist examination administered by the 
Ministry of Justice or from those candidates who were thought to have a mastery of judicial 
affairs even though they did not have a law school diploma (The Collections of Modern Laws 
and Acts in Late Chosŏn-Korea: Hanmal kŭndae pŏpryŏng charyochip). However, the real intent 
of such measures was to recruit those royal to the king to the judiciary positions. In particular, 
given the closing of the Jurist Training School in 1896, these measures contradicted efforts to 
elect officials familiar with modern laws. On the contrary, the positions of judicial officials were 
filled by traditional literati, the monarchy’s close associates, or those who had worked in the 
Board of Punishment before the 1895 reforms. The monarchy wished to keep the judiciary under 
his direct control as his predecessors had done with the Royal Tribunal. Thus, the chief judges of 
the Court of Seoul and the Higher Court (later renamed to P’yŏngriwŏn in 1899, the Court of 
Cassation) were appointed from his first-aides although other judges and prosecutors were 
recruited from the internal pool of judicial officials. Of the eighteen chief judges in the two new 
courts over the Kwangmu period, no one was promoted from ordinary judgeship. Instead, all 
came from different departments or bureaus within the bureaucracy. In contrast to his belief in 
the first-aides, the Korean emperor was suspicious of the study abroad students in Japan 
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believing them to be potential instigators of political coups. Some of the study abroad students 
did become involved in coup attempts against the Emperor at the turn of the twentieth century. 
Consequently, few became appointed to office upon their return. Moreover, the ministers and 
officials of the Korean government not only shared this distrust of the returning students but also 
doubted their ability to properly rule Korean cases after having been schooled in Japanese law 
(Sichŏng kaesŏn hyŏpŭihoi Dialogue November 11, 1906). 
Whereas the laws and regulations of Chosŏn Korea gestured toward a Western-style 
judicial system, the actual operations relied heavily on traditional customs. Although the Jurist 
Training School reopened in April 1903, it taught traditional laws to the students.13 The 
promulgation of the Great Criminal Codes (Hyŏngpŏp taechŏn) in April 1905 exemplified the 
government’s aims of incorporating Western laws into traditional legal codes. The Codes, 
however, were simply a compilation of every possible crime and its corresponding punishment. 
Nowhere in the Codes were the rights of individual subjects defined; the Western laws appeared 
in the Codes to supplement the traditional codes (The Sourcebook of Modern Laws and Acts in 
Late Chosŏn-Korea: Hanmal kŭndae pŏpryŏng charyochip). 
While the monarchy and government were very much concerned with reforming the 
public sector of the legal system; even if it was not to establish an independent judiciary, they 
paid little attention to reforming the legal institutions within the private sector. The Korean 
government was aware of what lawyers did. Just like newspapers and intellectuals in the West 
had introduced the legal institutions to the public, the Korean people were exposed to the 
Western-style attorney system as early as the 1880s (Daily Hansŏng; Hansŏng sunbo 1884). 
Instead, they considered the legalization and regulation of native legal agents (taeŏnin or taesŏin) 
                                                 
13 A 1903 report by the Ministry of Justice asked the King to reprint and distribute the Great Ming Code to the 
students of the Jurist Training School as the remaining volumes of the Codes at the Ministry of Justice were 
insufficient to educate them (August 3, 1903, The Diary of the Royal Secretariat). 
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to be enough. The Ministry of Justice issued an executive ordinance regulating these agents on 
September 4, 1897 (The Sourcebook of Modern Statuary Laws at Late Chosŏn-Korea; hanmal 
geundae bŏpryung charyojip). Although their roles looked similar to those of lawyers in that 
they engaged in part of the litigation, the majority of taesŏin or taeŏnin did not have legal 
expertise; instead, they helped the litigants to prepare and file legal documents or spoke on their 
behalf in the court. Their legalization did not improve the quality of litigation but, on the 
contrary, caused myriad problems and inconveniences for the litigants including the 
overcharging of litigants for filing court documents (The Imperial Gazette 1897).  
Even as late as 1905, the legal system of Korea still remained in the traditional sphere. 
While the political orientation of Korea at the turn of the twentieth century subordinated the 
judiciary within the administration just like the traditional legal system, the reforms stressed a 
retrospective reconstruction of a monarchy with an absolute control over the legislative, 
administrative, and judicial powers. Given such conservative orientations of the Kwangmu 
reforms, it is not surprising that few attempts were made to investigate the local customs and 
norms in order to promulgate the civil codes.14 Whereas the Great Code of Penal Laws was 
declared in 1905, the codification of civil laws through investigating and collecting indigenous 
customs was postponed. Admittedly, the Korean government organized as a belated attempt the 
Committee for Investigating Customs and Enacting Civil Laws in July 1905. 
In short, the reforms failed to bring about an independent judiciary and the promulgation 
of civil codes. Although some reforms were made, few policies or enactments paid attention to 
the private sector, including the introduction of the attorney system, but rather simply used old 
                                                 
14 Ironically, the establishment of Korea’s civil codes through investigating indigenous customs was fulfilled by the 
Japanese colonizers as a course of colonization in 1907-09 years. However, the trial to establish Korea’s 
independent civil codes in Korea from Japan was discarded as Japan annexed Korea under its direct rule (Y. Yi 
2011). 
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measures to regulate private relations. Expertise of law was hardly recognized in the private 
sphere of law in Korea. The Korean government was either unable or unwilling to create an 
independent judiciary. This not only meant engaging in organizational reform but more 
fundamentally creating a field of jurisdiction for lawyers. In fact, the Korean government 
possessed few resources and even less will to enact the civil codes. Rather, the government 
focused its attention on promulgating public codes that incorporated both traditional and new 
elements of laws in 1905. Since there were no laws or regulations that defined their roles or 
demanded their expertise, Korean subjects proceeded to litigation without a lawyer or, at best, a 
non-lawyer agent. Up until November 1905 when the first Lawyers Law was promulgated in 
Korea, the Korean government took few actions to institutionalize an attorney system. On the 
contrary, the Korean government believed that regulating non-lawyer agents, called taesŏin (or 
taesŏŏpcha), was enough to regulate the transactions among Koreans and between Koreans and 
foreigners, which had dramatically increased at the turn of the twentieth century. It is significant 
that the lawyers’ law was enacted in November 1905 when the Japanese colonizers, who 
believed in the critical importance of lawyers for the purchase of land in Korea by the Japanese 
settlers, were about to take over Korea’s diplomatic sovereignty. 
 
The Co-existence of Two Legal Structures as a Result of Japan’s Encroachment 
 
In-Between: the Appearance of First Lawyers in 1906-07 
Two events in late 1905 are particularly noteworthy for bringing new legal system into 
Korea. One was the enactment of the First Lawyers Law on November 8th, 1905 from such 
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transitional environment (November 8, 1905 Law No. 5).15 Of its many articles, the first and 
second articles are of particular interest in defining the roles and qualifications of lawyers.  
 
 Article 1. Lawyers act as an agent in litigation and exercise advocacy by procuring clients 
or the criminally accused.  
 Article 2. Lawyers, with the permission of the Ministry of Justice, should become 
qualified by satisfying one of the following conditions: 1) being a successful candidate of 
the Deliberate Selection Process of Judicial Official Committee or the Judicial 
Examination administered by the Committee; 2) being a successful candidate of the 
Korean Bar Examination; 3) being a Member of the Bar Examination Committee; or 4) 
being a retired Judge or Prosecutor of P’yŏnriwŏn (the Court of Cassation), or of the 
Court of Seoul, or Instructor of the Jurist Training School who has served for more than 
one and a half year. 
 
In Article 1, it states that lawyers should be understood as having a special authorization 
to exercise advocacy in criminal cases in addition to acting as an agent in litigation. In fact, the 
first Lawyers Law did not clearly distinguish practicing lawyers from indigenous taeŏnin agents 
in terms of being a deputy-agent in civil litigation. Rather, the feature entitling lawyers to act as 
defense for the criminally accused became magnified. While many non-lawyer agents played the 
role of an agent in a civil lawsuit before the enactment of the Lawyers Law, the role of advocacy 
in criminal lawsuits represented great progress and was a definitive feature of the new legal 
profession. In fact, in traditional Korea, defending criminals was strictly prohibited. Thus, the 
advocacy for criminals was a distinctive jurisdiction granted to lawyers from 1905 onwards. 
                                                 
15 It is unknown why the Lawyers Law was enacted in such a hurry in November 1905. In fact, 
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Newspaper advertisements by early Korean lawyers in the subsequent years illustrate this well. 
The first, second, and third conditions in Article 2 strictly limited the qualification of Korean 
lawyers. As of 1906, neither the Judicial Examination nor the Bar Examination were 
administered. The fourth condition was also committed to guaranteeing the quality of practicing 
lawyers by limiting the position to those who were judicial officials within modern-style 
courts—P’yŏngriwŏn and the Court of Seoul.  
Following the promulgation of the First Lawyers Law in 1905, Hong Chaeki became the 
first person in June 1906 to register with the Ministry of Justice as a lawyer and to practice law 
in Korea (The Imperial Gazette, July 3th, 1906). A few months later in August and November, 
Yi Myŏnu and Chŏng Myŏngsŏp respectively also obtained permission from the Ministry of 
Justice to practice law in Korea. The first Korean Bar Examination was also administered on 
June 24th, 1907 (Official Gazette No. 3809). The exam produced six lawyers out of twenty 
applicants. One year later in 1908, the second Korean Bar Examination was administered in 
Seoul, producing four successful candidates of twelve applicants. 
The other event, presumably even more important than the first one, was the appointment 
of Yi Myŏnu as the head of the Jurist Training School on December 11th, 1905. On one hand, his 
appointment represented the advancement of the study abroad students to Japan into the judiciary 
and the field of law in Korea. As aforementioned, Yu was one of the students who had studied 
law in Japan from 1895 and returned to Korea in 1900. However, he did not become employed 
by the Korean government until 1902 and then merely in a lower-mid rank (chusa) position in 
the Ministry of Agriculture. He finally entered the judiciary after his appointment as a 
probationary prosecutor in June 1904 by the Korean government. Two days after his 
appointment as the head of the school, he replaced all the instructors who had primarily taught 
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traditional laws with Hong Chaeki, Yu Munhwan, and other study abroad students from the 
1890s (the Diary of the Royal Secretariats, December 13th, 1905). The massive layoff of the old 
instructors and the appointment of new ones signaled the transformation of the Jurist Training 
School into an institute geared towards teaching Western and Japanese laws. The replacement 
accordingly, stirred up a conflict between the practitioners of old and new laws. Those study 
abroad students who had learned law in Japan refused to recognize the old laws or senior 
students who had had learned the traditional legal codes after entering the school in 1903 (The 
Daily Korea March 13th, 1906). In 1906, with the employment of study abroad students by the 
Korean government, there was a further shift from indigenous to a new legal system. 
With the introduction of the attorney system, law education started adopting a system of 
modern laws; nonetheless, these measures did not automatically guarantee the jurisdiction of 
lawyers over lawsuits. As a matter of fact, the occupational title, lawyer (K: pyŏnhosa), held a 
meaning that was closer to a qualifier than a noun in entitling the lawyers to exercise advocacy 
for the criminally accused. Article 1 of the Lawyers Law in 1905 continued to define the roles of 
a lawyer as taeŏn (oral representation) and pyŏnho (advocacy). This was a significant progress in 
the sense that the Korean government had not previously recognized advocacy for the criminally 
accused. However, the Lawyers Law did not inhibit the brokering of native agents’ in litigation 
nor differentiated lawyers from other non-lawyer agents. By 1907 there were many native agents, 
often called taeŏnin, who served as agents in their clients’ lawsuit. Until 1905, a taeŏnin was 
closer in meaning to a messenger serving his master (Kyuchanggak Document No. 27318). The 
taeŏnin could also be other family members, relatives, friends, or neighbors appointed on behalf 
of youth, elderly, or a woman who were unlikely to appear by themselves in the court. In other 
words, even after the promulgation of the Lawyers Law, the lawyers coexisted along with other 
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native agents in the field of litigation for years. In fact, most Koreans did not understand what 
lawyers did and how they differed from the existing taeŏnin agents promoting the lawyers to 
work towards differentiating themselves from these agents by adding an additional occupational 
category of an oral agent-lawyer (taeŏnin pyŏnhosa). 
Complicating matters even more, not just the authorities but even the clients occasionally 
looked down upon the lawyers. The authorities took for granted the use of corporal punishment 
to discipline lawyers. In 1906, the first Korean lawyer, Hong Chaeki, was accused of being 
impolite to a plaintiff’s wife. After the plaintiff charged him, the Ministry of Justice sentenced 
Hong with 80 lashes. With no penal codes for regulating such insulting behavior, however, the 
Ministry had to draw on codes in the Great Ming Codes that specified the punishment of such 
[ethically and morally] inappropriate behavior even without a specific statement (The Korea 
Daily December 29th, 1906). Moreover, the ruling of the judges in either Seoul or the local areas 
did not necessitate the advice of lawyers because most of the verdicts were not grounded in 
statuary laws but the judge’s reasoning. As a result, most Koreans did not feel any needs to hire a 
lawyer for litigation. Despite their vast knowledge of law, most clients failed to recognize the 
difference between the lawyers and their non-lawyer agent competitors. 
 
The Establishment of the Modern-Yet-Still-Colonial Judicial System in 1908 
While the Second Japan-Korea Treaty (K: Ŭlsa Choyak) made Korea into Japan’s 
protectorate in 1905, it was the Third Japan-Korea Treaty on July 24th, 1907 that fundamentally 
changed the legal system in Korea, even nullifying the reforms that had been made by the 
Japanese themselves within the previous eighteen months. Itō Hirobumi, the first Residency-
General in Korea, wanted Korea to be dependent on Japan but did not advocate an abrupt 
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colonization process for his earlier terms.16 Reforming the judicial system of Korea had two 
goals. One was to garner the support of the Korean people for Japanese rule by reforming the 
old-tyranny of the judiciary; the other was to abolish the extraterritorial rights imposed by other 
Western powers. Less interested in direct rule than in gradually expanding its influences over the 
peninsula, the Japanese colonizers began to reform the judicial system by appointing a dozen of 
Japanese legal advisors in the courts throughout the Korean peninsula in 1906. However, Itō’s 
first trial conducted within the new judicial system faced strong resistance from the Korean 
emperor and local magistrates who had been accustomed to exercising judicial power. While the 
nationalistic judicial officials were by no means supportive of the Japanese policies, the 
Righteous Army (Korean Guerrillas) arose to resist Japan’s intrusion into Korea. 
Following the sending of a secret delegation to Hague in the Netherlands by the Korean 
Emperor in June 1907 in order to plead for Korea’s liberation from Japan, the Third Treaty 
between Japan and Korea (K: Chŏngmi Choyak) resulted in the deposition of the Korean 
Emperor and the division of the judiciary from administration. The Japanese believed that the 
Korean Emperor and his loyalists in the judiciary were hindering the Residency Office-led 
reforms to the judicial system. To effect the new division and to secure the judiciary in the hand 
of the Japanese, more than four hundred Japanese judicial officials from mainland Japan were 
assigned to posts within the Ministry of Justice and its courts throughout the Korean peninsula. 
They included the highest posts such as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Chief 
Prosecutor of the Supreme Court, and the Vice Minister of Justice. Ending the Japanese Legal 
Advisor Policies for the Korean courts which the Japanese had introduced in 1906, the 1907 
                                                 
16 Itō intervened in extensive areas of Korea’s domestic affairs through bi-weekly meetings with the Ministers of the 
Korean cabinet, even though the Treaty limited his authority to diplomatic affairs. Ito was much concerned with 
rearranging the legal system of Korea and aggressively pushed for the reform of the court system in Korea, insisting 
that much of the underdevelopment of Chosŏn-Korea originated from a deficient court system and the unity of 
administration and adjudication. 
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Court Constitution Laws (CCL) reconstructed the Korean judiciary and courts into one within 
which the Japanese judicial officials, with the support of Korean officials, controlled the chief 
positions. Promulgated in 1906, Korea’s new court system consisted of four levels of courts with 
three trial structures. The new courts opened on August 1st, 1908—a full year after the signing of 
the Third Treaty and eight months after the promulgation of the Court Constitution Laws in 
December 1907. In addition to promoting these organizational changes, the CCL in 1907 
differed from its two earlier enactments in 1895 and 1899 in other substantive ways. In the first 
enactment of CCL in 1895, independent courts were established in Seoul but the courts in local 
areas were left intact. In 1899, the courts became a branch of the administrative organizations 
once again. In contrast, the CCL in 1907 clarified the separation of judicial power from the 
administration at every level of the courts and made judges and prosecutors to be separated from 
the local administrative officials. Before 1908, the magistrate of a county (kunsu) usually 
assumed the roles of both administrative and judicial officials, but now the magistrate’s role was 
only limited to administration. The supervisory role of the Ministry of Justice was either 
minimized or abolished. Before 1908, it was de facto the highest level of court as it presided over 
the cases filed with the organization. The Ministry of Justice had served as an organ in which the 
monarchy and the Minister frequently engaged. The CCL in 1907 declared that the Supreme 
Court is the highest court that finalized ruling and decisions. As of August 1908, however, all of 
the courts on the Korean peninsula were controlled by Japanese judicial officials. While about 35% 
of judges and 10% of prosecutors were Korean, none of them occupied a supervisory position. 
By 1909, the judicial power of local magistrates was delegated to the courts and the local 
magistrates remained administrative officials. On July 12th 1909, a memorandum pertaining to 
the administration of judicial affairs and prisons in Korea was signed, which included the 
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dissolution of the Ministry of Justice. Subsequently, Korean judicial courts and prisons were 
formally entrusted to Japan. The name change of the highest court from Taesimwŏn (the 
Supreme Court) to Kodŭng Pŏpwŏn (the High Court) implied that the courts in Korea would 
soon fall under the Japanese jurisdiction and never be equal to those in Japan.17 
 
Structural Chasm between New Courts and Old Practices 
Although such changes between 1908-09 expedited the ceding Korea’s judicial 
sovereignty to Japan and its colonization, they contingently concretized the lawyers’ expertise 
with their jurisdiction over litigation. They also have effected marginalizing the native agents in 
the courts. First of all, the imposition of the colonial court system on Korea caused changes in 
the verdicts. Even as late as 1907, most verdicts were grounded on traditional ways with the 
traditional judge usually listening to both the accuser and accused and making a ruling based on 
his own judgment. What mattered most in the assessment of a case was the judge’s reasoning of 
native norms and customs. With the changes, litigation procedures became more complicated 
than before. Not only was the language of the litigation documents and court proceedings in 
Japanese, the procedures were also based on Japanese laws. The number of articles also 
increased from 43 within the procedure laws in 1899 to 118 in 1907. Moreover, the enactment of 
the Regulations on Litigation Procedures in 1908 reinforced the jurisdiction of lawyers over the 
non-lawyer taeŏnin agents. The regulations that were promulgated on July 13th, 1908 stipulated 
the entrusting of a litigant with a lawyer or agent. In order to hire a non-lawyer agent for 
litigation, however, the litigant had to obtain the court’s permission. Finally, the official 
language used within the court proceedings and the filed documents changed from Korean to 
                                                 
17 The term pŏpwŏn refers to courts whose status was not stipulated by the Japanese Constitution in the Japanese 
empire. While courts in metropole Japan were generally called saibanso (chaep’anso in Korean), courts in the 
colonies, including Korea and Taiwan, were called houin (pŏpwŏn in Korean).  
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Japanese. Although the Korean government and the Japanese offices employed interpreters 
during litigation, the majority of them were not proficient enough in understanding legal jargons 
and terms. 
 
 
Figure 1 Institutionalized Use of Lawyers in Litigation at the High Court of Colonial Korea; Source: the collection of verdicts of 
Chosŏn Supreme Court 1905-1909, the collective of verdicts of the High Court of Colonial Korea 1911-1920, the profile of lawyers 
was collected by the author from the Official Gazette of Chosŏn and the Official Gazette of Governor-General Office Note: 
w/lawyer denotes cases in which either accuser or accused or both sides hired a lawyer in litigation; the cases in 1910 were 
missing. 
 
Figure 1 presents the use of lawyers in litigations filed at the highest level of court in 
Korea from 1905 to 1920 (the Supreme Court of Korea―P’yŏngriwŏn and Taesimwŏn―from 
1905 to 1909 and the High Court of Colonial Korea from 1909 to 1920). Three findings are 
intriguing. First, the use of agents for litigation at the highest courts started increasing from 1908 
and became dominant by the early 1910s. In 1906, in only two out of sixty two cases were 
lawyers appointed by the plaintiff or defendant (3%). In 1907, the number of litigations with a 
lawyer increased to nineteen out of sixty seven cases (28%). In the next two years from 1908-09, 
however, the number of litigations involving a lawyer rose to 62 out of 140 (44%) cases in 1908 
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and 42 out of 133 (34%) cases in 1909. Second, 1911—one year after the colonization of 
Korea—became an important year when the use of lawyers became a rule of thumb for litigants. 
Of the total of 57 cases dealt with by the High Court in 1911, lawyers were hired by the plaintiff 
or defendant in 47 cases (82%). For the following years until 1920, lawyers became an 
indispensable element for the winning of a case in the High Court of colonial Korea. In 1920, 
lawyers were hired in 78 of the 80 cases (98%) that were filed. Third, non-lawyer agents nearly 
disappeared in the 1910s. After the number of cases involving non-lawyer agents peaked in 1907 
at 21 out of 66 (19%) cases, their number shrank to only three cases in 1911. With litigants 
allowed to use non-lawyer agents only on special occasions, the agent came to reside primarily 
outside rather than inside the court.  
Detailed case illustrations can help us understand the changes in which type of agents 
were used between these two periods. By 1907, the use of non-lawyer agents in lawsuits at the 
highest court was not uncommon. In a verdict in 1907 (case No. 48 and No. 49, Kuhanmal 
minsachaep’an p’angyŏlchip: the Collections of Verdicts of the Supreme Court of Pre-colonial 
Korea), Chŏng Ch’angkyu played the role of a non-lawyer agent in the litigation. In another case, 
Chang Chuyŏng, exercised the role of the non-lawyer agent (Volume 42. Page 269). In another 
example, both the accused and the accuser hired non-lawyer agents in the same litigation. In a 
verdict on November 22, 1907 (Volume 45 No. 144). Even some non-lawyer agents seemed to 
play like a professional lawyer. For instance, Kim Ikche was a non-lawyer agent who appeared 
in various cases in 1907. He, on one hand, appeared on behalf of a Korean geisha (gisaeng), and 
also appeared in another case. 
However, the 1907 CCL profoundly changed the landscape by inviting Japanese judges 
and prosecutors to Korean courts. Japanese judges, in principle, needed to apply Korean laws to 
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individual cases; in reality, they relied on Japanese civil laws. A Japanese judge at the 
P’yŏngyang local court recalled how judges followed civil procedural rules but resorted to 
Japanese civil laws in substantive laws (Nam p. 49). The Japanese judges resorted to applying 
Japanese laws because there had few sources to refer to. Complicated litigation procedures and 
the implicit use of Japanese civil laws fueled the disappearance of non-lawyer agents in litigation 
from 1909. The imposition of the colonial court system also brought up the issue of translation 
and interpretation. With the majority of judicial officials and court clerks being Japanese, 
Japanese language proficiency became an asset among the majority of litigants who were Korean. 
In 1908-09, while the Japanese office and the Korean government eagerly recruited fluent 
Japanese speakers, the Korean officials and newspapers criticized these Japanese language-
oriented policies. The 1907 CCL drastically changed the status of both lawyers and non-lawyer 
agents as well. According to Article 63, while the status and rights of the lawyers were 
recognized by the court, those of the non-lawyer agents needed the court’s permission. The 1907 
CCL also changed the court environment in which Japanese became the official language. Even 
with the court interpreters, there were issues of language within the new courts presided over 
primarily by the Japanese judges. Given the general lack of judicial officials proficient in both 
law and the two languages, prowess in both was considered noteworthy.18 The majority of the 
first generation of Korean lawyers came from students who had been sponsored by the Korean 
government to study in Japan in the 1890s. 
 
                                                 
18 Thus some Korean judicial officials were recruited from those who spoke Japanese well even though they had 
little experience in the judiciary. Cho Wŏnkyu was one such case. Except for three months as a lower-mid rank 
official in the Ministry of Justice from December 1895 to March 1896 as his first appointment, Cho served mostly as 
a language interpreter for the Korean bureaucracy for more than ten years. Nonetheless, in December 1908, he was 
named a judge. Other cases included Yi Sŏnchong and Hong Sŭngkŭn. Both Yi and Hong had graduated from the 
public Japanese Language School in 1904 and entered the office as interpreter officials in P’yŏngriwŏn (The Court 
of Cassation) and The Ministry of Justice. Neither of them had any law school training in either Japan or Korea 
(Taehan cheguk kwanhŏn iryŏksŏ 1907; The Collections of Officials’ Resumes of the Taehan Empire 1907). 
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Lawyers as Cultural Holes 
 
Lawyers located themselves as cultural brokers within these structural arrangements. In 
concert with the establishment of colonial courts in Korea from 1908, the lawyers made efforts to 
create a forum in which they could express their expertise and claim jurisdiction. Alongside 
other jurists and law students, Korean lawyers organized the Society of Jurisprudence (Pŏphak 
hyŏphoe) in 1908. It is notable that the notion of legal right was introduced and employed by the 
society’s official journal (Pŏphakkye) published in 1908. In the journal, translating the concept 
of right into “Kwŏnri” into Korean, consisting of the two Chinese characters denoting authority 
(Kwŏn) and profit or interest (Ri), the lawyers claimed that individuals in an advanced or 
civilized society exercised their right by advocating for and protecting their own interests. 
 
The entire nation’s legal mind, in other words, is the nation’s legal right mind. If 
the legal right is lost then the soul of the laws becomes lost. And if the soul of 
the laws is lost, then the legal right is lost. […] In discussing why Anglo-Saxon 
nations have been dominant in the world, [I suggest it is] because they have an 
abundance of good legal minds. In order to obtain their legal right, they have 
been diligent. In order to dignify their legal right, they have been reckless. And 
in order to claim their legal right, they have been strenuous. […] Alas, we 
Koreans! Have we ever held exhibited the legal right mind? In order to cultivate 
our nation’s legal right mind, there is no other way but to raise its legal mind 
(Byŏn, Yŏngman, pp 11-12). 
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The author, Byŏn Yŏngman, considers the notions of right and legal right to be mutually 
complementary and recommends their cultivation among Koreans. Indeed, because both the 
concept of right and seeking one’s right through laws were novel for most Koreans, the pursuit 
of both right and legal right was considered a decisive break from the traditional legal system. 
Byŏn asserted that legal procedures and litigations were no longer considered activities that 
disturb social harmony but a process in which one’s right could be realized by citing  the case of 
the Anglo Saxon that their passion for and possession of the legal right mind was critical for their 
development and dominance in the world.  
The practicing lawyers thus positioned themselves as a cultural bridge for Koreans who 
were not accustomed to a Westernized litigation process within the colonial courts set up by the 
Japanese. It was not uncommon to observe the discomfort of Koreans with such a Westernized 
litigation process in advertisements from 1908-09.  
 
Despite living in an era when many new laws and regulations are being 
promulgated, many people are clearly ignorant of their meanings and thus are 
unable to protect themselves or their property. Resigning from his position as XX, 
Mr. Choe (Choe Chin) has thus devoted himself to interpreting the laws and 
representing the litigants (The Imperial Gazette August 27, 1908).  
 
Due to the complicated procedures, many members of the public are unable to 
properly handle their own litigation. Instead, they just spend a lot money and feel 
overwhelmed. In order to advocate for the people and protect their property, Mr. 
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Yu (Yu, Munhwan) has resigned from his office and opened a law office (The 
Imperial Gazette, October 23, 1908).  
 
In the same vein, the expulsion of a young lawyer, Hŏ Hŏn, from the list of lawyers in 
1908 because of his misdemeanor in the court drew the attention of the mass media. Hŏ had been 
one of the six successful candidates of the first Korean Bar Examination in 1907. He became 
expulsed from the list when he yelled at a judge whom he believed was negligent in listening to 
his client’s case. Hŏ was disciplined and expelled from the list of lawyers by the Ministry of 
Justice. However, one article in the Korea Daily celebrated Hŏ as a true advocate of litigators 
against the corrupt court and its judges (The Korea Daily, December 8, 1908).  
 
Chapter Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have argued that the cultural holes created by the implementation of the 
modern-yet-still-colonial legal system enabled Korean lawyers to promote their knowledge of 
law and claim exclusive control over litigation procedures. Exploiting both structural and 
cultural opportunities between 1908-09, these legal experts not only defeated their native agent 
rivals but also became prominent professionals of Westernized court procedures. Identifying the 
concept of right with that of legal right, the Korean lawyers underlined their roles as cultural 
bridges for their Korean clients within courts where the Japanese judicial officials ruled over 
cases in Japanese using Japanese laws. From 1909 onwards, it became nearly impossible to 
litigate in the highest courts without legal experts. This was a dramatic change in the turn-of-the 
twentieth-century-Korea where legal occupations had traditionally received little social 
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recognition or respect. Using the concept of cultural holes, I have highlighted how they 
advocated the importance of legal knowledge and litigation in resolving social disputes. 
Ironically, with Korea’s colonization, the rise of lawyers occurred in tandem with the 
collapse of the traditional state’s judicial functions. Before the first Lawyers Law was 
promulgated in Korea in November 1905, the Korean government had taken few steps to bring 
the attorney system to the country. The Korean government paid much attention to securing the 
judiciary as a vehicle for cementing monarchial power believing that its absolute manifestation 
was the only way to overcome the threats of imperialism during this era. The Court of Seoul and 
the Higher Court (the Court of Cassation after 1899), both of which were supposed to be filled 
by independent and modern judicial officials, remained in monarchial hands until 1907. On the 
contrary, the Korean government believed that it was enough to regulate the native agents, called 
taeŏnin and taesŏin, to regulate the transactions among Koreans and between Koreans and 
foreigners. Given the Korean government’s obsession with restoring the old orders from 1897 to 
1905, it is not surprising that the government did little to try to separate the private from the 
public sector. It was natural for most Korean rulers including the monarchy and his ministers to 
insist that the judiciary remain under the supervision of administrative officials and the private 
sector be monitored by the public sector. While the Great Codes of Penal Laws were proclaimed 
in 1905, no explicit attempts were made to promulgate civil codes that regulated individual 
relations. Insofar as lawyer’s expertise resides in knowledge of codified law and local customs 
that potentially convert into legal codes, the absence of codified civil laws prevented the 
emergence of lawyering as a profession. 
Lawyers emerged as a profession out of a sudden transition in power towards the 
Japanese colonizers who usurped the judicial sovereignty of Korea and implemented Western-
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style courts throughout the Korean peninsula. The Japanese colonizers were concerned from 
1906 with instituting an independent judiciary because they believed that it was an efficient way 
to expand and secure their influence over the country. The proclamation of the Court 
Constitution Law in 1907, the invitation of Japanese judicial officials to Korean courts, and the 
eventual usurpation of Korea’s judicial sovereignty by Japan generated a structural chasm in the 
sense that Japanese officials ruled over cases involving Koreans who were not familiar with legal 
procedures. Armed with their knowledge of modern law and its litigation procedures, the lawyers 
emerged as indispensable actors within the new courts within in a matter of few years. Not only 
did the lawyers and the jurists organize a forum in which they could promote their status but they 
also proactively positioned themselves as cultural mediators who linked the Korea public to the 
new court system. By 1909, the profession’s skillful maneuvering of the structural and cultural 
contingencies of the era made the use of lawyers a taken-for-granted fact at the highest level of 
court. 
Explaining the abrupt rise and consolidation of lawyers in Korea in the late 1900s in 
terms of structural and cultural contingencies, the present study suggests that legal professions, 
in particular, and professions, in general, craft and find their expertise and jurisdiction in 
structuration processes. Expertise—referring here to knowledge of Japanese Western law—had 
been undervalued until 1905. Japan’s colonial courts that resulted from Japan’s colonial intrusion 
in Korea, however, contributed to reassessing its value. Jurisdiction—referring to the exclusive 
application of this knowledge to litigation—was granted to lawyers as they were able to 
linguistically and juristically navigate the new courts but not to the native agents. In addition to 
navigating such structural features, the lawyers were nimble at filling in the gulf between the 
Japanese judges and their Korean subjects. Their roles as a cultural interpreter were appreciated 
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under the structures that placed them at the chasm as evidenced in articles and advertisements 
addressing that the individual right is protected through litigations and proper procedures. 
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CHAPTER 3: SOCIAL CLASS MOBILITY THROUGH LAWYER 
The Effects of State’s Symbolic Power on Social Class Mobility in Korea from 1895 to 1910  
 
 
Chapter Summary 
 
Given the political changes that eventually ended in the Japanese colonial occupation of 
Korea at the turn of the twentieth century, one intriguing question is how the regime change 
affected existing social status system and social class mobility. Judicial officials and private 
lawyers hailed from the members of the upper-middle classes, not only because they were 
materially affordable to law education but because they took for granted becoming a legal 
professional and being infused with existing symbolic capitals. Drawing on theories of state’s 
symbolic capitals, I argue in this chapter that it was relatively marginal literati groups entered 
legal professions because the ruling elites in pre-colonial Korea were ill-prepared to employ the 
symbolic capital of the professions during a period of radical regime change. By analyzing the 
effects of law education on the appointment of judicial officials and the backgrounds of early 
Korean lawyers registered from 1895 to 1909, I demonstrate that few families with the highest 
social prestige produced the legal professionals.  
 
Introduction 
 
Lawyer is a profession that relies on the state’s symbolic power. The profession and the 
state are interdependent with each other in the sense that the former’s rise occurred along with 
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political regime changes that replaced the legal system and the latter required the former to 
actively engage in shaping the political system. As Perkin (2001) points out, the advent of 
lawyers as a professional group in England in sixteenth century took place alongside the rise of 
the dominant middle-class ideology. In reverse, with political regime changes that provided the 
institutional contexts for the new professions, who or which social class advanced to the 
professions is determined. Abbott (1988) asserts that building a nation-state necessitated 
professions’ role. By positioning themselves as curers of the social pathologies of the nation, 
medical doctors were able to establish themselves as a profession in nineteenth century France 
(Goldstein 1984). In this sense, the politics matter for the legal professions not only because it 
consolidates the legal professions by creating institutional contexts (Halliday and Karpik 1997), 
but grants symbolic power on the professions’ role and status. 
Despite the plethora of studies on the relationship between the politics and legal 
professions, however, few have examined how the politics is related to the professions by state’s 
symbolic capital. It is state’s symbolic power that exerts control over the behaviors of the ruling 
class and legitimizes their actions to become a legal professional. State’s symbolic power, an 
exclusive power to constitute the given to be natural (Bourdieu 1991), enframes the legitimate 
schemas, practices, and world views. The monopolization of the symbolic power that judges 
good or bad and right or wrong knowledge affects the behaviors of the ruling class, because, as 
Philip Gorski (2003) points out, “states are pedagogical, corrective, and ideological organizations 
(165-166).” Julia Adams (1994) powerfully demonstrates that the state’s cultural system that 
state actors inhabit is integral for understanding how the actors think about the state and how 
they use the power through an analysis on the case of the Netherlands. Ruler’s cultural 
frameworks determine which policies to be administered. Julian Go (2008) proves that the 
60 
cultural project of the colonizers was central to their strategy of rule by a comparative analysis 
on the US colonizers’ tutelary interventions into local political culture between the Philippines 
and Puerto Rico. Specifically, radical political regime changes minimize or obsolete the 
opposition from existing factors that advocated traditional symbolic powers (Loveman 2005).  
Investigating the process by which the exercise of the symbolic power by the state shapes 
the significance of the professions counts, because it explains the social class mobility through 
legal professions. Professions turn to be a channel for social mobility after they became socially 
aspired. Their prestige and esteem that make them aspirant are not sui generis but constituted by 
social processes that recognized them. Historical studies have witnessed that in some places 
occupations in law existed one of prestigious and influential social classes (Bouwsma 1973; 
Amelang 1984), whereas in others their existence was insignificant or negligible. Lawyers and 
judges served as a main channel for social reproduction or upward mobility because of high 
social esteem, while they remained a secondary route due to the lack of social recognitions given 
to them.  
The rise of legal professions at the turn of twentieth century Korea provides a unique 
research site to test these theories in that social class mobility via the legal profession occurred 
alongside political regime changes. As we have already seen in Chapter 2, Japan’s colonial 
encroachment into Korea resulted in the establishment of a whole new set of professions 
including professional judges, prosecutors, and lawyers. Several waves of political change from 
absolute monarchism to semi-colonialism and then full colonialism facilitated the formation of 
prestigious legal professions independent of administration in the late 1900s, which had barely 
been imagined by the ruling elites in 1890s Korea. While the effect of regime changes upon the 
constitution of the legal professions as a new legal system has been well documented, less 
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explored has been its effects on social class mobility via the profession that started to rise to 
prestigious occupations. With the Korean monarchy continuing its conservative reforms as late 
as 1904, the king and his cabinet members maintained a hostile stance towards Western laws and 
their legal institutions. With a few exceptions, most judicial positions within the courts in both 
Seoul and local towns were filled by those with little expertise in Western laws. The students of 
modern law schools, on the other hand, usually landed a lower mid-ranked position in the 
bureaucracy after graduation. However, only a handful of the graduates were appointed to 
ordinary judicial officials until 1905. It was a radical regime change after 1906 that generated 
new opportunities for social mobility through law education and judicial examinations.  
Through an analysis of two things, I argue that the conservative reforms by the Korean 
monarchy that lasted until 1905 made the ruling elites ill-prepared to become legal professionals: 
1) the effects of Western law education and qualifying examinations on the process of becoming 
a judicial official and 2) the occupations/titles/ranks of the fathers of the early Korean lawyers 
who registered from 1906 to 1910. I collected the data from historical archives including The 
Official Gazette of the Taehan Empire (Taehanchekuk kwanbo), The Resumes of the Officials of 
the Taehan Empire (Taehanchekuk kwanwŏn iryŏksŏ), The Diary of the Royal Secretariat 
(Sŭngchŏngwŏn ilgi), and The Lists of Successful Candidates of the National Examinations from 
1864 to 1894 (Pangmok), newspapers from 1895 to 1909. Examining the organization of the 
judiciary within the bureaucracy from 1895 to 1909, I analyzed the effects of modern law 
education on the process of becoming a judicial official from 1895 to 1909, compared the career 
trajectories of two officials who had passed the civil service examination in 1905 and then the 
judicial service examination in 1906, and then analyzed the family backgrounds of the first 25 
Koreans who had registered as lawyers from 1906 to 1910. I found that even though reforms in 
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Korea at the turn of the twentieth century resulted in the establishment of Western-style courts, 
the traditional understanding to the judiciary not only survived but continued to reign among 
those who became judges and prosecutors. 
 
Legal Professions as a Symbolic Conduit for Social Class Mobility 
 
In two regards, becoming a professional is a behavior to enter already established cultural 
web in which the state designed and incorporated with existing social forces. On the one hand, 
becoming a professional means learning knowledge that institutionally accepted. On the other 
hand, it suggests that in doing so, professionals accept existing order of knowledge that are 
critically and directly related to the governance. In most Western/European countries, in fact, 
legal professions remained a social pathway to transfer one’s social status and fortune to 
offspring. Based on the assumption that every member of a society aspires to advance into a 
profession, the literature has also viewed professions as merely a conduit for social mobility or 
class reproduction. This assumption, however, needs to be modified in order to be applied to 
radical regime changes. Given the fact that the expertise of the professions and their application 
of this expertise within certain domains are a culturally contested process (Freidson 1986; Abbott 
1988; Liu 2013; Kellogg 2014), the rise of a profession as a cultural phenomenon must be 
accompanied by the reconfiguration of the dominant cultural schemas. An occupational group of 
experts becomes a profession when the view that their knowledge solves a set of problems faster 
and better than their competitors gains wide social legitimacy (Abbott 1986; Abbott 1988; Liu 
2013). Gaining this legitimacy is made within cultural schemas that outline a set of behavioral 
guidelines for social actors to make judgments about their actions (Biernacki 2005; Swidler 
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1986). For the case of the legal professions, the issue of legitimacy gets intensified due to their 
central role within state bureaucracy. The rise of the legal professions, on the one hand, 
represents a political regime change because their judicial functions and roles are closely tied to 
state governance. On the other hand, their rise also indicates cultural and ideological changes 
(Brint 1984; Perkin 2002). The different historical experiences of Anglo-Saxons from 
Continental European countries (with differences even between France and German) have 
shaped the diverse roles and features of judicial officials and practicing lawyers (Collins 1990). 
Examining the rise of English lawyers in the sixteenth century, Perkin (2002) asserts that it also 
meant the rise of a new political ideology. Asserting that the roles and expertise of lawyers who 
rose as a profession in Germany in the nineteenth century were determined by political structures,  
Rueschemeyer (1986) suggests that the historical development of a legal profession is heavily 
dependent on how a state and its governmental organizations interact within a particular society. 
Politically transitional periods provide different contexts for patterns of social class 
mobility through professions. Professions are an important social channel through which ruling 
class members transfer their status and wealth to descendants during transitional periods such as 
revolution, marketization, and colonization (Walder 1995). As an occupational group of experts, 
a profession’s status and privilege heavily depends upon to what extent a ruling class or group 
has monopolized political power before the transition, how long the transition period has lasted, 
and what structural opportunities the ruling elites have been able to appropriate (Walder 2003). 
Konttinen (1991), for instance, has shown that Finish legal professionals hailed from the noble 
class that employed the judicial bureaucracy as a means to transfer their status, because the noble 
class firmly controlled the bureaucracy. His account of their transition from nobility to judicial 
officials and practicing lawyers draws attention to the backgrounds of the legal professionals and 
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the social status system. Analyzing the social backgrounds of medical doctors in Thailand, 
Maxwell (1975) discovered that the majority of doctors emerged from either the royal families or 
the upper classes during modernization.  
Professions have traditionally served as a social conduit within modern societies to either 
reproduce a social class or effect upward social mobility. Since becoming a professional usually 
requires a longer education and qualifying examinations, both of which require material and 
cultural support, professions are usually dominated by those who can afford the education and 
often take it for granted (Dezalay and Garth 2010). At the same time, since professional 
qualifications are granted to candidates who successfully pass the examinations regardless of 
their social background (Collins 1979), talented members of the lower class or social minorities, 
who are attracted by such meritocratic features, enter the professions. Therefore, examining the 
ways in which members of a lower class or social minorities advance into a profession is key to 
understanding the pattern of social class mobility. 
Rather than simply a hallowed conduit through which one attempts to pass in order to 
achieve upward social mobility, legal professions in a transitional period have to be culturally 
fortified. Cultural repertoires serve as tools that either strengthen or weaken the legitimacy of a 
legal profession during a transitional period. During a period of structural change, culture creates 
multiple competing ideologies that model new ways of organizing social actions. In turn, it 
makes people either adhere to traditional ways of doing things or adopt new patterns of behavior 
(Swidler 1986). To properly understand the pattern of social mobility through legal professions, 
it is necessary to investigate how competing cultural understandings of a profession are 
incorporated into a political regime and how this incorporation leads a profession to be victorious. 
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Consequently, in regards of social class mobility through professions, it was the ruling 
class members that exclusively took advantage of the transition. However, political regime 
changes shift, and even challenge, the assumed pattern that the ruling class advanced to the 
professions by challenging the symbolic powers associated with the relationship between the 
state and the profession. Political regime changes change the status of symbolic power that had 
been legitimized. The doubt on existing system of the symbolic power delegitimizes the 
institutionalized paths. The rise of professions is an outcome of the changes. 
 
The Marginal Status of Occupations in Law in the Bureaucracy 
 
In traditional Korea, the bureaucratic system was closely related to the Confucian 
political regime. Confucianism, according to Weber (1978), is a bureaucratic religion that 
typically lacks both an internalized drive to salvation or spirituality—the main means for people 
to legitimize their social situation in the world and for the state to control the populace. 
Confucianism and the state bureaucracy of Korea mutually reinforced each other in that all 
bureaucrats were Confucian literati who had learned the Confucian classics, passed the national 
examinations based on these classics, possessed military skills, and had knowledge of applied 
sciences. The state bureaucracy of Korea served as both an instrument to spread Confucianism 
throughout the country and a field in which the bureaucrats and the king learned and reflected 
upon Confucian learnings. Confucian ideologies defined the relationship between administration 
and judiciary. With adjudication considered a part of the administration, holding a judicial 
position in the bureaucracy was considered a stepping stone to becoming a good magistrate for 
the people or bureaucrat for the state. Since becoming a good arbitrator was the first virtue of a 
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magistrate assigned to local governments, the magistrate did his best to solve the lawsuits as 
quickly as possible. By no means, however, did this suggest that the magistrates be legal 
specialists. On the contrary, it implied that the backlog of litigation would have not have been 
created if a magistrate’ governance depended on his virtue and not on laws. The prioritization of 
the rule of virtue over law, though idealistic, made the interpretation and application of laws a 
secondary matter. According to studies of the legal clerks and the judicial department in Chosŏn 
Korea, the former were mainly assigned to the Board of Punishment (Hyŏngjo) or its affiliated 
organs after passing the national examination but their rank and promotion were limited to the 
junior sixth rank (To 2014; N. Yi 1999).  
This hierarchical division of labor was closely related to the social status system in Korea 
before 1894. The higher ranks and important positions in the bureaucracy including the Board of 
Punishment, the Censorate, the Royal Tribunal, and the Bureau of Seoul were monopolized by 
the yangban literati-aristocrat who had passed the civil service branch of the three national 
examinations. Those who had passed the technical branch of the national examinations were 
assigned to the lower mid-rank positions in the judicial departments. Along with other chapkwa 
chungin that included the collective body of government interpreters, medical doctors, 
astronomers, painters, and mathematicians, the lower mid-ranked judicial officials were assigned 
to specific departments and bureaus that needed their specialty (S. J. Kim 2008; Hwang 2004). 
Within members of the chungin status, those who specialized in law were further marginalized. 
A study found that officials in foreign language interpretation and medicine were generally 
promoted up to the senior third rank (chŏng samp’um)—the fifth rank within a bureaucratic 
system with eighteen ranks—while officials in laws did not go beyond the junior sixth rank??? 
(chong yokp’um) (N. Yi 1999). In addition, Yi (1999) found that while officials in foreign 
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language interpretation and medicine began to form strong social networks through marriages in 
order to emerge as a core block in 18th and 19th Korea, other technical officials did not enjoy 
such a rise. 
Thus, reforming the bureaucracy not only meant rearranging the bureaucratic hierarchy 
between the yangban literati aristocrats and chungin law clerks, but also involved changing the 
social status system that buttressed the hierarchical division between the administration and 
judiciary. It was cultural understanding that divided the social statuses and further legitimized the 
hierarchical division, because the division of the social status and the hierarchical division 
between the administration and judiciary were supported by particular cultural understandings. 
From the traditional point of view, it was hard to imagine the separation of the judicial officials 
from civil ones and promoting officials who specialized in law to high positions. Traditionally, 
adjudication was considered one of the most important tasks of the central and local governments. 
Judicial officials and magistrates assumed the role of the judge in cases filed to administrative 
offices. Law clerks or assistants were expected to provide the necessary interpretation of laws 
during their application. However, having a specialized knowledge of laws was not considered a 
necessary virtue to become a good magistrate. Although the majority of ruling elites, including 
the yangban literati, were civil officials whose jurisdiction included the judiciary, they were 
expected to be good judges but not proficient at interpreting the laws. For the ruling elites, 
therefore, it made no sense to pass the judicial examination and become a judicial official. 
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Figure 2 The Bureaucracy Structure of the Korean Government before 1895 and after 1906 
 
Figure 2 summarizes the organizational changes pertaining to the judiciary within the 
bureaucracy. The judiciary before 1895―on the left side of Figure 2―had been subjugated to 
the administration, although it had used to recruit officials from the national jurist examination. 
The promotion of the officials was limited and the role in the bureaucracy was marginal. It was 
the yangban literati officials who occupied the higher ranks of the bureaucracy that supervised 
the officials in the judicial organs. While civil officials assigned to judicial departments or local 
governments assumed the roles of judges before 1895, the judges and prosecutors were elected 
from a pool of candidates who had passed the jurist examination and been dispatched to the local 
courts after 1906. Another significant change was the naming of those who had passed the jurist 
examination to the higher rank (chuimkwan) of judges or prosecutors whereas those who had 
passed the civil examination were assigned to the bureaucracy’s lower ranks (p’animkwan).19  
Structural changes in the bureaucracy seen in the above diagram accompanied the radical 
political changes in the regimes. The bureaucratic structures in the right diagram were conceived 
by Korean politicians during the 1894-95 reforms which were necessarily incomplete because 
                                                 
19 Ch’ikimkwan, Chuimkwan, and P’animkwan were the officials’ ranks established in 1894. The Korean 
government replaced a rank system that consisted of 18 classes with one that consisted of 11. While Ch’ikimkwan 
occupied the highest two, each of which had senior and junior segments, Chuimkwan was located from the third 
through the sixth, and P’animkwan formed the lowest from the seventh to the ninth.  
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they lacked the resources. The reforms from 1894-96 rearranged the status and role of the 
judiciary quite differently from the traditional system. First, the judges and prosecutors in the 
courts were relieved of their administrative affairs and their status elevated. Judges and 
prosecutors were assigned to the higher status of officials (Hanmal kŭndae pŏpryŏng charyŏchip) 
as h’ikimkwan or chuimkwan.20 Second, the criteria for selecting the judicial officials, such as the 
education and examination process, also changed. The establishment of the Jurist Training 
School in 1895 set the groundwork for modern law education in Korea. The Jurist Training 
School recruited Japanese instructors to teach Japanese civil, criminal, and procedural laws. 
Along with establishing Western-style courts in Seoul―the Court of Seoul and the Higher 
Court—the Korean government initially planned to supply the judiciary with its graduates who 
had learned Western laws. 
While the reforms from 1894-96 emulated Meiji Japan in orienting Korea towards 
Constitutional Monarchism, the subsequent reforms from 1897-1905 prioritized the restoration 
of absolute monarchy. In other words, even though both reforms had tried to establish a modern 
judiciary, their underlying visions for the judiciary were sharply different. The reforms from 
1897-1905 were essentially conservative in a sense that the judicial officials were appointed by 
the Korean monarchy who directly controlled the Ministry of Justice and the Court of Cassation. 
Therefore, the reforms from 1897-1905 focused on nullifying or at least minimizing the effects 
of the earlier reforms on the judiciary. First, the division between the administration and the 
adjudication was restored. In 1899, the Court of Seoul fell once again under the jurisdiction of 
the Bureau of Seoul. In relation to the restoration, although the higher status and rank of judicial 
officials were preserved, the independence of judicial officials was revoked. Although the Court 
                                                 
20 In a job classification of prosecutors (kŏmsa chikje) published in 1895, prosecutors were stipulated as part of the 
higher chuimkwan ranks.  
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of Cassation (P’yŏngriwŏn) was established as the highest court in Korea in 1899, it actually 
served as an appellant court that had higher authority than both the court in Seoul and the 24 
local courts scattered throughout the Korean peninsula. It was the Ministry of Justice that 
finalized and even remanded the rulings of judges in the lower courts, including the Court of 
Seoul and the Court of Cassation. The Minister of Justice, Kwŏn Chaehyŏng, took for granted 
such a hierarchy between the Court of Cassation and the Ministry of Justice (The Diary of the 
Royal Secretariat September 5th, 1900). Likewise, the Court of Seoul was seen as an 
administrative office that dealt with affairs in Seoul. 
Although the Korean government announced regulations pertaining to the examination of 
judicial officials in 1899, it did not administer it until 1906. The regulations in 1899 stated that 
the judicial officials had to be elected from those who had either graduated from law schools or 
who were proficient in legal knowledge. However, given that the Jurist Training School was 
closed and no examinations were arranged, this regulation served to justify the whimsical 
appointment of judicial officials. Until 1906, examinations for recruiting judicial officials were 
administered only to lower mid-rank officials upon the recommendation of the Ministry of 
Justice. Therefore, judicial officials in the Court of Seoul and the Court of Cassation were not 
selected through an open examination but appointed by the Emperor through the 
recommendation of the Ministry of Justice. In March 1898, the Minister of Justice, Yi Yu-in, 
was impeached by Kim Sŏkryŏng because Yi had arbitrarily appointed judges in violation of 
these regulations (The Diary of the Royal Secretariat March 29th, 1898). The origin of such 
impeachment can also be traced to Yi Yuin’s attitude towards the judicial officials. In a petition 
to king in 1898 which suggested that the courts in Seoul dissolved into the administrative 
organizations. In the same petition, Yi also expressed that judges and prosecutors assigned at the 
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Court of Seoul and the Court of Cassation were regarded as an upstart that promoted from lower-
mid ranked officials to the rank of higher officials in a day thanks to a bit of their knowledge on 
laws.  
 
The Korean State as the Monopolizer of Symbolic Capital Until 1905 
 
Effects of Modern Law Education on Becoming a Judicial Official 
One dimension showing to what extent the state seized symbolic capital of law is the 
effect of law education on becoming a judicial official or a legal profession. Examining the 
profiles of graduates who became judicial officials from 1895 to 1909 provides a clear snapshot 
of the impact of modern law education. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Chosŏn Korean 
government not only adopted Western-style courts in Seoul but also became concerned with 
training jurists from 1895-96. The judges and prosecutors assigned to courts in Seoul were 
expected to be independent judicial officials. In addition, the government established the Jurist 
Training Center in Seoul to educate young officials who specialized in modern laws and sent 
hundreds of youths to Japan in the hope of recruiting them later as officials.  
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Figure 3 Number of Officials at Courts in Seoul with Modern Law Education from 1895 to 1908; source: The Resume of Officials of 
the Taehan Empire; the Diary of the Royal Secretariat; note: Modern Law Education includes graduates or students of the Jurist 
Training School of Korea, graduates of Japanese law schools, and graduates of private law schools in Korea.  
 
Figure 3 shows the frequency of appointment for judicial officials who had received their 
modern law education from 1895 to 1908. With the production of the first two cohorts by the 
Jurist Training Center from 1895-96, it is possible that the Korean government used them in 
1896 to fill the positions of judges or prosecutors. Moreover, with the study abroad students 
returning to Korea from 1900, it could have also appointed them to the judiciary during 1900-01. 
Until 1905, however, only eight judicial officials (either judge or prosecutor) who had received 
modern law education were named to judicial positions.21 During1896-97, that number was three. 
Of the three, Yi Sŏn-chae (aka Yi Chun) and Ham T’ae-yŏng, who had both graduated from the 
Jurist Training Center in 1895, were named to probationary prosecutors in 1896 (For Yi, The 
Diary of the Royal Secretariat Feb 3rd, and for Ham, The Daily Reflection March 5th, 1896). Yun 
Sŏng-po, another graduate in 1895, was appointed as a probationary prosecutor in 1897 (The 
                                                 
21 They are Yi Sŏnchae (aka Yi Chun), Ham T’aeyŏng, Yun Sŏngpo, Yun Panghyŏn, Hong Yongp’yo, Chang To, 
Yi Myŏnu, and Hong Chaeki, 
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Diary of the Royal Secretariat July 10th, 1897). Even for the period from 1898 to 1903, there 
were only two. Hong, Yongp’yo, a graduate in 1896, was initially appointed as a lower mid-rank 
official in the Ministry of Justice before being promoted to a judge in the Court of Cassation in 
July 1902 (The Diary of the Royal Secretariat July 3rd, 1902), a year after the appointment of 
Yun, Panghyŏn in 1901, who had studied in Japan for less than a year before returning to Korea 
in 1896 (Yun’s resume).22  
It was not necessarily foreordained that the graduates of the Jurist Training School would 
be appointed to a mid low-rank official position. In addition to the three judicial officials, sixteen 
graduates were appointed as lower mid-rank officials in the Ministry of Justice (chusa), which 
accounted for less than 20% of the 86 graduates of the first two cohorts in 1896.23 The lower 
appointment rates of the graduates of the Jurist Training School show that a Western legal 
education was not fully appreciated until 1905. As seen in Figure 3, becoming a judicial official 
was much harder because the majority of judicial officials in Seoul courts still came from a pool 
of officials who had already worked in the judicial departments before the reforms or those who 
had been appointed by the king or the Minister of Justice. For example, Yi Hŭi-sŏn became a 
probationary prosecutor in the Court of Seoul in November 1896 and passed the first stage of the 
civil service examination in 1883 (Yi’s resume, The Diary of the Royal Secretariat February 8, 
1883). Appointed as a prosecutor in the Higher Court in February 1896, Yi Hoegu was a 
successful candidate of the traditional civil service examination in 1894 (The Diary of the Royal 
Secretariat February 8, 1894). Yi Hŭichŏng became a judge of the Court of Seoul in 1897 (The 
Diary of the Royal Secretariat November 1st, 1897). None of these judicial officials were 
                                                 
22 One exception is Hwang Ch’ŏlsu, who had graduated from law school in November 1895 and was appointed as a 
probationary prosecutor on Cheju Island in 1902. Since the court on Cheju was old-fashioned, it is difficult to 
understand how it fit into the larger legal context. 
23 Some graduates advanced to other governmental departments such as The Ministry of Treasury, The Ministry of 
Education, and so on.  
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graduates of the Jurist Training School but were lower mid-rank officials in the Ministry of 
Justice.  
While some of the appointed judges and prosecutors were proficient in laws and legal 
procedures, others were not. Not only did the judicial officials appointed after 1895 have little 
legal experience, the frequent change in appointments made it difficult for them to become 
proficient in one job. The career of Yun, Sŏngpo’s illustrates how chaotic the personnel 
management was at the turn of the twentieth century. Yun, a graduate of the Jurist Training 
School, was first promoted from a chusa position to that of a probationary prosecutor in the 
Higher Court in November 1897 (Yun’s resume). Eight months later in July 1898, he was named 
prosecutor in the Higher Court. Four months later in November 1898, he was, once again, 
transfered to the Court of Seoul. In the next month, December 1898, he was assigned to the 
Governor of Kangsŏ (kunsu). Returning to the Ministry of Justice in June 1901, he became a 
judge in December 1901 (Yun’s resume). In addition, with political considerations influencing 
the appointment of chief judges in the Court of Seoul and the Court of Cassation, the Minister, 
the Vice Minister, and military generals were often named to such positions (To 2014). Once, the 
Minister of Justice even asked the king to dismiss the chief judge in the Court of Seoul due to his 
incompetence in law and legal procedures (The Diary of the Royal Secretariat April 3rd, 1905). 
Given the solid status of the Korean state as the guidance of the old practices, it was hard 
for those who learned modern law to enter the bureaucracy and to become a judicial official. The 
state agent behaved and the bureaucrats believed that the judiciary should be integrated with the 
general administration regardless of different political stances and views. The state was the 
monopolizer of the symbolic power that governed the behaviors of individual bureaucrats. The 
fact that some judges and prosecutors were still recruited from officials who had worked in other 
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administrative departments or bureaus reflects that the Korean government did not firmly 
establish the idea that the judiciary should be detached and judicial officials learned specialty in 
law. In the same vein, officials with training in law were assigned to another department. Given 
the circumstance, the effects of modern law education on becoming a judicial official did not 
work immediately until 1905 when the Japanese started to intervene in the domestic affairs of 
Korea in a full-scale. 
 
Increased Prestige of the Judicial Service Examination vs. the Civil Service Examination 
The effects of modern law education on the process of becoming a judicial official did 
not make themselves fully visible until 1905. While the majority of judges and prosecutors 
originally hailed from lower mid-rank officials in the Ministry of Justice, the transition years of 
1905-07 changed the recruitment patterns profoundly, especially for newly appointed judicial 
officials. Beginning with the study abroad students, an increasing number law school graduates 
entered the bureaucracy. Along with the increasing dominance of law school graduates in the 
judiciary, the higher ranks of the successful candidates of the judicial service examination added 
prestige to both the position of judicial officials and law education. The first open qualifying 
examinations for electing judicial officials was administered on December 5th, 1906, producing 
twelve successful candidates (Official Gazette No. 3634 December 12th, 1906). This examination 
acted as a gateway to the Korean judiciary for law school graduates. All twelve of them had 
entered the Jurist Training School in 1904. While ten candidates were assigned to probationary 
positions in local courts on December 12th, 1906, one was assigned to the Jurist Training School; 
the fate of the last one is unknown. Skipping the years 1907-08 when the examination was not 
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administered, seven out of about two hundred applicants successfully passed it on October 13th, 
1909, when it was readministered.24 
During 1905-06, it is noteworthy that the passers of the judicial service examination were 
considered more prestigious than the passers of the civil service examination. The two 
examinations were administered around a similar period. After reforms dissolved the traditional 
exam system in 1894, the Korean government administered the civil service examination on May 
18, 1905 and the judicial examination on December 5, 1906 as the first set of open qualifying 
tests. While the former produced 30 successful candidates who passed both the first and second 
stages, the latter produced twelve. Of the 29 civil exam passers, all except one were appointed to 
the position of lower mid-rank official (p’animkwan). For the twelve successful candidates of the 
judicial examination, eleven were appointed to the higher rank (chuimkwan). Therefore, both the 
pre-colonial Korean and the colonial Japanese government extended preferential treatment to the 
successful candidates of the judicial service examinations in terms of both rank and promotion. 
Despite their nearly similar qualifications in terms of successfully passing the examinations, their 
pre-office careers, and educational backgrounds, most passers of the civil service examination 
began their service at a lower rank than the passers of the judicial service examination, who 
started immediately at the top. During their tenure, the judicial officials also experienced faster 
rates of promotion. 
A closer comparison of two figures, who had each passed two examinations, helps us to 
understand the discrepancy further. After entering the Jurist Training School in 1904, Kim Yi-
hyŏn passed the civil service examination in May 1905 (Kim’s resume). Right after he passed the 
exam, he was assigned to the Department of Treasury in December 1905 as an 8th p’animkwan 
                                                 
24 The Korean Bar Examination was administered separately from the Judicial Service Examination. On June 24th, 
1907 the first Korean Bar Examination produced six successful candidates out of twenty applicants. And on 
November 16 in the next year, the examination selected four out of twelve applicants. 
77 
(The Diary of the Royal Secretariat December 21, 1905). Next year, he was promoted to the 7th 
p’animkwan (Kim’s resume). During his in-office career under colonial rule, his position 
remained in the realm of a p’anim rank until 1921. After being named the governor of Sach’ŏn 
county (kunsu) in 1922, he was finally promoted to the 8th chuimkwan rank in XX (List of 
Government Officials of the Colonial Government of Korea 1922). In contrast, Yun Hŏnku who 
had graduated from the Jurist Training School on July 6, 1904 passed the Judicial Service 
Examination on December 5, 1906 whereupon he was promoted to the chuimkwan rank and 
assigned a prosecutor position in a North Chŏnra Province court. Continuing his in-office career 
under Japanese colonial rule, Yun was promoted to the 6th rank of chuimkwan with a 9th salary 
class in 1913. After resigning as a prosecutor in the Haeju local court in May 1914 (Official 
Gazette of the Colonial Government, May 1st, 1914), he practiced law in Haeju until 1913 
(Official Gazette of the Colonial Government, September 3rd, 1931). 
The fewer opportunities for a recipient of a modern law degree to become a judicial 
official reflect the ruling class’s adherence to a traditional understanding of the judiciary in the 
turn of the twentieth century Korea. Because the ruling elite viewed that courts were still 
regarded as part of the administration, the division of the judiciary from the administration was 
considered either illegitimate or at best waste of money.  
 
The Family Backgrounds of the Early Korean Lawyers Registered from 1906 to 1910 
Another important venue for examining legal professions as a channel of social mobility 
is the lawyers’ family backgrounds. By analyzing the occupations of the early Korean lawyers’ 
fathers, I tried to understand the patterns of inter-generational mobility through the legal 
professions. Since 1906, when three lawyers first registered in the Ministry of Justice in Korea, 
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48 more lawyers have registered and practiced law until 1910. The 51 Korean lawyers during 
this period came from either the judiciary or the successful candidates of the Korean Bar 
Examination. Of these 51 registered lawyers, I was able to locate information about the 
occupations, titles, and ranks of 25 of the lawyers’ fathers within the bureaucracy and classified 
them into five categories. The first and second categories refer to those who were either 
appointed as officials or held officially named or awarded ranks. I then divided them into lower 
and upper echelons depending on whether they had remained lower than it (Tanghakwan or 
equivalent ranks) or been promoted or appointed to a position higher than the third senior 
(Tangsangkwan or equivalent ranks). The third category refers to those who had passed the first 
stages of the traditional exam system and gained titles such as Chinsa or Saengwŏn. Although 
they were not officially named an official in the bureaucracy, their titles indicated that they were 
both learned and enjoyed social prestige. The fourth category refers to those who were learned 
but not recognized by any social institution. Yuhak or Haksaeng were some of the titles given to 
those who were learned but had not passed the entry level examinations in the Chosŏn dynasty.  
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Figure 4 Early Korean Lawyers’ Family Backgrounds (father’s occupation, title or rank); source: the Collection of Resumes of the 
Officials of the Taehan Empire 
 
Of the information about the occupation/title/rank of the fathers of the twenty five 
Korean lawyers registered from 1906 to 1910 that I was able to locate from the resumes of the 
governmental officials in Korea, only four of them had received ranks above the upper echelon 
of the bureaucracy (Tangsangkwan); seven received the lower echelon positions (Tanghakwan); 
two passed the first stages of the national exam system (Chinsa or Saengwŏn); five were Yuhak 
or Haksaeng and had no official title; and the rest had no official careers (See Table 9 in the 
APPENDIX located at the end of this dissertation for details).  
While eleven of the lawyers’ fathers were listed as government officials, further 
investigation reveals a different picture. Of the four who were promoted to the upper echelon, 
three did not pass the highest stage of the civil service examination (Taekwa), which was 
considered the primary path to becoming a higher official. In contrast, P’yi Sang-pŏm’s father, 
P’yi Chong-yun, was granted the rank of the upper echelon (Chŏlch’ung Changgun) but did not 
pass Taekwa. From the fact that P’yi Sang-pŏm had passed the traditional jurist examination in 
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1882 (P’yi’s resume), I concluded that he had a chungin background. Another case of Yi Kyŏng-
chi, Yi Yong-sŏng’s father, was awarded the rank of T’ongchongdaebu because of his 
achievement as a government interpreter—a position that he occupied after passing the 
interpreter examination in 1849. Yi Yong-sŏng’s grandfather was a medical doctor who had 
passed the medical examination in 1803 and been promoted to the rank of Kasŏndaebu, the 
junior second rank of the bureaucracy. In other words, lawyer Yi Yong-sŏng had a prestigious 
chungin background in the nineteenth century. Pyŏn Yŏng-man’ father, Pyŏn Chŏng-sang, was 
promoted to the position of Puyun, a governor of Samhwa, a region located in the South 
P’yŏnyan Province. Even though Pyŏn Chŏng-sang achieved the junior second position, there 
was no record of him passing the traditional service examination. In contrast to these three 
figures, Yi, Chong-sŏng’s father, Yi, Sŏ-yŏng, was the only one out of the 25 lawyers’ fathers to 
pass the traditional civil service examination and become promoted to the upper echelon (Vice 
Minister of the Board of Rite, Yecho Ch’amp’an).  
Having a father at the lower echelon of the bureaucracy did not necessarily mean that he 
was powerful and had served as an official for a long time. Rather, it simply meant that he had 
been appointed and recognized by the government. In fact, out of the nine cases whose father 
entered the bureaucracy, three were lowest in the eighteen rank system of the traditional Korean 
bureaucracy. For instance, Pak, Sŭngpin’s father, Pak, Gyŏngyang, was named to 
Kagamyŏggwan, a temporarily established position ranking junior 9th, the lowest position in the 
bureaucracy. Kwŏn Pyŏnghun’s father, Kwŏn Panghŏn, was named to the Ch’ampong position, 
also the lowest position in the bureaucracy. In addition, the fathers’ ranks and positions disclosed 
the military background of some of the early lawyers’ fathers. Sŏnryak Changgun, to which 
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Chang To’s and Yi Kŏnho’s fathers were named, was a junior fourth rank that was usually 
awarded to military officials.  
Two lawyers’ fathers gained the title of Chinsa or Saengwŏn and five lawyers’ fathers 
were identified as Yuhak or Haksaeng. The Chinsa or Saengwŏn titles were awarded to those 
who had passed the first two stages of the national civil service examination. Only those who 
held either Chinsa or Saengwŏn title were allowed to take the main exam. In contrast to Chinsa 
or Saengwŏn, Yuhak and Haksaeng titles were not officially granted. Meaning “still immature 
learning” and “student,” the two titles recognized that one was learned but had not taken any 
examination. Therefore, these titles indicated that the fathers of seven lawyers were learned to a 
certain extent and probably identified themselves as part of the learned class. The reports of the 
lawyers to their clans also indicated their self-identification as learned families, which were 
distinctive from the commoners in the social status system. These seven lawyers wrote their 
fathers’ names on their resumes without a specific rank, position, or title. I was unable to locate 
their names from the list of the successful candidates of the national examinations of Chosŏn 
Korea. 
Given that father’s occupation or rank indicated family prestige in pre-colonial Korean 
society, the missing of them represents that the seven lawyers highly likely hailed from 
somewhat marginalized classes rather than the upper/ruling classes. There is little evidence to 
suggest that men from elite yangban lineages or their descendants entered the field of law and 
practiced it in early 1900s Korea. Of the 51 first lawyers, no one had passed the final stage of the 
civil service examination that was maintained until 1894. In Chosŏn-Korea, passing the final 
stage of the civil service examination guaranteed promotion to higher positions in the 
bureaucracy. However, the fact that no evidence found that the lawyers had passed the 
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examination indicates that becoming a lawyer had less to do with the reproduction of the existing 
elites. The link between judicial professionals and the chungin families is not clear. I was able to 
identify only three out of the 25 lawyers with a chungin lineage (see Table 9 in the APPENDIX 
at the end of this dissertation). According to a study on the chungin families in 18-19th century 
Korea, the chungin families became prominent through inter-family marriages among those who 
had produced the passers of the national examinations (N. Yi 1999). Although some lawyers out 
of 51 early Korean lawyers originated from chungin families, an insignificant portion of 
prominent chungin families advanced to the legal profession in early twentieth century Korea. 
This analysis shows that the first lawyers came from neither the elite yangban nor chungin 
backgrounds but from other social status groups that were hardly present in the bureaucracy until 
the late nineteenth century.  
This finding suggests both nuanced similarities and differentials to the body of literature 
on the social mobility at the dawn of modernity of Korea. The literature has suggested or 
conjectured that modern professions (lawyers, doctors, and a few more) became a gate for 
marginalized status groups to make upward social mobility. Though there have not been explicit 
attempts to define what marginalized social status groups were in pre-colonial Korea, the present 
finding is in sync with the literature in the way that somewhat relegated status groups who had 
been blocked to advance to the bureaucracy advanced to the legal profession. At the same time, 
the present finding proposes that it was not the chungin families—those who had produced the 
passers of the national service examination—that constituted the majority of the legal 
professionals in early modern Korea. Lawyer in late 1900s Korea was not a site employed by the 
existing ruling elites—both the elite yangban families and the elite chungin families—to 
reproduce their social status. Until 1905, only a handful of law school graduates were appointed 
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as judges or prosecutors within the Korean government. In contrast, the majority of the judicial 
positions were recruited from traditional civil or military officials who had little knowledge of 
Western laws. If there was any social mobility through the legal profession, it occurred after 
1905 with the administration of the Judicial Service Examination and the Korean Bar 
Examination. 
 
Chapter Conclusion 
 
A puzzle that has been unexplored is how the existing social status system in pre-colonial 
Korea engaged in producing professionals and it came to be changed alongside the rise of 
modern professions. Radical political change during early 1900s Korea resulted in the entrance 
of judicial officials and practicing lawyers from the learned members of the marginalized class 
while simultaneously excluding the ill-prepared ruling class through cultural reformulation. For 
the ruling elites, becoming a professional judicial official or a practicing lawyer was not urgently 
felt insofar as the regime remained unchanged. It also meant that it was difficult for them to 
adapt to another cultural schema that they had hardly been even aware of. Although the courts in 
Seoul were organizationally separated from 1895 to 1905, the judges and prosecutors were still 
considered to be a part of the administration. Along this vein of thought, education on modern 
laws played an insignificant role in promoting the social advancement of the recipients of law 
degrees. Only a handful of modern law school graduates in Japan and Korea were appointed as 
judges and prosecutors until 1905. Before the surge of appointments of modern law recipients to 
judicial positions, judges and prosecutors were recruited either from traditional literati officials 
or the monarchy’s first-aides. From 1906 and onwards, however, the judicial examination 
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became a shortcut to the higher positions in the bureaucracy. Of the backgrounds of 25 lawyers 
who had registered in the profession from 1906 to 1910, their fathers’ ranks, occupations, and 
titles indicated that the majority of them hailed from learned families with relatively less social 
prestige than the ruling elites. Their fathers’ occupations/titles denoted that few of them, despite 
their partially learned status, had been named to important posts in the bureaucracy. 
These findings suggest that the social class mobility through the legal professions 
occurred in an abrupt and uneven manner, because of the symbolic power to which the ruling 
elites had adhered. A series of changes in the legal system including the separation of the 
judiciary from the executive branch and the appointment of private lawyers in litigation was an 
abrupt change hardly compatible with existing schemas the ruling yangban elites had depended 
on. It was also abrupt in a sense that the social esteem of judicial officials and lawyers was 
established in a few years as the field of law and its expertise became independent from the 
administration. In contrast, relatively marginal groups among literati were not motivated to 
adhere to the existing symbolic power. Learning Western laws was not a hesitant behavior that 
stigmatize their conscience. It was uneven in that the legal professions were filled by members of 
learned but relatively marginalized classes. The majority of early Korean lawyers had neither a 
prestigious yangban lineage nor an elite chungin family background. Rather, their families were 
learned but located at the periphery of the state status system. Coupled with the collapse of the 
traditional social status system, learning law became the shortest path for colonial Korean 
subjects into the colonial bureaucracy, though the path remains narrow and competitive. The 
growing popularity of law education and soaring aspirations for passing the qualifying 
examinations were further propelled by colonial credentialism that, in part, enabled the Koreans 
to fight back against ethnic discrimination in colonial Korea. Such patterns of social class 
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mobility in Korea are somewhat different from other colonial cases where the native elites took 
advantage of the courts to secure their social status (Brown 1995; Roberts and Mann 1991; 
Hoffman 2010). In contrast to British-Egypt, French-Senegal and other countries where religious 
matters were separated from secular ones before colonization, Korea maintained an integrated 
legal system in which religious and secular laws were intertwined. In order to understand this 
disjuncture between Korea and the other countries, an examination of social class mobility via 
social paths other than professions within various pre-colonial contexts is needed. Meantime, in 
relation to the literature on institutional transitions, the present study suggests that the political 
orientation of reforms is more important than the reforms themselves in ensuring a successful 
transfer of status and the survival of existing elites. While the temporal success of the Kwangmu 
reform nullified the effects of reforms from 1894-96 and made Korea conservative, it also made 
the ruling elites ill-prepared to reproduce their social status via the newly emerging professions.  
There are, however, several limitations within this chapter that suggest future avenues of 
research. First, because the chapter did not investigate the family lineages of all the judicial 
officials and lawyers in the 1900s, the overall pattern of inter-generational mobility is not fully 
clear. Recent studies of families lineages reveal that the Korean society in the 18th and 19th 
centuries was remarkably dynamic to the extent that some families bought or even fabricated 
their elite yangban status while others descended to the status of commoners (Park 2014). If 
research on professions can be complemented by genealogical approaches, we will be able to 
better understand social class mobility at the dawn of modern Korea. Second, this study did not 
address why some judicial officials failed to practice law despite their eligibility to do so. The 
Lawyers Laws in 1905 and 1909 did not allow for the presence of judicial officials at every level 
of the court; instead, they strictly limited the eligibility criteria to the judicial officials of courts 
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in Seoul or judicial officials who had learned Western and Japanese laws. Even officials who met 
the conditions did not practice law after resignation/retirement. Further inquiries are to be made 
for why they did not practice law despite eligibility. Lastly, according to some studies, the ruling 
elites successfully became bankers or businessmen during the colonial period (Eckert 1996). 
Hence, a comparative study of the legal profession with other professions (e.g., medical doctors) 
and colonial Korea with other countries such as colonial Taiwan and even metropole Japan is 
required to understand more comprehensive pattern of social class mobility in early twentieth 
century Korea. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE FRAGMENTED IDENTITY OF LAWYERS 
Between Colonial Lawyers and Lawyers in the Colony 
 
 
Chapter Summary 
 
In this chapter, I examine how legal structures contributed to the fragmentation of the 
practicing lawyers’ identities within colonial Korea. The 1910 annexation treaty made Korea part 
of the Japanese empire but left its jurisdiction a legally separate territory with independent legal 
orders and courts imported from mainland Japan. This simultaneous integration and 
differentiation of colonial Korea resulted in a complex juxtaposition of practicing lawyers with 
qualifications from both metropole Japan and colonial Korea. Together, the dual nature of the 
lawyers’ qualifications along with their ethnic division prevented them from building a coherent 
identity as a profession. In particular, these differences manifested themselves in terms of the 
lawyers’ different attitudes towards the implementation of Court Constitution Laws.  
 
The Impact of Social Structures on the Identity Formation of the Professions 
 
A traditional view of the professions has identified professionals as those individuals with 
a higher level of education and work ethics that are essential to public interest (Carr-Saunders 
and Wilson 1933). This view mainly stems from the Durkheimian thought that professionals 
should play a key role in treating the moral diseases of society (Durkheim 1979; Durkheim 1992). 
Building on this line of thought, existing literature advocates that professions should exercise a 
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distinctive form of logic that is different from both the state and market, locating professions as a 
manifestation of modernity in providing checks and balances to the state and market and 
“guarding” modern society.  For example, in contrast to the state which values authority and the 
market which stresses efficiency, Eliot Freidson (2001) contends that professions can regulate 
their members with rules and norms that form their own distinctive “third logic.” The distinctive 
logic is important for professions such that it contributes to forming a common will and a unified 
sense of collectivity which are necessary conditions for professional autonomy (Halliday and 
Karpik 1997: 32). In reverse, some scholar suggests that the death of guild power be read as the 
decline of professionalism. Paralleling the ideal of guild that regulate and works for its members, 
Elliott Krause argues that the proliferation of market and state power over professions 
deteriorates the power of professions (Krause 1999).  
Much of the literature has highlighted the premise of a profession sharing a common 
identity, but, nonetheless, it leaves unexplored the process by which a group of experts becomes 
a profession. The premise holds true if and only if all or at least many professionals gather under 
a common banner of ideology and identity through similar experiences and social backgrounds. 
For instance, scholars have shown how professionalization intersects with multiple structures of 
discrimination, including patriarchy (Davies 1996; Witz 1992), heterosexuality (Woods 1993), 
and race (Shaw 1996). Stephanie Shaw (1996), for instance, has illustrated how 
professionalization for Black women involves a process of excluding their race and gender. In 
this sense, Ming-Chen Lo (Lo 2005) proposes that professionalization is a site of identity 
formation. Often embedded within the formal credentialing process, these exclusionary 
mechanisms serve to discriminate against female, non-white, and non-elite school practitioners 
of the profession. Or conversely, they work to create the dominant image of a profession as 
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composed of white, male, elite school graduates. That is, the collective identity of lawyers vis-à-
vis other professions does not spontaneously arise simply by the sharing of the nominal title of 
“lawyer” or any single or multiple attribute(s). Instead, it can be considered a social, cultural, and 
political project that transforms certain categories into a sense of groupness (Brubaker 2005).  
For practicing lawyers in the non-West, the colonial legal structures provide another lens 
to examine how their professional body became fragmented by racial/ethnic divisions and 
professional qualifications. Hierarchically arranged by race/ethnicity and by different 
qualifications between the metropole and the colony, the colonial legal structures generated 
vertical relations among the legal practitioners. Race/ethnicity, qualification, and the interplay of 
race/ethnicity with qualification thus differentiated the legal profession rather than integrated it. 
While racial/ethnic differentials discriminated against lawyers who became qualified in the 
colony, the different qualifications between the metropole and colony further reproduced them. It 
is doubtful that professionals from the ruling racial/ethnic group regarded their colonial 
counterparts as their peers.  
Such differentials of race/ethnicity and qualifications made it difficult for the collective 
body of lawyers to share common experiences that often form the basis of a coherent identity. 
According to Jan Goldstein (1984), it was the common experiences of fighting against epidemics 
that consolidated the identity of French medical doctors in the early nineteenth century into a 
profession. In contrast, as I argue below, by partitioning the individual practitioners of law in 
colonial Korea into several subgroups, the colonial legal structures made it difficult for them to 
build a unified professional identity. On the one hand, the ethnic division between Japanese and 
Korean lawyers was hardly undeniable in colonial Korea where Japanese were privileged to 
Korean subjects in most aspects. Japanese, regardless of either being migrated to or being 
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nurtured in colonial Korea, took for granted their superiority to native Koreans (Uchida 2011). 
Nationalistic stances were a dominant sentiment among Koreans. Even within the Bar 
association, Korean lawyers wished to be segregated from the Japanese counterparts (Yi 1974). 
On the other hand, professional qualifications partitioned the legal profession into colonial 
lawyers and lawyers in the colony. While the former group’s license was limited only to colonial 
Korea, the latter group was entitled to practice law everywhere in the Japanese empire. In doing 
so, the structures contributed the profession to be fragmented rather than building a distinctive 
logic against the colonial state.  
 
Research Context: Why Lawyers in Colonial Korea? 
 
The Separate Jurisdiction of Colonial Korea from Metropole Japan  
Examining the colonial context of Korea in the early 20th century and lawyers in colonial 
Korea contributes to debunking the conventional notion that professions in general and lawyers 
in particular hold a coherent identity. The separate jurisdiction of colonial Korea from metropole 
Japan resulted in legal practitioners in the colony who were differentiated from those in the 
metropole. While most colonial governments during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
were autonomous from their mother countries (Steinmetz 2008), the Governor-General of 
colonial Korea exercised extensive control over the legislature, judiciary, and administration. As 
an active Japanese army general, he was directly responsible to the Japanese emperor and—until 
a few years prior to Japan’s loss in World War II—was not at all accountable to the Japanese 
Cabinet. Although colonial Korea had formally belonged to the Japanese empire since 1910, 
laws promulgated by the Japanese Imperial Diet had no effect on people living on the Korean 
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peninsula unless they were sanctioned by the Governor-General’s executive ordinance known as 
seirei. The separate jurisdiction that accompanied the territorial distinction between Japan as 
naichi (the internal land) and Korea as gaichi  (the external land) resulted in an autonomous 
court system in which the High Court exercised the final decision over every lawsuit that was 
filed within colonial Korea. 
However, with the executive ordinances that were valid and effective within the 
boundary of colonial Korea underpinning the legitimacy of the colonial court and the status of its 
officials, the issue of whether or not the colonial judiciary was grounded in the Japanese 
Constitution arose. Courts in colonial Korea belonged to the colonial government as affiliated 
entities. Complying with the Japanese empire’s personnel management system, the judges and 
prosecutors were appointed by the Japanese Prime Minister but they remained under the 
supervisory control of the Governor-General. Executive ordinances on courts in Korea that were 
declared in 1911 secured all the appointments of judges and prosecutors through the Governor-
General, making the colonial judiciary subordinate to the colonial administration. With few 
exchanges of personnel during the colonial period, the judiciary in metropole Japan remained 
largely disconnected from that in colonial Korea. While there were Japanese judicial officials 
who volunteered to be stationed in colonial Korea, most judges and prosecutors assigned to 
colonial Korea were likely to finish their career there and unlikely to return to metropole Japan.  
The Governor-General’s legislative power also allowed him to enact executive ordinances to 
regulate the selection process of judicial officials and lawyers. Judicial officials and lawyers who 
obtained their qualifications in colonial Korea were sometimes differentiated from those who had 
obtained them under the metropole conditions of the Japanese Bar or National Higher Civil 
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Service examinations. For instance, lawyers who were governed by this ordinance were not 
entitled to practice law in other regions of the Japanese empire (e.g., Japan and Taiwan). 
Multiple Routes to Practicing Lawyers, Two Ethnicities, and a Single Title25 
The second distinctive feature of the legal profession in colonial Korea lay in the fact that its 
members were entitled to practice law under the single court structure despite holding various 
qualifications and having two different ethnicities. Similar to the metropole government, the 
colonial government maintained two routes to become a practicing lawyer: the judiciary and the 
bar. All judicial officials (judge and prosecutor) of the colonial judiciary were eligible to practice 
law in colonial Korea unless their retirement/resignation resulted from disciplinary actions. 
Although some judicial officials were recruited through special recruitment programs run by the 
colonial government, the different qualifications had no impact on a lawyer as long as he 
practiced law in colonial Korea. Likewise, within the boundary of colonial Korea, those who 
passed the Korean bar examination held the same rights and obligations as those who passed the 
Japanese bar examination. By the executive ordinances of the Governor-General, lawyers who 
had been practicing law before colonization were permitted to continue practicing it in colonial 
Korea. By the mid-1920s, retired judicial officials of the Chosŏn-Korean government and passers 
of the Korean bar examination administered in 1907 and 1908 comprised the majority of Korean 
lawyers.  
Complicating the diverse backgrounds of the practicing lawyers in colonial Korea was 
the factor of ethnicity. According to the ordinance on lawyers in colonial Korea promulgated in 
                                                 
25 Regulations on Lawyers in Colonial Korea [seirei No. 12 in 1910 December 15th ; seirei No. 5 in March 1912; 
seirei No. 15 December 1921; seirei No. 8  June 1922] 
1. Those who obtained the license of lawyer in accordance with the Lawyers Law in Japan 
2. Japanese male subjects older than twenty who passed the Korean Bar exam 
3. The judicial officials of the courts of the Chosŏn-Korean government, the officials of the Residency-General’s 
Office, the officials of the Colonial Government, or those who had already practice law in Korea before colonization. 
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1912, all lawyers in Korea had to register in one of the bar associations located in the eight cities 
of the local courts. Many Japanese and Korean lawyers outside of Seoul belonged to these local 
bar associations. Accounting for approximately two-thirds of the practicing lawyers in colonial 
Korea who did not belong to the bar associations of Seoul, these two associations continued to be 
divided by ethnicity until 1937 when the colonial government united them.  
The equal status of lawyers despite their qualifications and ethnicities was made possible 
by the single court structure of the Japanese colonizers. Unlike some British and French colonies 
with a parallel system of courts in which native jurists and legal professionals ruled cases 
involving indigenous customs (Brown 1995; Sarr and Roberts 1991; Christelow 1982), the 
Japanese colonizers established a single court structure in colonial Korea in which all civil 
litigations and criminal trials began and were completed within the colonial court system. In 
March 1912 the colonial government issued the Ordinance on Civil Matters under which the 
basic legal order of the colonial period was constituted. While Japan’s civil code became the 
governing law in colonial Korea, the Governor-General decreed that private legal matters among 
Koreans be regulated by Korean customary rules. Thus, both Japanese residents and Koreans in 
colonial Korea had to consult with lawyers registered by the colonial authorities in order to file 
their lawsuits.  
 
Geographical Proximity and Transnational Migration between Japan and Korea 
The third factor that made the legal profession in colonial Korea noteworthy was the 
geographical proximity of Japan and Korea, which enabled a large transnational mobility of legal 
professionals. The 700 miles between Tokyo and Seoul took about three days to cross in the 
1920s. Pusan, which served as the main gateway for Japanese migration to Korea, was only 130 
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miles from the City of Fukuoka in Kyushu. During less than 40 years of colonial period, 
Japanese companies and their colonial government brought over more than one million Japanese 
migrants and their families to colonial Korea. Lawyers comprised a minor portion of the entire 
Japanese migrant population but their inflow to Korea continued steadily into the early 1940s.  
The geographical proximity of the two countries also facilitated the Korean students’ 
study abroad to Japan. Before 1922 when the colonial authority resumed the Korean Bar 
Examination, returning to Korea after passing the Japanese Bar Examination was one of the two 
routes for them to practice law in colonial Korea. Even after 1922, with Keijō Imperial 
University remaining the only college-level institute in colonial Korea until the end of colonial 
rule in 1945, studying abroad to Japan was popular with elite Korean students who desired to 
study law. This desire was reinforced by the ethnic quota maintained by Imperial University in 
which only one third of the spots were reserved for Korean students forcing many elite Korean 
families to send their offspring to Japan every year for higher education. Studying in Japan was 
also advantageous for taking qualifying examinations such as the Japanese Bar Examination and 
the National Higher Civil Service Examination. Consequently, in the last two years of colonial 
rule, the number of Koreans who passed the exams in mainland Japan exceeded 70. 
 
The Pathways to Become a Practicing Lawyer in Colonial Korea 
 
Lawyers with Metropole Qualifications 
Metropole qualifications reflected the changes in selection criteria established by the 
metropole Japanese government. The qualifications consisted of three different conditions. The 
first condition was passing the Japanese Bar Examination. All practicing lawyers in mainland 
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Japan were entitled to practice law in Korea (and colonial Taiwan). Until 1925 when the 
Japanese Bar Examination was integrated into the National Higher Civil Service Examination, 
the Bar Examination served as the major source of practicing lawyers for the Japanese empire. 
Even after 1925, this source of practicing lawyers survived under the name of the “52 Exam.”  
 Former judicial officials in mainland Japan were also granted the right to practice law in 
colonial Korea after retirement with no restriction. For many judicial officials, passed the jurist 
examination was considered another pathway to becoming a lawyer. Graduating from an 
imperial university was the third and last condition for meeting the metropole qualifications of 
becoming a practicing lawyer although this pathway was cut short in 1921. After graduation, the 
Imperial University graduates were often granted a probationary judgeship or prosecutor position. 
Unlike private university graduates, Imperial University graduates were not required to take the 
jurist exam either to become a judicial official although they were still required to pass a test 
after an eighteen-month probationary position. In addition, they were allowed to practice law as a 
lawyer. After the administration of the National Higher Civil Service Examinations in 1925 
united the two paths to becoming a judicial official or practicing lawyer, the judicial branch of 
the examination, as one branch of the National Higher Civil Service Examinations, produced 
about 300 successful candidates per year. 
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Figure 5 Registration of Lawyers with Metropole Conditions in Colonial Korea from 1908 to 1945; source: The Official Gazettes of 
the Colonial Government from 1910 to 1945; the Official Gazettes of the Metropole Government from 1916 to 1924 
 
Figure 5 presents the annual number of lawyers by ethnicity who registered as lawyers 
after satisfying the metropole conditions. To locate the registration of metropole lawyers, I 
examined the lawyers’ qualifications from archives including the Official Gazettes of the 
colonial and the metropole governments, a colonial Korean version of Who’s Who (Chosŏn 
Sinsataedongpo) and constructed all registered lawyers’ profile during the colonial period. The 
supply of lawyers with metropole qualifications in colonial Korea depended on the unequal 
relationship between the two countries. The first generation of metropole lawyers in colonial 
Korea can be traced back to the late 1900s. One group came from the members of the judicial 
advisor to the pre-colonial Korean government or the affiliated officials of the Residency-
General’s Office. Keeping with the aim of the Residency-General’s Office’s policies to 
Westernize the Korean judiciary, they were appointed as judicial officials in colonial Korea. 
Colonization of Korea changed many of the Japanese officials’ career trajectories. After the 
colonial government of Korea downsized the colonial judiciary in 1911-12, many of them 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
b
e
fo
re
 1
9
0
8
1
9
1
0
1
9
1
2
1
9
1
4
1
9
1
6
1
9
1
8
1
9
2
0
1
9
2
2
1
9
2
4
1
9
2
6
1
9
2
8
1
9
3
0
1
9
3
2
1
9
3
4
1
9
3
6
1
9
3
8
1
9
4
0
1
9
4
2
1
9
4
4
KOR
JPN
97 
resigned from their offices. Some of those who resigned stayed in Korea, and started to practice 
law.  
Along with them, migrant Japanese lawyers constituted the main corpus of metropole 
lawyers in colonial Korea as late as 1919. In contrast to the influx of metropole lawyers into 
colonial Korea in the early 1910s, which occurred in part due to the colonization project, the 
migration of Japanese lawyers after the late 1910s was caused by the oversupply of lawyers in 
Japan. After the 1920s, the Japanese Bar Examination produced a greater number of successful 
candidates. More than 700 became successful graduates in both 1922 and 1923, which was five 
times the number of passers in 1919 (the Official Gazette of the Japanese Government 1922; 
1923). From 1919 to 1924, about 47 Japanese metropole lawyers migrated to Korea to practice 
law, far exceeding the previous number of Japanese migrant lawyers.  
From the early 1920s onwards, a growing number of Korean lawyers with metropole 
qualifications started to register and practice law in colonial Korea. Many were former study 
abroad students who had studied in Japan’s elite universities. The first Korean to pass the 
Japanese Bar Examination in 1918 was Yi Sŭngu. Following Yi, twenty Korean lawyers 
registered with the colonial government after passing the Japanese Bar Examination between 
1919 and 1924 (the Official Gazette of the Japanese Government 1919; 1920; 1921; 1922; and 
1923). It is noteworthy that the key figures of the lawyer activism in the 1920s, including Yi In 
and Kim Yong-mu, were those who had passed the Japanese Bar Examination. Although not all 
Korean candidates returned to Korea right after passing the exam, the majority of them did. Kim 
Pyŏng-u, who passed the Japanese Bar Examination in 1921, came back to Korea in 1927 (The 
Official Gazette of the Colonial Government July 14th, 1927). After the judicial examinations 
became integrated into the National Higher Civil Service Examination in 1925, the influx of 
98 
returning Korean candidates continued. In the early 1940s, while the number of Koreans who 
passed the National Higher Civil Service Examination surged, the number of Japanese applicants 
decreased due to conscription.  
The study abroad of Korean students and their return after graduation originated from a 
huge difference in law education between metropole Japan and colonial Korea. Emulating the 
education system in metropole Japan, the colonial government maintained its education structure 
but segregated the structure into a two-track system based on ethnic division. Most Japanese 
students followed a track oriented to higher education from elementary, to secondary, and to 
college education, whereas most Korean students trailed a path directed toward vocational 
education from normal, to secondary, and higher vocational education. Most Koreans were 
allowed to learn law in vocational colleges. An offspring of the pre-colonial Korean 
government’s Jurist Training School, the Keijō Vocational Law School (k: Kyŏngsŏng pŏphak 
chŏnmunhakkyo; j: Keijō hougaku senmon gakou) was the sole path to learning law and 
becoming a low mid-ranking official within the colonial government. However, graduating from 
this school did not guarantee a lawyer license. To become a lawyer, one had to compete with 
other Korean court clerks for the three or four positions as judge or prosecutor within the 
colonial government that were available every year.  
With the path to higher education nearly closed to them in colonial Korea, many Korean 
students opted to study in Japanese colleges, which remained open to Korean students (Zeng 
1999). Many Korean elite students considered study abroad in Japan as the most promising way 
to attain higher education in the early 1900s and transformed Japanese colleges into a training 
ground for national exams. In particular, for Korean students who usually did not have a middle 
99 
school diploma, the vocational programs (j: senmonbu) within the Japanese four-year colleges 
were the most popular. 
 
Lawyers with Colonial Qualifications 
The Lawyer’s Law in 1912 divided the lawyers into two groups depending on their 
qualification. One was lawyers qualified by imperial law; the other was lawyers qualified by an 
executive ordinance. Lawyers with colonial qualifications were qualified by an executive 
ordinance that operated independently of the laws in mainland Japan. Unlike judicial officials 
with metropole qualifications, some judges and prosecutors of the colonial government were 
recruited through a special condition that responded flexibly to colonial circumstances. In 
principle, the colonial government had to abide by the Constitution and Court Constitution Laws 
in electing its higher officials. The Constitution and Court Constitution Laws dictated that judges 
and prosecutors meet their qualifications by either passing the Jurist Examination (later known as 
the National Higher Civil Service Examination) or graduating from an imperial university 
(before 1920). However, attracting elite judicial officials to colonial Korea was not an easy task. 
Vacancies at the lowest level of court became common from the late 1910s to the late 1920s. To 
fill these vacancies, the colonial government introduced a measure in 1922 to hire judicial 
officials from a pool of Japanese and Korean court clerks. During the 1920s, about 80 Japanese 
and 60 Korean court clerks were promoted to judges or prosecutors and assigned to the lowest 
level courts. In addition, special regulations for Korean judicial officials, who accounted for a 
quarter of the judicial officials within the colonial government, were passed. The quota, inherited 
from the pre-colonial government of Korea in 1908, remained in effect until the end of colonial 
rule. After the promulgation of ordinances No. 6 and 7 in 1910, it became possible for Korean 
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judicial officials and Korean court clerks to become judges or prosecutors within the colonial 
government. For most Korean judicial officials, who had neither graduated from imperial 
universities nor passed the national exams, this was their only path of employment in the colonial 
government?  
With the end of this system of promotion for Korean clerks who wished to become 
judicial officials in the early 1930s, the judicial bureaucracy became the main source of lawyers 
in colonial Korea. Although they were devised to meet the shortage of qualified judicial officials 
and recruit Korean officials into the colonial government, the Governor-General’s ordinances 
created special paths of recruitment which would have not been possible in metropole Japan. 
Many court clerks, some policemen, and Korean officials were named judges or prosecutors 
through executive ordinances on their qualifications. Still, judicial officials appointed through 
these measures were not allowed to be promoted to higher positions such as the chief-judge of 
local courts or the prosecutor-in-chief of local prosecutor’s offices. In addition, judicial officials 
and lawyers appointed through these special conditions were not entitled to practice law outside 
of colonial Korea.  
After the Korean Bar Examination that had ceased operation in 1909 resumed in 1922, it 
also became an important institution for producing lawyers in colonial Korea. Unlike the 
Japanese Bar Examination administered by the Ministry of Justice in metropole Japan, the 
Korean Bar Examination was administered by the colonial government’s Bureau of Justice. An 
ordinance on the Korean Bar Examination passed on December 2nd, 1921 stipulated that the 
examination be comprised of a preliminary exam, a main written and oral exam, and a medical 
checkup. Those who had completed preliminary college courses or their equivalent as recognized 
by the Governor-General were waived from taking the preliminary exam, which consisted of an 
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essay. Topics within the written exam included civil law, criminal law, commercial law, civil 
procedure, criminal procedure, international law, the Constitution, and economics. The 
successful candidates of the written exam moved onto the oral exam, which tested their 
knowledge of civil law, criminal law, commercial law, civil procedure, and criminal procedure. 
By 1945, the Korean Bar Examination had produced 224 successful candidates who were 
entitled to practice law only within the jurisdictional boundary of colonial Korea. Also different 
from the Japanese bar examination was the quota system that was in place with the Korean Bar 
Examination. Within the Korean Bar Examination system, only a limited number of successful 
candidates could pass the exam. Until 1940, the number of successful candidates of the 
examination remained less than 10 per year. In 1924, Daily Dong-A newspaper reported how 
exam applicants had pleaded with the Governor-General and even to the Japanese government to 
increase the number of passers after pointing out how the examination had produced only three 
that year (Daily Dong-A September 14th  and September 29th ,1924). 
The category of colonial lawyers also included Korean lawyers who had already 
practiced law before colonization. The Korean Bar Exam was administered twice in 1907 and 
1908, producing 11 lawyers in total. In addition to these practicing lawyers, there were Korean 
lawyers who had retired from the Korean courts prior to the delegation of judicial sovereignty to 
Japan in 1909. By an executive ordinance passed in 1910, the Japanese colonial government 
recognized the right of these lawyers to practice law. Therefore, before colonization, there were 
about 47 practicing Korean lawyers either from the pre-colonial Korean judiciary or the Korean 
Bar Examination.  
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Figure 6 Registration of Lawyers with Colonial Conditions; source: The Official Gazette of the Colonial Government from 1910 to 
1945; note: there was no lawyer registration in 1937 because the Lawyers Law in 1936 required the Korean Bar Examination 
passers to go through an eighteen-month probationary course. Thus, those who passed the exam in 1936 and 1937 started to 
register only in 1938. 
 
Figure 6 presents the longitudinal trend of colonial lawyers’ registration with the colonial 
government from 1910 to 1945. Until 1921, nearly all the colonial lawyers were Koreans. Most 
Korean lawyers who registered before 1911 were lawyers who had already obtained their license 
from the pre-colonial Korean government. From 1912 to 1921, there were only a handful of 
lawyers with colonial qualifications since the government did not administer the Korean Bar 
Examination. During this period, the Korean lawyers were either practicing lawyers who had 
already registered before the country’s colonization in 1910 or judicial officials of pre-colonial 
or colonial Korean governments. With the resumption of the Korean Bar Examination in 1922 by 
colonial authorities, the supply of lawyers with colonial conditions slowly but steadily increased.  
Still, until the early 1930s, the Korean Bar Examination produced less than 10 successful 
candidates per year. The first year, for instance, produced only four passers out of 122 applicants. 
In 1923, the second year, the number of passer remained at only five. Meanwhile, the 
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administration of the Korean Bar Examination in 1922 induced the influx of Japanese into 
colonial Korea. In fact, the Korean Bar Examination was another route for talented Japanese 
court clerks or policemen to become a lawyer within a few years. In 1922, three out of the four 
successful candidates were Japanese. The dominance of Japanese passers continued until the 
early 1930s leading to a growing number of Japanese practitioners with colonial qualifications. 
From 1922 to 1936, about fifty Japanese lawyers who had satisfied the colonial conditions 
practiced law in colonial Korea.  
 
 
Figure 7 the Institutional Pathways to Practicing Lawyers in Colonial Korea from 1910 to 1945 
 
Figure 7 illustrates the five institutional pathways to becoming a practicing lawyer in 
colonial Korea. While metropole lawyers were either judicial officials of the colonial 
government (MQ1) or migrant lawyers from mainland Japan (MQ2), colonial lawyers came from 
practicing lawyers in pre-colonial Korea (CQ1), retired/resigned judicial officials of the colonial 
government (CQ2), or the Korean Bar Examination passers (CQ3). Ethnicity became a 
complicating factor in the composition of practicing lawyers in colonial Korea. Ethnicity 
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complicated the five pathways in increasing the numbers of Japanese who became a lawyer 
through colonial qualifications while Koreans became a lawyer through metropole ones.  
Due to these different backgrounds, it became difficult for the collective body of 
practicing lawyers in colonial Korea to build a coherent professional identity. As former judicial 
officials of the colonial government or migrant lawyers, the Japanese lawyers considered 
practicing law in colonial Korea to be a business. If their business did not go well, they just quit 
and left. Their professional identity remained that of practicing lawyers in a colony. For colonial 
lawyers, in contrast, colonial Korea was the jurisdictional boundary within which their status was 
legally guaranteed. They thus became colonial lawyers with a marginalized status vis-à-vis their 
metropole counterparts. 
 
Fragmented Interests and Identity 
 
Such different attitudes of the Japanese and Korean lawyers towards colonial Korea 
manifested themselves specifically in their differing stance towards the withdrawal of 
registration and implementation of Court Constitution Laws. While resigning meant quitting 
their job within the colonial government for colonial lawyers, it meant leaving colonial Korea for 
presumably another job—similar or different—elsewhere in the empire for metropole lawyers. 
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Figure 8 Lawyer's Dropout Except for Death Divided between Metropole and Colonial Lawyers; source: The Official Gazette of the 
Colonial Government from 1910 to 1945 
 
Figure 8 shows the longitudinal trend of the lawyers’ dropout except for death from 1908 
to 1945 divided into metropole and colonial lawyers. Because the executive ordinance on 
lawyers in colonial Korea stipulated that lawyers be disqualified through the submission of the 
withdrawal to the colonial government, disciplinary actions imposed by the government, or death, 
the longitudinal trend of lawyers’ dropout represents the different intents of quitting their work 
by professional qualifications. The overall frequency of withdrawals from the lawyer registration 
by Japanese metropole lawyers is shown to be far greater than the withdrawal of other groups of 
lawyers. Whereas no more than ten colonial lawyers submitted their withdrawal requests to the 
colonial government for the first two decades of the colonial rule, the number of requests of 
metropole lawyers amounted to 37 for the same period. The submission of withdrawals of 
metropole lawyers rapidly increased, as Japan entered in conflicts with China and Western 
countries in the 1930s. 12 lawyers in 1930 and 15 lawyers in 1936 submitted such requests. In 
particular, after the colonial government enacted an executive ordinance in 1936 requiring all 
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lawyers to register with a bar association, many metropole lawyers left colonial Korea. If the 13 
metropole lawyers who had been deleted from the colonial government’s registry would have 
been included in the counting (the Official Gazette of the Colonial Government August 3rd 1936), 
then the number of metropole lawyers’ withdrawal request becomes 27. With the start of a full-
scale war by Japan in the 1940s, many metropole lawyers also decided to return to Japan. From 
1940 to 1943, while 26 metropole lawyers dropped out of the bar associations in colonial Korea, 
no metropole lawyers registered in colonial Korea. 
More complicated than the withdrawal of lawyers from colonial Korea was the issue of 
implementing the Court Constitution Laws that had the potential to unify the separate legal 
jurisdictions and equalize the status of colonial and metropole lawyers.26 The unification of the 
two jurisdictions involved the fundamental issue of whether the Governor-General in Korea or 
the Minister of Justice in Japan would exercise control over the judicial officials and court 
administration in the colony. As a separate jurisdiction, colonial Korea was under the direct rule 
of the Governor-General who controlled the affiliated organizations and issued executive 
ordinances that were equivalent to enacted laws in mainland Japan. The ordinance on colonial 
Korean courts (Chosēn Chuhutoku Saipanshurei) stipulated that the authority to monitor judicial 
officials in colonial Korea was held not by the Ministry of Justice but by the colonial government. 
In contrast to judges in mainland Japan whose independent status was protected by the 
Constitution and its related laws, judges in colonial Korea had no such protection. Some articles 
in the ordinances stipulated the independence of judges but their coverage fell far short of those 
                                                 
26 To restrain the Governor-General’s extensive authority in colonial Korea, the metropole government in the 1920s 
introduced several measures. Attributing the cause of the country-wide anti-Japanese movement in Korea 1919 to 
the Governor-General the Japanese government tried to appoint a civilian official to this position. The appointment 
of Saito Makoto, a Navy Admiral, was a result of negotiation between the Japanese government and the Japanese 
Army. 
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in metropole Japan.27 If the Court Constitution Laws were applied to colonial Korea, then the 
Governor-General would have lost its power to monitor the judiciary. Therefore, the application 
of the Court Constitution Laws to colonial Korea was a non-negotiable issue for the colonial 
government. 
In general, the Japanese metropole lawyers also took a negative stance towards the 
implementation of these laws, insisting that colonial Korea was too under-developed to be 
completely incorporated into Japan. In a lawyer’s conference in 1925, Matsuda, a Japanese 
lawyer, suggested that colonial Korea remain under the direct control of the Governor-General 
for a while longer. It is not surprising that Matsuda took this stance since he was a former 
judicial official of the colonial courts. In contrast, Japanese colonial lawyers viewed the 
implementation of these laws as an important means to elevate colonial Korea’s level of 
civilization. With their legal status as a lawyer meaningless outside the boundary of colonial 
Korea, they pushed for the unification of the two jurisdictions as a means to practice law 
anywhere in the Japanese empire. 
While the Korean lawyers and the general Korean public were well aware of the 
importance of the Court Constitution Laws, they were divided as to how to view them. In 1921, 
the Daily Dong-A proposed that the Court Constitution Laws be applied to colonial Korea as part 
of legislative efforts to eventually make Koreans equal to the Japanese in terms of voting rights 
and other constitutional protections (Daily Dong-A May 11th, 1921). In the following year, the 
newspaper also declared that jurists in colonial Korea should remain keenly aware of the 
people’s right to vote (Daily Dong-A February 27th, 1922). To be sure, Korean lawyers were 
already well aware of importance of colonial Korea’s juridical separation from mainland Japan. 
                                                 
27 For example, the judge disciplinary committee was organized by the Governor-General and the General assumed 
the chair of the committee. Moreover, The Bureau of Justice, one of the six main bureaus within the Governor’s 
Office, supported and advised the General with regard to the personnel management of judicial officials. 
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In an interview with Tongkwang (1932), one Korean lawyer, Hŏ Hŏn, asserted that “the point 
that we want to reiterate is the different jurisdiction of colonial Korea from metropole Japan 
since the Court Constitution Laws do not apply to this country (Hŏ Hŏn, November 1st, 1932 
Tongkwang Vol. 39).” 
However, applying the Court Constitution Laws to colonial Korea was not an easy issue 
for nationalistic activists. Depending on whether they believed that colonial Korea would one 
day be part of the Japanese empire or an autonomous territory that deserved its own self-
governance, the Koreans viewed the laws differently. The issue of the law’s implementation also 
provoked strong reaction on the part of pro-Japanese Koreans who actively championed the 
equal rights of Koreans. They believed that the integration of colonial Korea into imperial Japan 
would eventually result in an envoy of Korean representatives to the Imperial Diet. In contrast, 
the majority of nationalistic Koreans, who stressed the education and enlightenment of the 
Korean public, supported jurisdictional separation. They, on the one hand, hoped that the 
institution of the Court Constitution Laws would contribute to the abolishment of oppressive 
legislations based on the Governor-General’s executive ordinances regarding security, 
newspapers, and public gatherings—all of which constrained the Korean people’s freedom. 
Despite these hopes, however, they were still concerned that the integration of colonial Korea 
into the Japanese empire would result in its permanent subordination, which opposed to their 
goal to achieve self-ruling by Koreans in the Japanese empire. Between the integration of the 
legal system and the jurisdictional separation, many nationalistic lawyers did not firmly establish 
their stances, because each represented two different ideals. The integration of the legal system 
risked their nationalistic and realistic goal to obtain self-governance, although it possibly 
improved the oppressive politics by the colonial authorities. In contrast, the jurisdictional 
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separation to some extent guaranteed the different status of colonial Korea from metropole Japan. 
Advocated by the colonial government, the separation served as the main reason for extensive 
power of the colonial government. However, it also played the deterioration of the rule of law in 
colonial Korea, as it granted the colonial government excessive power. 
The group that most aggressively challenged the status quo and advocated for the 
adoption of these laws were the Japanese colonial lawyers. In a newspaper article entitled, “The 
Independence of the Judiciary and colonial Korea,” Miyazaki Takeshi, a Japanese lawyer who 
had passed the Korean Bar Examination in 1924, asserted,  
 
The direct control of the Governor-General over the court should be ceased at its 
administrative control, but not be extended to the content of judgments. I have been told a 
rumor that the Governor-General has occasionally intervened in some cases. I do not 
believe such a rumor to be true. But I suggest that the rumor already reflected that the 
judicial system exposes some problems… The prosecutor’s office as well as the court 
should be under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Justice in mainland Japan. Although 
such a delegation [of the judicial power to the Ministry of Justice] would be uneasy for 
the Governor-General and the colonial government, it is inevitable [for the independence 
of the judiciary] (Miyazaki Takeshi, September 8th, 1929, Horitsu Shinbum). 
 
In the article, Miyazaki asserts that the division of the judiciary from the administration 
be accomplished and further the court be integrated into the court system in metropole Japan in 
order to improve the role of judiciary in colonial Korea. His arguments were reasonable in that as 
a practicing lawyer in colonial Korea with the colonial qualification, the unification of the legal 
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system brought him to the same legal status to metropole lawyers. Moreover, similar to many 
Japanese residents in colonial Korea who believed that the colonial government was oppressive 
even to Japanese, his argument aimed at restraining the extensive power of the colonial 
government. However, the arguments were hardly acceptable for both the colonial government 
and the Korean practitioners with entirely different reasons. For the colonial government, on the 
one hand, the unification meant the loss of judicial power that had served one of its main wings 
to stably and efficiently rule colonial Korea. For most Korean lawyers, on the other hand, the 
unification denoted that colonial Korea to be unified into a part of Japan and therefore lose the 
change to be independent. 
 
Chapter Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I have shown how the identity of practicing lawyers in colonial Korea, as 
dictated by the colonial legal structures, became fragmented by qualifications and ethnicity. 
Lawyers who were segregated by separate jurisdictions and ethnicity displayed very different 
attitudes towards the legal orders of colonial Korea and the entire empire. I have suggested that 
one way the lawyers in the colony and the colonial lawyers differed was through their different 
patterns of withdrawal and attitudes towards the Court Constitution Laws. For most metropole 
Japanese lawyers, colonial Korea was merely an extension camp where they might advance to or 
retreat from. Within metropole lawyers, Japanese lawyers were not much interested in improving 
the status of colonial Korea. In contrast to their metropole counterparts, Japanese lawyers who 
obtained their license from the colonial government were the most actively engaged in the 
unification movement.  
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Such varying attitudes derived from the legal structures in colonial Korea imposed by the 
Japanese colonizers. The legal structures made it difficult for lawyers, divided by qualification 
and ethnicity, to form a coherent professional identity. With ethnicity and/or qualification 
prioritized over their unity, it also made it difficult for the profession—despite the high status of 
individual lawyers—to be vocal on public issues. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF LAWYERS 
Where to Practice and Where to Move 
 
 
Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter explains how lawyers’ status in the bar hierarchy affected their choice of 
residence during the colonial period from 1910 to 1945. To analyze their “geographical 
distribution,” I examined the relationship between their first choice of place to practice law and 
the odds of being transferred to another place with their ethnicity, qualification, and in-office 
career. As explicated earlier, lawyers in colonial Korea were equally treated regardless of their 
origin of qualification or ethnicity. Drawing on writings on the social stratification of lawyers 
which argue that a lawyer’s place of practice and chances for transfer are determined by their 
status, I argue that both the most and least prestigious lawyers practiced law in Seoul whereas 
lawyers with intermediate prestige practiced law in minor cities. After constructing a profile of 
the 799 practicing lawyers including their dates of registration, plates of registration, dates of 
transfer, dates of withdrawal, and their in-office career trajectories through archival research, I 
engaged in logistic regression analysis to discover that lawyers who served in higher level courts 
and who started their law practice right after passing the bar examination tended to choose Seoul 
as their first place of registration. In contrast, Korean lawyers with colonial qualifications were 
more likely transfer to another place. Another logic regression analysis tracing the Korean 
lawyers’ history of transfer showed that the majority of Korean lawyers circulated around local 
cities or moved from larger to smaller cities. I conclude that lawyers in colonial Korea, who were 
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hierarchically structured by their in-office career, qualification origin, and ethnicity—all of 
which differently impacted their status in the bar—experienced different forms of geographical 
distribution.  
 
Theories of Lawyer Status in the Bar and their Geographical Distribution 
 
The geographical distribution of lawyers represents two dimensions. On the one hand, it 
is involved with where lawyers decide to practice law. The fact that elite lawyers have corporate 
clients also suggests that they are more likely to locate in big rather than mid or small-sized cities. 
That is because major cities provide more opportunities for lawyers to acquire corporate clients. 
In today’s globalized world, prestigious law firms in the United States or United Kingdom open 
branch offices in large metropolitan cities in Asia, Africa, and South America but not in minor 
cities (Silver 2007). On the other hand, the distribution is related to where practicing lawyers 
transfer. Literature on lawyers’ domestic and international migration supports this proposition. 
For instance, with rapid industrialization, Chinese lawyers have migrated from inner cities and 
rural towns in the western part of the country to big cities on the east coast to seek opportunities 
(Liu, Liang, and Michelson 2014). With the choice for place where to practice law and the 
decision to transfer, the geographical distribution of practicing lawyers is determined. 
Where to practice law and where to transfer are closely associated with the lawyers’ 
relative status in the bar hierarchy. The social status of lawyers in the bar is by and large 
determined by two factors. One is the client-type. According to Heinz and Laumann (1994), 
lawyers have two client types: corporations and individuals. Lawyers with higher social status 
tend to work for corporate clients or a few select individuals. Lending support to this thesis has 
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been Sandefur’s research, which shows that lawyers, whose prestige lies in their specialty, are 
more likely to attract corporate clients (Sandefur 2001). Dinovitzer and Garth (2007: 43) have 
also suggested that “the higher a lawyers’ law school ranking is, the more likely s/he would have 
corporate type clients than individual/small business type clients.” Another factor contributing to 
the lawyers’ social status is their durable social relationships with their clients. The expertise of 
lawyers is in many cases defined by their jurisdictional boundary since law is a system not only 
of substantive incentives and penalties but also moral principles and symbolic rules (Suchman 
and Edelman 1996). If they move beyond the jurisdictional boundary of their knowledge, they 
are likely to lose legal authority. With their expertise heavily reliant on local knowledge and 
local social networks, lawyers seek to maximize both in order to bolster not only their income 
but also their social status (Michelson 2007; Sarat and Felstiner 1994; Silbey 1981; Mather, 
McEwen, and Mainman 2001). Since lawyer is a legal profession whose power is based on long-
term relationships with their clients, migration to a new place often risks the loss of social capital 
as well as their expertise resulted in entering the bottom of the legal profession’s social structures 
(Dinovitzer 2006). 
The concepts of social capital bridge the distribution of lawyers with their status in the 
bar. Social capital, defined as potential and realized benefits from social ties with someone 
(Bourdieu 2001; Lin 2002),28 the capital can be measured empirically along two dimensions. 
One is the prestige of the people with whom I have a relationship. Existing literature on social 
network studies suggests that the prestige of the people with whom I made be considered in 
differentiating social links (Katz 1953) (Podolny 2001). The other is the duration of social 
relationships with which I have maintained. As Ronit Dinovitzer (2006) asserts, “[T]o be 
productive social capital must be successfully marshaled by those situated individuals who can 
                                                 
28 There are some studies noting constraining effects of social capital (Uzzi 1996; Dinovitzer 2006). 
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convert it into a meaningful resources” (448: italic added by the author). How long a person 
makes a relationship with others indicates the depth of the relationship and therefore increase the 
likelihood to convert the relationship into resources. In other words, a lawyers’ social capital is a 
situated asset whose conversion into a more tangible form depends on who the other person is 
and how long the lawyer has known him or her. 
With regard to the relationship between the lawyers’ status and their geographical 
distribution, therefore, the most prestigious are those who have enjoyed a stable relationship with 
prestigious clients. In other words, lawyers with relationships with corporate-type clients for a 
long while are the most prestigious lawyers. Such lawyers are found in large cities with a great 
number of corporations and prestigious individual clients. In contrast, the least prestigious are 
those who have maintained short-term relationships with individual clients. In failing to find and 
maintain durable relationships with prestigious corporate or individual clients, non-elite lawyers 
often migrate to either big or mid to small-sized cities in order to find better opportunities. 
Somewhere between the most and the least prestigious lawyers, there are mid-ranked lawyer 
groups who enjoyed either durable relationships with their individual clients or unstable 
relationships with corporate clients. Lawyers who fall in these two groups hold intermediate 
levels of prestige in a sense that they lack either compared to the most prestigious lawyers.   
Using the theoretical insights of these readings, this chapter seeks to understand the 
geographical distribution of practicing lawyers in terms of social capital that shows what types of 
social network one maintains. We can conceptualize two clusters of practicing lawyers in a given 
geographical distribution by the relationship’s stability and prestige. In one cluster, the most and 
least prestigious lawyers practice law in big cities for very different reasons. Lawyers, who 
belong to the dominant racial/ethnic group and have an upper class family background and elite 
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law school education, are much more likely to have stable and well-compensated relationships 
with higher status clients. In contrast, lawyers from a minor racial/ethnic group with lower class 
family background and less prestigious law school education undergo many difficulties in 
finding stable client relationships and settling down. Unlike elite lawyers, non-elite lawyers in 
big cities are forced to decide whether to stay or leave a big city depending on the ethnic 
networks that are available to them in other cities. In the other cluster are lawyers with an 
intermediate level of prestige, who are neither super elite nor super poor. They practice law in 
minor cities by relying on existing social networks. Although these practicing lawyers in small 
cities and rural areas have limited chances to gain prestigious clients, their durable relations with 
the residents and community leaders of these cities sometimes contribute to them becoming 
influential figures. In sum, the geographical distribution of practicing lawyers can be 
summarized as follow: 1) lawyers who graduated from elite law school likely to practice law in 
major cities; 2) lawyers who graduated from non-elite law school likely to practice law in major 
cities; 3) lawyers who graduated mid-level law school likely to practice law in minor cities; 4) 
lawyers who held lower level of social network likely to transfer to another city.  
 
The Colonial Korean Context for the Lawyers’ Bar Status 
 
Japanese Migrant Lawyers to Colonial Korea  
Colonial Korea provided a context for migrating Japanese lawyers that was both similar 
and different from the context of ordinary migrants. Unlike migrant workers who often lacked 
the basic language skills and social networks to acquire prestigious jobs (Ahmad 2014), the 
Japanese migrant lawyers had little problem communicating with Japanese government officials 
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in colonial Korea. In fact, even though Japanese residents represented less than 3% of the entire 
population in colonial Korea until the 1940s (Uchida 2013), they monopolized important 
political, economic, and social positions. As for some Japanese lawyers, they were much more 
privileged than their Korean counterparts in possessing valuable social networks. For this reason, 
many celebrated Japanese metropole lawyers settled in Seoul and engaged in various enterprises 
ranging from mining, fishery, agriculture, fabrics, and finance.  
For example, after registering to practice law in Seoul in 1916, Fusaki Uzawa later 
became a member of the Japanese Diet in 1930-34 followed by an appointment as the president 
of Meiji University 1934-1935. After graduating from Tokyo Imperial University, Torakichi 
Akao migrated to Seoul in 1912 and practiced law together with another prominent Japanese 
lawyer, Takahashi Shonosuke. In 1914, Mr. Akao obtained an exclusive mining concession in 
the Hamhŭng province from the colonial government. Another case was Heikichi Okawa who 
returned to Japan after being appointed the Minister of Justice in 1925. As Uchida (2013) 
quipped, these lawyers were brokers for the empire, linking the metropole and colony and 
imposing the colonial rulers’ perspective on the Koreans (Uchida 2011). For the Japanese 
lawyers, however, living in colonial Korea was like migrating to a distant foreign country in the 
sense that they felt immediately estranged once they stepped outside of the few familiar 
residential areas. This sense of estrangement constrained them from transferring to other places. 
In particular, Japanese lawyers who qualified under colonial conditions (see Chapter 4 for a more 
detailed analysis) were migrant lawyers in a sense that they had fewer social networks to 
mobilize than other Japanese metropole lawyers or even Korean lawyers.  
The Growth and Development of Seoul during the Colonial Rule 
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The colonization of Korea also changed the status of Seoul. After the country’s colonization in 
1910, the Japanese colonizer downgraded the status of Seoul from the capital city of a five-
century-long Chosŏn dynasty (1392-1910) to merely one of many colonial cities. In 1914, along 
with 14 other major cities in colonial Korea, Seoul was administratively downgraded to a city 
(pu), which stirred up internal and external tensions (B. Kim 2010). The Japanese residents in 
Seoul were outraged by the plan and appealed to the colonial government to develop their 
residential areas in the southern part of the city. Korean residents also expressed discontent at the 
colonial government’s lack of interest in developing Seoul and its unequal treatment between 
Korean and Japanese residents. Consequently, the colonial government in the 1920s reversed its 
position and implemented plans to develop Seoul to be on par with other major cities in Japan 
such as Tokyo and Osaka. As a result, the population of Japanese residents in Seoul exploded 
nearly four-fold from 1910 to 1940. From less than 40,000 in 1910, the number of Japanese 
residents in Seoul increased to 65,617 in 1920, 97,758 in 1930, and eventually 150,627 in 1940. 
The last figure accounted for nearly 21% of the total 707,337 Japanese residents in colonial 
Korea during that period (www.kostat.go.kr). The rise of Seoul as a metropolitan city attracted 
highly skilled workers from Japan and the inner cities of colonial Korea. Good amenities, 
including educational facilities, also attracted lawyers from metropole Japan and other local 
cities to Seoul. 
Not only was Seoul’s population growth, the city turned to be a center of colonial 
judiciary. The colonial government’s main office building was located at the very front of the 
main palace of Chosŏn-Korea. In Seoul, the three levels of court were established from the local 
court, the appeal court, and the high court. The local court of Seoul supervised branch courts in 
Kyŏnggi and Kangwŏn provinces, which amounted to 18 in the 1930s. The appeal court of Seoul 
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controlled local courts under its jurisdiction which included courts of Seoul, Kongju, and 
Hamhŭng, and Ch’ŏngchin, and served as the higher courts to which cases filed to these local 
courts were transferred. Moreover, the high court that exercised control over all personnel in the 
judiciary was located in Seoul. Not surprisingly, the number of judicial officials assigned to 
Seoul accounted for the largest proportion. In 1930, there were 39 judges and 16 prosecutors 
were assigned to courts in Seoul, which accounted for 20% (39/196) and 19% (16/86), 
respectively. 
 
 
Figure 9 The Number of Practicing Lawyers, their Average Annual Income, and Its Standard Deviation in 1935-36; source: Survey 
on Lawyers’ Income by the Colonial Government’s Bureau of Justice 1935-1936 
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The concentration of elite lawyers to Seoul, depending on the social structure, also 
resulted in a particular geographical distribution of lawyers in colonial Korea. Figure 9 presents a 
map of the geographical distribution of lawyers throughout the Korean peninsula during the 
years 1935-36 along with their average annual income and the standard deviation of the income 
according to the cities in which they practiced. Noteworthy in Seoul’s dominant status is the 
number of lawyers, their average annual income, and the standard deviation of this income. Of 
317 reported number of practicing lawyers in eleven cities, 105 lawyers practiced law in Seoul, 
accounting for 33% of the total registered lawyers. Lawyers in Seoul far outnumbered the sum of 
lawyers in P’yŏngyang (27) and Taegu (42), then the second and third largest cities in Korea. 
Following P’yŏngyang, the average annual income of practicing lawyers in Seoul was second out 
of eleven cities. The average income of Seoul lawyers at 3,618 Japanese Yen) was only slightly 
less than lawyers in P’yŏngyang at 3,918 Yen. Even though P’yŏngyang lawyers, on average, 
earned more than Seoul lawyers, the latter recorded the broadest range in annual income from 
1,000 to 14,000 Yen compared to 2,000 to 8,000 Yen for the former. No other city in colonial 
Korea had such a huge range of lawyers’ average income. In other words, the practicing lawyers 
in Seoul had the most inegalitarian income structure in colonial Korea during the mid-1930s. 
 
Research Design 
 
Data 
To collect data pertaining to the registration, transfer, and withdrawal of lawyers in 
colonial Korea under Japanese rule, I looked at the official gazettes of the Japanese colonial 
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government from October 1910 to August 1945. Given the independence of the colonial 
judiciary, the colonial government was central to the registration of lawyers in colonial Korea. 
Lawyers who met or passed the metropole conditions were entitled to practice law in colonial 
Korea. This was after submitting a registration request form and obtaining permission from the 
prosecutor-in-chief of the local prosecutor office.29 Likewise, when a lawyer wanted to transfer 
to another location, he had to submit a transfer request form to the prosecutor-in-chief. Upon 
receiving the request, the prosecutor-in-chief filed a report with the director of the Bureau of 
Judicial Affairs along with his evaluation of the lawyer. Upon approving the registration or 
transfer, their details were publicized in the official gazette along with the lawyer’s name, 
location of practice, and the date of request.  
To identify the lawyers’ qualification, institutional origin, and ethnicity, I also looked at 
other archival sources including the official gazette of the imperial Japanese government (1910-
1943), the official gazette of the Taehan Empire (1906-1909), and the list of officials in the 
Japanese colonial government (1910-1943) as well as the official gazette of the Japanese colonial 
government. From the first archival source, I obtained a list of judicial officials assigned to the 
colonial government and the successful candidates of the Japanese and Korean bar exams. From 
the second archival source, I obtained a list of Korean lawyers who had practiced law prior to 
colonization in 1910. From the third archival source, I was able to find out whether a lawyer 
came from the judiciary or not. From the fourth source, I was able to attain the list of successful 
candidates of the Korean bar exam from 1922 to 1945. 
 
                                                 
29 The letters included a set of documents including the certificate of qualification, university diploma, resume, 
home registry, biographical information, and, if necessary, a recommendation letter by a former employer. By 
regulation, all practicing lawyers in colonial Korea were required to submit a transfer request form in order to 
practice law in another place. They were also required to submit a withdrawal request form in order to quit their 
service. 
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Variable Measures and Descriptions 
 
Variable Description Operationalization Mean (Std. Dev) Number of 
observation 
Ethnicity Lawyer’s ethnicity  (Korean =1, Japanese 
=0) 
.525(.500) 795 
Qualification 
Origin 
Lawyer’s place of license 
acquisition  
(colonial Korea = 1, 
metropole Japan =0) 
.457(.498) 784 
Bar Exam Whether a lawyer came 
directly after passing ? the 
Japanese/Korean bar exams 
or not 
(the successful 
candidates of the bar 
exams = 1, ) 
.575(.495) 784 
Rank The highest rank in office 
achieved by the lawyer 
1 (the lowest) to 37 
(the highest), 0 
indicates no office 
career 
6.548(9.744) 799 
Level The level of court in which 
a lawyer served his final 
year of office.  
1 (the lowest) to 4 
(the highest), 0 
indicates no office 
career 
.697(.949) 791 
Seoul Whether a lawyer’s first 
registration place is Seoul or 
not 
(Seoul = 1, other 
cities = 0) 
.395(.489) 799 
Transfer If a lawyer submitted a 
transfer request to another 
place within colonial Korea 
during his time of service, 
then 1; otherwise 0 
(Transfer = 1, 
otherwise = 0) 
.171(.377) 799 
Table 1 Variables and Descriptions 
 
Table 1 presents and summarizes the variables measured for the present analysis. Though 
there was a total of 814 lawyers registered during the colonial period, this study analyzed only 
782 because I was unable to verify some of the attributes of the remaining 32 lawyers such as 
their ethnicity, origin of qualification, first registration date, etc.30 Rank indicates the highest 
position within the colonial government’s judiciary achieved by the lawyer. The system of 
ranking for judges and prosecutors ranged from the 1st rank with 1st salary class for the Chief 
                                                 
30 I excluded three lawyers who registered in the 1940s because their Japanese names hindered me from judging 
their ethnicity. With the colonial government forcing all Korean residents to adopt a Japanese first and/or last name, 
many Korean lawyers complied by changing their first name, last name, or both. Though I tried to find and link their 
old Korean name to the new Japanese one, I was not totally successful. Therefore, I left these individuals 
unidentified. 
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Justice of the High Court and the Prosecutor General to the 8th rank with 12th salary class, which 
was the entry class for Korean judicial officials in the 1910s. Between these two ranks, there 
were 34 combinations of rank and salary class within the colonial judiciary hierarchy. Therefore, 
in order to conduct the analysis, I operationalized the rank as a continuous variable from 1 for the 
lowest and 37 for the highest. The Level variable, meanwhile, denotes the level of court at which 
a lawyer conducted his last year of service. Though the colonial court system technically 
consisted of three level courts with three trials, in reality, it had four tiers: the branch courts, the 
local courts, the appeal courts, and the high court.31 The judges and prosecutors at the higher 
level of court had more authority than those at the lower level. Thus, I assigned one point in an 
ascending level from the lowest courts to the high court.  
As dependent variables, I focused on two dimensions of the lawyers’ migration: lawyers’ 
concentration of Seoul and the transfer of lawyers. As described in an earlier section, Seoul’s 
development attracted an increasing number of Japanese and Koreans during the colonial era, 
prompting Japanese firms in mainland Japan to open offices in Seoul. In addition, Seoul was 
home to both the highest court of authority and the law faculty of Keijō Imperial University 
making it the center of legal authority. The concentration of lawyers to Seoul, I suggest, 
represented the structuation of lawyers in colonial Korea in the way which elite lawyers 
increasingly settled down. Meanwhile, the transfer of practicing lawyers in colonial Korea also is 
the point on which this analysis focuses. Given that lawyers’ reputation and prestige are 
accumulated from social networks, I suggest that frequent transfer(s) denotes that the lawyer 
failed to form firm social networks and accrue social capital. Therefore, lawyers’ frequent 
transfer indicates lawyers with lower prestige.  
                                                 
31 The three trial system worked in such a way that the cases filed at the branch court level moved up to the appeal 
court level and not to the local court level. 
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Analysis and Findings 
 
Regression Model Results 
1) Where to Practice Law (Seoul Orientation) 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
b Exp(b) B Exp(b) b Exp(b) 
Ethnicity (KOR=1) -.325(.178)† .723 -.684(.160)*** .504 -.443(.166)** .642 
Colonial Qualifications -.450(.178)* .638     
Bar 1.069(.158)*** 2.911     
In-Office 
Career 
Rank   -.032(.013)* .969 -.001(.152) 1.001 
Level   -.061(.126) .940 -2.130(.334)*** .119 
Level-Sq     .707(.103)*** 2.027 
Constant -.647(.158)***  .176(.126)  .249(.128)†  
Log Likelihood -489.41      
Pseudo R2 .070  .033  .086  
N 782  789  789  
Chi-Sq 73.93  35.16  91.5  
*p <.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, †<.1, standard errors in parentheses 
Table 2 Logistic Regression Models on the Choice of Seoul as Lawyers’ First Registration Place 
 
The first model, displayed in Table 2, indicates the influence of ethnicity, qualification 
origin, and office career on the odds of practicing law in Seoul. Specifically, controlling the 
effects of qualification origin and the bar exam, the odds of practicing law in Seoul for Korean 
lawyers are .723 compared to the Japanese lawyers. Inversely, in terms of percentage, the odds 
for Japanese lawyers are 38% higher than Korean lawyers. As for the effects of the bar exam on 
the odds of practicing law in Seoul, holding the effects of ethnicity and qualification origin on 
the odds of practicing law in Seoul constant, the odds of practicing law in Seoul for lawyers who 
passed the bar exam and held no office career are 191% higher than lawyers who went through 
the office. In sum, Japanese metropole migrant lawyers formed the majority of practicing 
lawyers in Seoul.  
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Then, to what extent did office careers affect the likelihood of lawyers beginning their 
service in Seoul? In Models 2 and 3, to test the effect of office careers on the odds of practicing 
law in Seoul, I measured the lawyers with ex-judicial official experiences. Rank denotes the 
highest promotion of the lawyer in office, while court level means the level of courts in time of 
registration. In Model 2 where both rank and office levels are taken into account, only Rank 
proved statistically significant. One unit increase in the lawyer’s rank during their time of service 
resulted in a slight decrease in their odds of practicing law in Seoul. However, in Model 3, where 
the squared value of the office level (Level-Sq) was inserted, the variable Level turned out to be 
statistically significant. Holding Ethnicity and Rank constant?, the office level turned out to have 
a positive effect on the odds of practicing law in Seoul, when the lawyer worked either at the 
Appeal Court (Level = 3; in Seoul, P’yŏngyang, or Taegu) or the High Court level (Level = 4; in 
Seoul). 
These findings are consistent with my argument that the most and least prestigious 
lawyers tend to practice law in big cities whereas lawyers with mid-level of prestige practice law 
in minor cities. After passing their bar exams, more elite lawyers with greater office experience 
and non-elite lawyers with little office experience worked in Seoul than lawyers with ordinary 
office experience. With lawyers from the colonial judiciary already having formed social 
networks during their time of service in local cities, they had to consider their accumulated 
capital when deciding where to practice law. Although some were able to mobilize their social 
capital during their term in office, their social capital remained, to a large extent, effective only 
at the local level. In Seoul and within the central bureaucracy, the dominant bureaucrats of the 
colonial government hailed from elite Japanese imperial university or private university 
graduates. In contrast to legal practitioners from the judiciary who usually opened their first 
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office at which they served for last term in order to maximize their social networks with local 
community leaders, the lawyers who became qualified through the bar exam usually registered in 
Seoul. Such lawyers who became qualified through the bar exam had few social networks to 
mobilize. Unlike Korean lawyers who became qualified through the bar exam, who might utilize 
their hometown or family networks, the Japanese lawyers had few such connections in colonial 
Korea. 
2) Lawyers’ Transfer 
 
 Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
b Exp(b)  Exp(b)  Exp(b) 
Seoul -.474(.219)* .623 -.588(.213)** .555 -.466(.219)* .628 
Ethnicity (KOR=1) .513(.235)* 1.670 .643(.218)** 1.901 .547(.221)* 1.728 
Colonial Qualifications .676(.244)** 1.966     
Bar -.066(.202) .936     
Office career Rank   -.054(.020)** .947 -.067(.020)** .936 
Level   .341(.168)* 1.406 1.330(.385)** 3.783 
Level-Sq     -.388(.142)** .678 
Constant -2.081(.237)***  -1.667(.209)***  -1.770(.214)***  
Log Likelihood -344.23  -345.283  -341.03  
Pseudo R2 .051  .052  .064  
N 782  789  789  
Chi-Sq 37.27  37.85  46.37  
*p <.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, †<.1, standard errors in parentheses 
Table 3 Logistic Regression Models on Lawyer’s Transfer 
 
Table 3 presents the results of a logistic regression of the transfer variables. In Model I, I 
found that Seoul had a negative effect on a lawyer’s transfer while a Korean ethnicity and 
colonial qualification had a positive effect. This result indicates that the minorities in the bar—
Korean ethnicity and colonial qualifications—did not play a positive role in the lawyers’ 
decision to settle down in a place. That is, Korean colonial lawyers, regardless of whether they 
came from the judiciary or not, were more likely than other lawyers to transfer during their time 
of service. One possible explanation for the Korean lawyers’ propensity to transfer may be their 
desire to maximize their social networks of families, relatives, and friends in the local cities.  
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In Model 2 and 3, I also discovered that Rank consistently had a negative effect on the 
likelihood to transfer, implying that a higher ranked lawyer was less likely to transfer to another 
city. More specifically, one unit increase of Rank decreased the odds of transfer by .95 in Model 
2 and by .94 in Model 3. For instance, the odds of a lawyer at the 5th rank with 8th salary class 
(Rank = 20) transferring was lower than the odds of a lawyer with no office career (Rank = 0) 
transferring by a factor of .26 (e-1.34 = .26). Similar to the results in TABLE 3, in terms of the 
office level, the higher level a lawyer served, the more unlikely he was to transfer. 
The findings of the second logistic regression analysis proved consistent with the findings 
of the first regression analysis in that lawyers with a lower social status tended to seek 
opportunities in other places. However, this still left unexplained why more Korean colonial 
lawyers from the colonial judiciary tended to transfer to another city than their Japanese colonial 
counterparts. This differential between the Korean and Japanese lawyers can be explained by the 
fact that the Korean lawyers retired at a younger age than the Japanese lawyers who retired as 
late as possible. In fact, the average years of service for Korean judicial officials were less than 
six and a half years compared to more than 14 years for Japanese judicial officials (The List of 
Officials of the Colonial Government). As a result, Korea judicial officials, despite being less 
than Japanese judicial officials, were the source for supplying lawyers during the colonial period. 
 
Further Analysis of the Korean Lawyers’ Transfer 
According to Model 1 in Table 4, Korean lawyers with colonial qualifications were the 
most likely of all lawyers to transfer to another place. In the following section, I further analyzed 
their transfer requests according to three periods: 1) 1910 – 1919; 2) 1920 – 1929; 3) 1930 – 
1939. With only two cases for 1940s, the transfer frequencies for this period were not included. I 
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then divided eleven Korean cities in which they practiced law into three tiers by the level of 
courts located. Thus, Seoul was measured as a first tier city, P’yongyang and Taegu as second, 
and Pusan, Kwangju, Chŏnju, Kongju, Haeju, Sinŭiju, Hamŭng, and Ch’ŏngchin as third. 
 
 1910-19 1920-29 1930-39 
From/to 1st 2nd  3rd Tier 1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd 
1st Tier  N/A 2 3 N/A 1 5 N/A 4 9 
2nd Tier 0  1 1 5 0 16 3 0 12 
3rd Tier 2  1 3 7 4 16 10 3 8 
Table 4 Korean Lawyers' Transfer from 1910 to 1939; source: the Official Gazettes of the Japanese Colonial Government from 
1910 to 1939 
 
Table 4 can be interpreted as follows. During a set period, I charted the transfer of each 
lawyer from a departure city (a row) to a destination city (a column). Thus, if a lawyer moved 
from Seoul to P’yŏngyang in 1916, I counted this transfer as one from a first tier city to a second 
tier city during the 1910 to 1919 period. Likewise, if a lawyer moved from Taegu to Pusan in 
1931, I counted this as a second to a third tier city transfer from 1930 to 1939. Cells in the upper 
diagonals represent migrations from upper status to lower status cities (e.g., from Seoul to 
P’yŏngyang or Pusan or P’yŏngyang to Hamhŭng), while those in the lower diagonals denote a 
transfer from a lower to an upper tier (e.g., from Haeju to P’yŏngyang or P’yŏngyang to Seoul). 
Over the colonial period from 1910 to 1940, a total of 118 transfer cases was observed. 
The two most frequent forms of transfer observed in the 1920s were from second to third 
tier cities and among the third tier cities. In total, there were 16 cases of these forms of transfer, 
indicating that Korean lawyers tended to move to lower status cities and practice law in local 
cities. Even during the 1930s, there was no change is such tendency with 12 cases of transfer 
from second to third-tier cities and eight cases of transfer among third tier cities. Some lawyers 
also transferred to Seoul during the 1920s to 1930s. Twelve and 13 transfers from local cities to 
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Seoul were reported in the 1920s and 1930s, respectively, accounting for 10% (12/118) and 11% 
(13/118) of the total transfers. However, in general, the Korean lawyers’ transfers were oriented 
towards a local city. From the 1910s to 1930s, the frequency of downward transfer was 53 
(2+3+1+1+5+16+4+9+12) while that of upward transfer was 35 (2+1+5+7+4+3+10+3). Thus, 
taking into account transfers among third tier cities, 27 (3+16+8), the majority of Korean lawyers 
practiced law in local cities. 
Additional archival data buttressed the above findings of Korean lawyers engaging in 
downward transfers or circulating among local cities. In his transfer request submitted in 1936, a 
Korean lawyer, Yi Kwan-su, who had been practicing in Taegu, stated that he had been earned 
less than ¥ 1,200 per year since 1927. After his transfer to his hometown in Kongju, he wrote 
that he expected to earn more (Lawyer Documents No. 1936-27). Another Korean lawyer, Kang 
Kŏ-pok, also transferred from Seoul to Haeju, his hometown, in 1933 in the hope of increasing 
his income (Lawyer Documents No. 1933-13).  
 
Geographical Distribution of Lawyers in Colonial Korea 
 
The analysis thus far indicates that the geographical distribution of lawyers depended on 
the lawyers’ relative social status. First, while ethnicity, qualification origin, and the bar were all 
factors affecting the lawyers’ first place of law practice, the bar had the largest impact on 
whether they chose Seoul as their location. Logistic regression analysis has also revealed the 
Japanese metropole lawyers with little office experience in the colonial judiciary to be more 
likely to practice law in Seoul than Korean colonial lawyers with a lot of office experience. 
Lawyers working at a higher level of court also tended to register in Seoul compared to those 
who worked in the lower level courts who tended to open their office in local cities. In the 
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colonial context, lawyers from the Korean bar exam were the least prestigious group of lawyers 
in Seoul. Unlike their counterparts within the judiciary, they had few solid connections to local 
leaders. Nor did they have connection with high status corporate or individual clients like their 
metropole counterparts.  
The second regression analysis also revealed the Korean lawyers to be making the most 
frequent moves to another place. In contrast to their Japanese counterparts, Korean lawyers had 
to submit a transfer request to the colonial authority regardless of whether they had graduated 
from the bar or not. A more detailed analysis of the Korean lawyers’ transfer showed the transfer 
to be occurred in two opposing directions. One was from Seoul to other local cities; another was 
from local cities to Seoul. The results of both the regression and trace analyses demonstrated that 
Korean lawyers transferred to Seoul or moved to local cities during the colonial period. 
Consequently, lawyers in colonial Korea became divided into two clusters by whether 
they practiced in law in Seoul or not. In one cluster were Japanese elite and non-elite lawyers 
who practiced law in Seoul. Within this group of elite Japanese lawyers were those armed with 
diplomas from prestigious imperial universities and those who had resigned from higher posts 
within the colonial judiciary. However, colonial lawyers who had passed the Korean bar 
examination comprised of a great portion of practicing lawyers in Seoul. With no experiences in 
the judiciary as judicial officials, these lawyers suffered at competing with the elite lawyers in 
Seoul. In the other cluster were lawyers with mid-level office careers who tended to practice law 
in local cities and who tried to use their relationships with the local leaders to their advantage. 
The linkage of the two clusters was Korean lawyers. With the dominance of Japanese lawyers in 
Seoul, Korean lawyers practiced law in second, third, or even lower tier cities and towns in 
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colonial Korea. Within such a system, lawyers who had become qualified in the old Chosŏn-
Korean system and bar exam passers became pushed to the bottom tiers of the legal profession.  
 
Chapter Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have examined the effects of lawyers’ status on their geographical 
distribution through two regression analyses testing the factors that affected the lawyers’ first 
place of law practice and the likelihood of transferring to another place. I have also added a 
complementary analysis showing that Korean lawyers with colonial qualifications made frequent 
transfers from one place to another due to their insufficient income and poor social networks. 
Using the dataset obtained from archival research published by the colonial government, I have 
demonstrated that being Japanese, having metropole qualifications, and passing the bar exam all 
increased the odds of practicing law in Seoul over such attributes as being Korean, having 
colonial qualifications, and leading office careers. In other words, while Japanese elite lawyers 
opened their office in Seoul, Korean lawyers from the colonial judiciary tended to practice law in 
the local cities. With regard to the issue of transfer, possessing a Korean ethnicity and colonial 
qualifications were the two main factors driving the lawyers’ transfer to another city. Given the 
risk to the lawyers’ reputation and the potential loss of social networks, the least prestigious 
category of lawyers--Korean colonial lawyers--were the mostly likely to transfer. In a further 
analysis of their origin-destination, the majority of Korean colonial lawyers were seen to transfer 
from upper to lower status cities or circulated among third tier cities.  
By synthesizing social status and social relations theories, we can better understand the 
geographical distribution of lawyers as shaped by their spatial mobility. The lawyers’ location of 
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practice and their transfer to a new place were not only related to their relative social status but 
also intimately tied to the geo-politics of colonial Korea. The findings within this chapter also 
reveal how the spatial division between the center and the periphery in colonial Korea was tied to 
the hierarchical relationship between metropole Japan and colonial Korea. With Seoul, the 
capital of colonial Korea, dominated by elite Japanese lawyers, Korean lawyers were able to 
exercise control only within local cities. The present study urges further examination of the 
effects of spatial division on colonial politics in studying legal institutions within the colony. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF LAWYERS 
Salient Professionals, a Silent Profession 
 
 
Chapter Summary 
 
In this chapter, I argue that the colonial legal structures produced lawyers in colonial 
Korea who were prominent as individuals but comparatively powerless as a profession. In other 
wishes, while many individual lawyers became prominent figures in local politics, business and 
finance, and social organizations, the bar associations, in which they were members, remained 
politically and juristically marginalized. Although the annexation of Korea and the establishment 
of the colonial court system resulted in the proliferation of practicing lawyers, colonial Korea 
remained isolated from mainland Japan with the colonial government exercising absolute control 
over the colonial judiciary and administration. At the same time, colonial Korea remained 
peripheral to the production of legal knowledge that was either imported from mainland Japan or 
formed through the interpretation of indigenous Korean customs by elite Japanese judicial 
officials in the High Court of Colonial Korea. By showing how Japanese colonization brought 
about the formal professionalization of Korean lawyers without granting them substantive rights 
as a profession, this chapter concludes that being a lawyer in colonial Korea was a means to gain 
power and prestige in other social realms but was not an end in itself to form an independent 
profession.   
 
Popularity of Law Education and Qualifying Examinations 
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The popular aspiration to become a practicing lawyer could be seen in great public 
attention paid to the colonial government’s administration of the Korean Bar Examination in 
1922. On December 2nd 1921, the ordinance on the regulation of the Korean Bar Examination 
stipulated that the examination be comprised of the preliminary exam, the main (written and oral) 
exam, and a medical check-up (The Official Gazette of the Colonial Korea, December 2nd, 1921). 
While an essay test served as the first stage of the exam, those who had completed a preliminary 
college course or its equivalent as recognized by the Governor-General were waived from it. The 
subjects of the written exam included civil law, criminal law, commercial law, civil procedure, 
criminal procedure, international law, Constitution, and economics. Only the successful 
candidates of the written exam were entitled to take the oral exam that tested civil law, criminal 
law, commercial law, civil procedure, and criminal procedure. The first Korean candidate to pass 
the Bar Examination, Yi Chongsŏng, along with two Japanese passers, became the subject of 
intense media spotlight in 1922 (Daily Dong-A October 10th, 1922). The competition rate was 
extremely high for this bar examination with 117 applicants taking the main examination and 
only three successful candidates going through all of its three stages (Daily Dong-A October 10th, 
1922). The number of successful candidates for the annual bar examination gradually increased 
from the 1930s to the 40s, but the steep competition remained unchanged. From a pool of nearly 
600 applicants, the exam produced about 20 successful candidates per year in the 1940s. The 
extremely competitive nature of the exam disclosed the unprecedented popularity of law as a 
profession. 
Ironically, one factor responsible for the soaring competition was the poor education 
system. The colonial educational structure brought to colonial Korea by the Japanese colonizers 
consisted of academic and vocational tracks divided from the level of elementary education. In 
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turn, these two tracks corresponded to the ethnic division between Japanese and Koreans with 
the former following a path of elementary school, middle school, and then higher education 
(higher school and university) in Japan while the latter followed a course of a normal school, 
higher normal school, and then vocational school. Despite the modern education system, the 
enrolment rate in these schools remained extremely low. According to one study, with the 
number of students far exceeded the number of schools, the enrolment rate for normal school 
was less than 40 percent until the end of colonial rule (Oh and Kim 2011). Moreover, until the 
opening of Keijō Imperial University (k: Kyŏngsŏng cheguktaehak) in 1924, there were no 
universities in colonial Korea. While post-secondary schools in Korea remained vocationally-
oriented (j: Senmon gakku; k: chŏnmun hakkyo), the colonial government prevented private 
vocational colleges from becoming universities. Law education in colonial Korea was taught at 
vocational law schools including Keijō Vocational Law School (k: Kyŏngsŏng pŏphak chŏnmun 
hakkyo) and Posŏng Vocational College (Posŏng chŏnmun hakkyo). They were designed to 
teach law for vocational purposes and provide a supply of lower mid-level officials such as court 
clerks, policemen, and administrative clerks for the courts and government. For the graduates of 
these schools, there was no possibility of further education.  
The bar examination thus became increasingly viewed as a path of upward social 
mobility for students and lower mid-level officials. Since the examination did not require a 
formal legal education, lower mid-ranking officials and white-collar workers with a secondary 
education were particularly interested in taking it. Among them was Kang Kongsŭng who passed 
the preliminary stage of the Korean Bar Examination in 1925 (Dong-A Ilbo, September 10th, 
1925) but failed to pass the main exam that followed it. He kept applying for the bar exam in the 
1930s and even petitioned the colonial government in 1938 not to abolish it (Dong-A Ilbo, 
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December 27th, 1938). In 1938, 1940, and 1942, he (Official Gazette of the Colonial Government, 
July 25th, 1938; Official Gazette of the Colonial Government, July 29th, 1940; Official Gazette of 
the Colonial Government, July 27th, 1942) but failed in passing the main exam. Finally in 1944, 
he passed all three stages of the bar examination just one year before the colonial government’s 
demise and the independence of Korea (Official Gazette of the Colonial Government, August 
28th, 1944). After independence, he was issued his lawyer license by the Korean Bar Association 
in Seoul in 1946 (Dong-A Ilbo February 7th, 1946). He worked as a mid-level manager (chusa) 
in the central bank of colonial Korea, Bank of Chosēn, which usually required a middle school 
diploma. A diploma of the secondary education, which took ten to twelve years to get, signaled 
that its hold could be a white collar worker. Though Kang’s case is somewhat extreme, many 
people in mid ranking positions took many years to pass the bar examination.  
 
Background Court-Clerk Other governmental 
positions (e.g., 
policeman, school 
teacher) 
Student Others Unknown  Not to 
practice 
law 
Total 
Total 59 (32.6%) 15 (8.3%) 40 (22.1%) 10 (5.5%) 43 (23.8%) 14 (7.7%) 181 
Table 5 Backgrounds of Successful Candidates of Korean Bar Examination from 1922 to 1942; source: Official Gazette of the 
Colonial Government of Korea 1922-1942; Daily Dong-A 1922-1938; Alumni List of the Law School of Seoul National University; 
Alumni List of the Law School of Korea University 
 
Table 6 lists the backgrounds of the Korean Bar Examination’s successful candidates 
from 1922 to 1942. I obtained the table by investigating individual passers’ jobs before 
practicing law from multiple archives such as newspapers, biographies, and classified documents 
surveying educational and occupational backgrounds. Seventy-four out of the 181 successful 
candidates were court clerks, policemen, or teachers, all of which were ranked lower-mid rank 
officials during the colonial period. Although being a court clerk or administrative clerk held a 
certain degree of social prestige and power in colonial Korea (Chang 2001), with the exception 
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of a few who became judicial officials, the majority of them did not rise to the rank of a higher 
official (j: koukokan; k: kodŭngkwan) within the colonial bureaucratic system. Passing the Bar 
Examination became one of the ways to climb the social ladder. The court clerks were more 
advantaged than other applicants in dealing with litigation and other legal issues in everyday life. 
Few applicants in Korea had the opportunity to learn law in the regular colleges. Of the 84 
successful candidates of the Korean Bar Examination from 1922 to 1931, 62 candidates (74%) 
were court clerks.  
The popular aspiration to become a lawyer also manifested itself in the transnational 
migration across the Korean Strait. Hong Nam-sun, who had grown up in South Chŏnra 
Province’s Hwasun County, migrated to the City of Yakayama in Japan in 1936 to enter its 
Yakayama Commercial School. Working as a migrant worker during daytime and studying law 
at night, Hong spent the late 1930s preparing for the Higher Civil Service Examination. When 
his attempts proved unsuccessful, he returned to Korea in 1940 to take up a position as the 
director of Hwasun County’s registration office from 1940 to 1947. Eventually, however, he 
passed the Korean Bar Examination in 1948 and became a practicing lawyer (Memorial 
Committee for Lawyer Hong Nam-sun, 2004). 
Among the disciplines in Keijō Imperial University, law education was the most popular 
and prestigious. Until the end of colonial rule, Keijō Imperial University, founded in 1924, was 
the highest level of educational institute in colonial Korea (Chŏng et al. 2011). According to an 
ethnic quota system, among the 120-150 students admitted each year, one third were Koreans. In 
contrast to the four other Imperial Universities in mainland Japan that had natural sciences and 
engineering departments, Keijō Imperial University only had its School of Law and Letters and 
the School of Medical Science. Within the School of Law and Letters, the majority of students 
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were inclined towards the law department. In 1930s, while 16 Korean students transferred from 
the Department of Letters to the Department of Law, no student did the reverse (Law Faculty 
Alumni of Seoul National University, 2004).32 
 
Socioeconomic Compensation of Lawyers  
 
High Level of Income 
What made lawyer a popular profession was its high income. After the use of a lawyer 
became a taken-for-granted aspect of litigation in the highest level of court from the early 1910s, 
the incomes of lawyers began to soar. Ch’oe Sunmun, the son of Ch’oe Chin, one of the earliest 
Korean lawyers to practice law since 1908, recalled his family never suffering financially during 
his youth. In the early 1910s, a few years after he started to practice law, his father was able to 
purchase a 17 room-house in Seoul (The Journal of the Korean Bar Association: Taehanpŏnhosa 
hyŏphoechi, 1972). Pak Ch’anil, another Korean lawyer who practiced law in Kwangju in the 
1930s, stated that most lawyers earned an average of 3,000 Japanese Yen per year and paid no 
tax on this income (Taehanpŏnhosa Hyŏphoechi 1973). Although this was not true for all 
practicing lawyers in colonial Korea, the majority of the lawyers earned far more than ordinary 
workers and other professionals. According to a statistic released by the colonial government, the 
average annual income of tenants and semi-tenants was around 500 and 550 Yen, respectively, 
during this period (The Annual Statistics of the Colonial Government 1925). While secondary 
school teachers earned about 720 to 1,080 Yen per year, journalists at major newspapers usually 
                                                 
32 Korean students at Keijō Imperial University preferred law to the letters faculty for practical reasons. Graduates of 
the letters faculty who taught the liberal arts disciplines of language and literature, philosophy, and history 
experienced lower social status and prestige. The Korean graduates of this department could become secondary 
education teachers but not full-time faculty at an Imperial University. 
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earned from 960 to 1,080 Yen. Doctors, meanwhile, earned approximately 1,080 to 1,400 Yen 
per year. Even relatively high-ranking government officials received less than 2,000 Japanese 
Yen per year.33 
 
 
Figure 10 Average Annual Income of Practicing Lawyers in Northwestern Korea in 1927-28 and Number of Civil Cases Assumed; 
source: Classified Documents Regarding Lawyers’ Registration 1927-28; note: the income was counted with civil cases) 
 
Figure 10 shows the annual average income of practicing lawyers in two cities: 
P’yŏngyang and Sinŭiju in Northwestern Korea, which the colonial authorities surveyed twice in 
1927 and 1928. It presents the average income of lawyers from civil cases reported in the two 
surveys. From an annual figure of 66 cases per lawyer, the average reported income was 2,903 
Japanese Yen. An outlier was O Sungŭn, a Korean lawyer, who reported 12,000 Yen from 95 
cases in 1927 and 9,684 Yen from 76 cases in 1928. Promoted from a court clerk to a prosecutor 
in 1921, he started to practice law in the city of Sinŭiju in 1923 (Official Gazette of the Colonial 
Government January 27th, 1923). He seemed to choose Sinŭiju as the registration place, because 
                                                 
33 Judges and prosecutors made 1,080 to 1,200 Japanese Yen during their first year of service year, which varied 
slightly depending on their salary class. To earn at least 3,300 Yen per year, the official had to have more than 
fifteen years of service. 
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
0 50 100 150 200
J
a
p
a
n
e
s
e
 Y
e
n
Cases
140 
the city was close to his birth place, Ch’ŏlsan, North P’yŏngan Province. Even after excluding 
this outlier, the average income for lawyers was about 2,606 Japanese Yen. The fees for the 
cases varied by the lawyer. While Cho Wŏnkyu, a Korean lawyer, charged 23.8 Yen per case for 
a total income of 4,160 Yen for the 175 cases he took on between 1927 and 1928, O Sungŭn 
charged 126.8 Yen per case for the 171 cases he represented during this two year-period.  
The main reason for the lawyers’ high income was the tacit practice of giving an 
honorarium to a lawyer who won his lawsuit. Unlike the retainer fee, which ranged from 24 to 
133 Yen per case, the honorarium had no limit. According to one law journal in 1930, lawyers 
customarily received up to 10 percent of the profit that their client expected to earn from a 
litigation (Hōritsu Shimbun 1930, November 5th). Occasionally, the honorarium reached several 
thousand Yen. For example, a magazine cynically reported in the 1930s a case that Han 
Ch’angtal, a Korean lawyer, received an honorarium of 2,000 Yen from a civil case involving an 
inheritance dispute between a father and son (Samch’ŏnri January 1st, 1935).  
 
Categories Monthly Expenditure 
Office rent 40 
Salary for clerk in the office 50 
Other expense 40 
Money to home 80 
General expense 30 
Social expense 40 
Total 280 Japanese Yen 
Table 6 Proposed Budget Plan submitted to the Colonial Government in time of Registration Request (source: Pyŏnhosa kwankye 
sŏryo Pak Ch’anil 1934 No. 6) 
 
The lawyers’ monthly budget also indicated their affluence. Table 6 shows the proposed 
budget of lawyer Pak Ch’anil from his registration request in 1934: 280 Japanese Yen for 
monthly expenses for a total of 3,300 Yen per year. Except for office rent (40 Yen), the office 
clerk’s salary (50 Yen), and family expenses (80 Yen), the rest were variable expenses. Although 
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this was an estimation calculated before practicing law, it indicates that most lawyers looked 
forward to earning around 3,000 Yen per year. 
 
Advancement into Local Politics, Business, and Social Organizations 
Due to their high social status and prestige as reflected in their income, many lawyers 
became prominent political, business, and social leaders. Becoming a board member of one of 
the local assemblies (hyŏpŭhoe) was one way for lawyers to engage in local politics and build 
social networks with local leaders. Despite the introduction of the local congress system into 
Korea by the colonial government, the congress was not a legislative organ and did not have the 
authority to decide on politically sensitive issues. The colonial government prevented self-
reliance to the extent that the voters could not freely elect their representatives. Instead, the 
colonial authorities administered local politics in order to placate the local population and to 
offer the Japanese residents a similar system that they had enjoyed back in Japan. Despite of the 
limited nature of the election, however, its membership was sufficient enough to show leadership 
in local community (Tong 2011). With the right to run for political office open only to a certain 
class of tax payers, it was not easy for commoners to become local elected officials. A notable 
exception was the Korean and Japanese lawyers who ran and often won these elections.  
Using their social prestige and high income, lawyers successfully transformed themselves 
into business entrepreneurs with close connection to the central and local governments in 
colonial Korea. After graduating from prestigious imperial or private universities, Japanese 
migrant lawyers engaged in various enterprises ranging from mining, fishery, agriculture, fabric 
production, and finance. Utilizing their connections to the government officials, businessmen, 
and other professionals, the Japanese lawyers successfully expanded their businesses. For 
142 
example, Akao Torakichi, a Japanese lawyer who had migrated to Korea in 1912 to work with 
another prominent Japanese lawyer, Takahashi Shonosuke, acquired the right to mine a section 
of North Hamkyŏng Province to start a mining company (Official Gazette of the Colonial 
Government 1914). Another noteworthy example was the Japanese lawyer, Tominaga Koreyatsu. 
After graduating from Tokyo Imperial University in 1914, he migrated to Korea and became the 
executive of a financial union in Yŏngdŭngp’o in 1915. A few years later, he moved to the city 
of Sinŭiju to chair the local financial union until 1925. As the owner of a publishing company in 
Japan and Korea, he also frequently crossed the Korean Strait to conduct business. Finally, as a 
practicing lawyer in Sinŭiju, he reported an additional annual income of 6,423 Yen in 1927 
(Classified Documents Pertaining to Lawyer Registration 1927). Tominaga’s work as a 
businessman in northwestern Korea and practicing lawyer in Sinŭiju worked synergistically to 
advance his career.  
Also noteworthy was the advancement of Korean lawyers into business and financial 
sectors. In 1930, Yi Hŭichŏk, a practicing lawyer in Sinŭiju, was elected president of its finance 
union, which consisted of both Korean and Japanese members.  This was the first time in the 
finance union’s 30 year-old history that a Korean was elected the president (Ch’oe 2012). Along 
with his peer lawyers, Ch’oe Ch’angcho and Han Ch’angtal, Yi Hŭichŏk used his money and 
social connections to become involved in many firms located in Korea’s northwestern cities. 
After serving on one company’s board of directors, in 1940, Yi Hŭichŏk became the president of 
his own company capitalized at 125,000 Yen. Like Yi Hŭichŏk, some if not all lawyers in 
colonial Korea used their positions as corporate auditors or lawyers to become involved in 
company administration.  
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Many Korean lawyers also served as lawyers in criminal cases involving Koreans and 
participated in various nationalistic movements for Korean independence. According to one 
Korean lawyer, Yi In, in criminal cases involving the issues of nationalism or socialism, the 
nationalistic Korean lawyers did not receive a retaining fee or honorarium (Yi 1974). In 1927, 
under the banner of political liberty and ethnic equality for Koreans, nationalistic Korean lawyers, 
including Hŏ Hŏn, Kim Pyŏngro, Yi In, Kim Yŏngmu, Kwŏn Sŭngryŏl, and Kim T’aeyŏng, 
formed Hyŏngsa kongdongyŏnguhoe (The United Research Group to Unjust Criminal Cases) (H. 
Kim 2001). The goal of the group was to provide free advocacy for those charged by the colonial 
government. In a survey conducted by the colonial government, one member, Kwŏn Sŭngryŏl, 
refused the retaining fee for the four cases he took on between 1927-28 (Classified Documents 
Pertaining to Lawyer Registration 1928. No. 34).34 
Participating in such anti-colonial government movements granted these Korean lawyers 
with social and moral capital. Certainly, it was not a coincidence that the second and third 
presidents of Shin’ganhoe―the United Association of Korean Nationalists and Socialists (1927-
1930)―were both Korean lawyers.35 After the retirement of the first president, Yi Sangchae, Hŏ 
Hŏn and Kim Pyŏngro respectively led the association until it was disassembled in 1930 (K. Yi 
1993). When they became presidents, Hŏ had already earned their reputation as nationalistic 
lawyers in the 1920s through their involvement in various movements including the March 1st 
Independence Movement in 1919. Kim, after resigning the colonial judiciary in 1920 for less 
than a 20-month of service, started to take on pro bono cases for nationalistic activities involved. 
According to Yi In (I. Yi 1974), his peer lawyer in the cause lawyering activities, they defended 
Koreans against unjust prosecution by the Japanese colonial government in the 1920s. For the 
                                                 
34 Criminal cases were not as lucrative as civil cases. It was often reported that some lawyers who left the former to 
assume the latter were able to make more money (Tong-kwang 1931, Pyŏnhosa p’yŏngp’anki).  
35 The first president, Yi Sangchae, died in 1927 after chairing the presidency for six months.  
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second half of the 1920s, Hŏ and Kim would also chair the Bar Association of Korean Lawyers 
in Seoul (see appendix for the list of Bar Association chairs).  
Along with their social capital, the Korean lawyers had considerable material resources. 
For many social organizations, lawyers were ideal members who could both successfully 
mobilize the people for social movements and solve financial hardship. Shin’ganhoe, for instance, 
was reliant on the donations of its two lawyers to remain financially viable. Kim recalled 
contributing thousands of Yen to cover expenses that were not covered by the membership fees 
(H. Kim 2001). Thus Korean lawyers in colonial Korea brought their legal knowledge, social 
leadership, and material wealth to their socially important positions.36 
Except for a handful of nationalistic Korean lawyers, the accumulation of political, 
economic, and social capital occurred for the lawyers in a complementary manner. After 
resigning from his judgeship, Kim Sangsŏp started a law practice in the city of Taegu in 1911 
(Official Gazette of the Colonial Government November 29th, 1911). Soon after moving to the 
city of Mok’p’o in South Chŏnra Province in 1913, he became one of the most influential figures 
in the city. Not only did he chair the Youth Association of Mok’p’o in 1920, he was named an 
executive of Mok’po’s Commerce Chamber and later in the 1920s became the Bank of 
Mok’p’o’s president. From 1924 to 1934, Kim also served as the representative of a local 
assembly. In between, he also became a state council member. Kim was not alone. From 1924 to 
1944, another Korean lawyer, Yim Ch’angsu, served as the representative of a local assembly in 
South Ch’ungchong Province before advancing to the state council in 1945.  
 
The Formation of Legal Professional Families (Pŏpchoin Kajok) 
                                                 
36 Their commitment to nationalistic movements was rewarded after the country’s independence in 1945. While Hŏ, 
a nationalistic-left lawyer, became the first president of Kim Il-sung University in North Korea, Kim, a nationalistic-
right lawyer, became appointed as the first Chief-Justice of the Judiciary in South Korea. 
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One significant phenomenon during the colonial period that contributed to the socio-
economic reproduction of lawyers was the formation of legal professional families (Pŏpchoin 
Kajok). This occurred when the relatives or descendants of a judicial official or lawyer followed 
in their footsteps to become a judge, prosecutor, or practicing lawyer. Compared to a generation 
ago in the early 1900s when native agents in lawsuits still suffered from low social status, law 
became an important route to achieving social mobility within the colonial context. As a result, 
wealthy farmers and businessmen became eager to have their sons enter the legal profession. In 
1935, Kong Chint’ae, a lawyer who returned to Korea to practice law in 1923 after passing the 
Japanese Bar Examination in Tokyo in 1922, sent his two sons to study at Keijō Imperial 
University. His first son, Kong Yongho, attended the faculty of law of the university. Kong 
Chint’ae’s father, Kong Sŏngchae, meanwhile, was a ginseng merchant in the City of Kaesŏng 
(Kong’s profile from Chosŏn insa hŭngsinrok, the Directory of Influential Korean Figures). The 
transfer of wealth and social status from father to son often occurred through the narrow path of 
being a judicial official or lawyer. For instance, Kim Kapsu, who passed the National Higher 
Civil Service Exam in 1939, was the son of Kim Chongho, who had served as a judge in the 
colonial government from 1917 to 1919 and practiced law in Kwangju in 1919. Kim Kapsu’s 
granduncle, Kim Chŏngbae, also became a judge in the colonial government from 1918 to 1922 
(List of Officials of the Colonial Government 1918; 1919; 1920; 1921; Official Gazette of the 
Colonial Government September 18th, 1922). Kim recalled his father and grand-uncle deeply 
influencing his path to the Faculty of Law of Keijō Imperial University at an early age (K. Kim 
1970). Another famous father-son lawyer family in colonial Korea was No Chaesŭng and No 
Yŏngho. After retiring from the judiciary in 1912, No Chaesŭng started to practice law in 
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Kwangju from 1913. By the time that he retired from the legal profession, he reported an 
ownership of 200 durak of rice paddy (about 11.00 ha), 50 durak of field (about 2.8 ha), and 10 
chŏngbo of forest (9.9 ha). After passing the National Higher Civil Service Examination in 
Tokyo in 1939, his son, No Yong-ho, also became a judicial official (Chŏn 2010). Two other 
cases of father-son lawyer families were Chŏng Kuch’ang and Chŏng Kŭnyŏng and Ch’oe Chin 
and Ch’oe Sunmun. After resigning from the colonial judiciary, Chŏng Kuch’ang started to 
practice law in Seoul in 1913. After passing the Korean Bar Examination in 1941, his son, 
Chŏng Kŭnyŏng, also became a lawyer in 1944. Similar to the Chŏng family, Ch’oe Chin 
became a lawyer in 1908 followed by his son, Ch’oe Sunmun, in 1934. Meanwhile, after 
resigning from the colonial judiciary in 1927 and 1933, respectively, Yi Uik and Yi Usik became 
a team of brother lawyers who practiced law in Taegu. While the older brother, Yi Uik, became a 
prosecutor in a Hamhŭng court in 1916 after graduating from Keijō Vocational Law School in 
1912. Yi Usik entered the colonial judiciary in 1928 after passing the Higher Civil Service 
Examination in Tokyo in 1927.  
 
Son 
Father 
1910-19 1920-29 1930-39 1940-45 Post-colonial 
period 
Before 1910   1  1 
1910-19   2  2 
1920-29  2   4 
1930-39     3 
1940-45    1 1 
Post-colonial      
Table 7 The Formation of Law Families (including judicial officials, lawyers, and law faculties) in Korea from the late 1900s to post-
colonial period; source: the official gazette of the colonial government, the classified documents pertaining to lawyers’ 
registration 
 
Table 7 presents the number of cases in which family members (father-son, in-laws, and 
brothers) were involved in the legal professions as judges, prosecutors, lawyers, or passers of the 
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civil service exam. When someone had more than two sons (in-laws), for instance, who became 
legal professionals, I counted them as one case. The impact of family on improving one’s 
chances of becoming a lawyer was negligible: every year, only four to ten candidates passed the 
Korean Bar Exam and the maximum number of successful candidates in the entire Japanese 
empire was less than 300 hundred per year. Passing the Higher Service Examination or the two 
Bar Examinations in Tokyo and Seoul thus guaranteed social success and prosperity at a 
relatively young age. The mix of elitism and meritocracy within the extremely competitive 
examination process worked to some extent to overcome the ethnic discrimination against 
Koreans. 
The formation of lawyer (or legal professional) families that began in the 1910s was a 
dramatic indicator of the growing prominence of lawyers and other legal professionals as a 
profession. As seen in Chapter 3, the first generation of Korean lawyers, in large part, had a 
relatively marginalized social background. The majority of the early lawyers’ fathers had failed 
to advance into the mainstream of the late 19th century Korean society. During the colonial 
period, however, becoming a judicial official or a lawyer became closely linked with more 
prestigious family backgrounds. Although there were some self-supporting students among the 
passers of the legal profession’s qualifying examinations, the schooling and preparation for the 
examinations were often possible only with strong family support. To receive a proper education 
for the bar or national civil service exams, the students needed money for tuition and living 
expenses that ordinary people in colonial Korea could not afford.37 The total cost of attending 
Keijō Imperial University, including tuition, living expenses, and other fees was 400 Japanese 
                                                 
37 The coupling of affluent backgrounds and high education credentials also applied to Korean judicial officials who 
had passed the Higher Civil Service Examination. According to one Korean researcher, the socioeconomic 
background of Korean judicial officials who passed the Service Examination was much higher than that of ordinary 
Koreans. (Chŏn 2010) 
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Yen per year, which was slightly less than the annual income of ordinary workers in colonial 
Korea (Chŏng et al. 2011). An alternative option for law education was Keijō Vocational Law 
School whose tuition was 141 Japanese Yen per year (Law Faculty Alumni of Seoul National 
University 2004). Moreover, getting a higher education meant paying for all the educational 
costs associated with lower level education, which included at least ten years of elementary and 
middle schools. Although the examinations were meritocratic to the extent that they did not 
require a formal law education, they, in fact, favored higher education recipients. Passing the 
Korean Bar Examination was a goal of those who had completed secondary education or held 
equivalent credentials, while passing the Higher Civil Service Examination was the goal of elite 
law school students from Imperial Universities in the Japanese Empire. 
Lawyers became prominent professionals in colonial Korea. The high socioeconomic 
compensation of legal professionals propelled many aspiring Koreans to enter law and its related 
fields. The educational institutions and qualifying examinations, meanwhile, permitted only a 
handful of people to get into the profession and enjoy its exclusive rewards. Becoming a lawyer 
and judicial official meant not only individual prestige but also honor for his family and region. 
Meanwhile, facilitating such institutional path from receiving a law education to becoming a 
legal professional was Japan’s colonial rule. Even though their intentions were not necessarily 
benign, the Japanese colonizers established the court structure, law education, and the exam 
system to becoming a lawyer.  
Many Koreans in colonial Korea regarded the legal profession as a means to enter local 
politics, business and finance, and/or social organizations. However, few seriously contemplated 
what was involved in being a lawyer. The lawyers were an instrumental means to accomplish 
other people’s work but not a field with a common identity or shared set of values. However, the 
149 
legal profession was an outlet from which individual practitioners left, but not an entrance to the 
field of law. Except a handful of lawyers who willingly engaged in political movements; either 
pro-Japanese or anti-Japanese, most lawyers were not interested in what the bar associations did 
for the sake of their autonomy and the rule of law under the colonial rule. The bar associations 
hardly formed a collective identity of lawyers. Such inversion was caused not by individual 
lawyers but by structural relations that the lawyers made with the colonial state, the metropole 
state, and the colonized subjects. 
 
The Oppressive Colonial State and Constrained Political Space 
 
Although many legal practitioners enjoyed a prominent status in various social realms as 
individuals, their profession by no means enjoyed the same prominence. Rather, the bar 
associations remained weak, inactive, and even silent about major political and juristic issues 
during the colonial period. One reason for the legal profession’s marginality lay in the oppressive 
colonial government that extensively regulated the lawyers. During the colonial period, the entire 
number of registered lawyers reached around 814.38 However, this number never exceeded 400, 
which was far less than the number of practicing lawyers in Japan and Taiwan per capita.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 I examined multiple sources to find every registered lawyer during the colonial period. However, because of the 
name change campaign led by the colonial government that forced some lawyers to change their Korean names to 
Japanese ones, I was unsuccessful in some cases. 
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 Japan Taiwan Korea 
1921 15916 65018 85975 
1925 10432 44596 61539 
1931 9603 30405 N/A 
1935 9705 34971 56276 
1940 13386 49915 66975 
Table 8 Population per Lawyer in Japan, Taiwan, and Korea from 1921 to 1940; Source: Wang (2001: 89 table 3.6) 
 
According to Table 8 quoted from Wang (2001: 89), the number of practicing lawyer per 
population was 56,276 in mid-1930s Korea, which means that one lawyer covered approximately 
56,000 Koreans. Compared to metropole Japan and colonial Taiwan, where one lawyer was for 
slightly less than 10,000 and for about 35,000 respectively, the ratio represents that the number 
of practicing lawyers in colonial Korea was far short of. Throughout the entire colonial period, 
the number of practicing lawyers in colonial Korea never exceeded 420. 
 
 
Figure 11 The Number of Practicing Lawyers in Colonial Korea Divided by Ethnicity from 1909-1944 (Source: The Official Gazette 
of the Governor-general’s Office from 1910 to 1944; the data for 1909 was obtained from the Annual Report of the Residency 
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General’s Office in 1909) (Note: candidates who passed the bar exam in 1944 and 1945 were not eligible to practice law as they 
had to undergo an eighteen-month apprenticeship period.) 
 
Figure 11 shows the longitudinal trend of registered lawyers in colonial Korea from 1909 
to 1944.39 In terms of the supply of lawyers, the colonial period can be divided into three periods: 
1) 1909―1919 2) 1920―1935 and; 3) 1936―1945. The first regime of the colonial state (1910-
1919), often characterized as a period of military rule, was neither interested in expanding the 
role or function of the judiciary nor in establishing independent legal institutions. Instead, in 
accordance with Korea’s colony status, the colonial government tried to simplify the judicial 
procedures. Admittedly, Terauchi Mashatake (from 1910 to 1917), a formerly active Japanese 
Army general and the first Governor-General, who became the Prime Minister of Japan in 1917, 
championed the rule of policemen and military police by allowing them to prosecute and even 
rule on minor cases without going through the court or the prosecutor’s office. It is not surprising 
that such colonial government did not administer the Korean Bar Examination for a long time. 
As a result, except for the influx of migrant lawyers from Japan or resigned/retired judicial 
officials, the supply of lawyers to colonial Korea remained largely stagnant. 
The supply of practicing lawyers in colonial Korea dramatically changed at the turn of 
the 1920s as the colonial government adopted more conciliatory policies. The colonial 
government resumed the Korean Bar Examination in 1922. Saito Makoto, the newly assigned 
Governor-General in 1920, initiated many measures to overcome the unequal standards between 
the Japanese and Koreans and to encourage the Koreans’ political participation. As a result, 
beginning with three successful candidates in 1922, the bar exam produced a total of 181 
                                                 
39 After the registration of the first three Korean lawyers in 1906, by 1910, 47 Korean lawyers practiced law in 
Korea alongside approximately 29 Japanese lawyers. The majority of the first generation of Korean lawyers came 
from study abroad students to Japan who had passed the Korean Bar Examination administered twice by the Korean 
government in 1907 and 1908. This exam turned out 10 successful candidates. 
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successful candidates by 1942.40 Over the 1922 to 1935 period, the number of registered lawyers 
in colonial Korea increased from 230 to 389. The year 1936 marked another threshold for 
lawyers in Korea. After the colonial authority classified lawyers who did not meet the 
profession’s standards, eighteen lawyers became deleted from the legal registry (Official Gazette 
of Governor-General Office 1935). Although the number of lawyers steadily increased until the 
end of World War II to arrive at the total figure of 400, the number of lawyers still fell far short 
of the demand for lawyers among the residents in colonial Korea. 
Despite such longitudinal changes in the lawyers’ registration, these increased figures did 
not change the colonial government’s registration, withdrawal, and disciplining of the lawyers. 
In other words, the bar association remained powerless to control the supply of lawyers in 
colonial Korea. Although the Korean Bar Examination resumed in 1922, the exam committee 
consisted of one chair and seven or eight committee members, all of whom were judicial officials 
within the colonial government. In contrast to the Director of the Bureau of Justice who 
continuously occupied the role of chair for the exam, no lawyers became appointed to the 
committee during the colonial period.  
The colonial government control of the Korean Bar Examination did not differ from the 
metropole government’s control of the Japanese Bar Examination. What differed, however, was 
the colonial government’s control of the supply of legal professionals by overseeing the lawyers’ 
registration process. Unlike metropole Japan where lawyers were allowed to practice law without 
the metropole government’s permission, all the lawyers in colonial Korea had to obtain the 
colonial government’s permission in order to begin their service. 
                                                 
40 The Korean Bar Examination produced passers in years 1943 and 1944; however, it was unclear whether they 
actually practiced law since a new Lawyer Law passed in 1935 forced them to undergo an 18 month-apprenticeship 
under a senior lawyer. 
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Registration was a very strict process for most lawyers. The colonial government 
required all applicants to have the village headman of their residential area submit an application 
letter, resume, record of family registration, record of qualification type, and confirmation letter. 
In addition, the prosecutor-in-chief of the local court where the lawyer planned to practice law 
had to submit a confidential report recommending the applicant to the Bureau of Justice. 
Attached to this report was another inspection report written by a policeman which detailed the 
applicant’s character, family wealth and reputation, and record of anti-social behavior, etc. Some 
lawyers failed to pass this registration process due to earlier run-ins with the law or their family 
background. For example, one request for a lawyer’s license by Kil Wŏnpong, a Korean 
applicant, in 1933 was denied because of his involvement in the 1919 Independence Movement 
Classified Documents Pertaining to Lawyer Registration 1933 No. 4). Another application by 
Korean lawyer, Wŏn T’aekyŏn, in 1931 was rejected after the local police station reported his 
father and brother’s involvement in the March First Movement in 1919 to the local prosecutor’s 
office (Classified Documents Pertaining to Lawyer Registration 1931 No. 3). 
The colonial government was also strict with the Japanese lawyers. A request by 
Japanese lawyer, Kuriyama Kenkichi, was denied by the colonial authority in 1938 when the 
prosecutor-in-chief of the P’yŏngyang local court deemed him a threat to the city. A former 
prosecutor of the colonial government until 1923, Kuriyama practiced law in Seoul from 1924 to 
1933 but remained thousands of Yen in debt to his friends while expanding his business. After he 
returned to Japan in 1933 only to come back to Korea in 1938, the prosecutor-in-chief became 
suspicious of his “unrealistic” dream to become rich overnight (Classified Documents Pertaining 
to Lawyer Registration 1938 No. 17). Personal character was another factor that the colonial 
government took seriously. In 1938, the registration request by a Japanese lawyer, Tajiyourou 
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Tanida, was rejected because of his “insincere” attitude towards work. After passing the judge-
prosecutor recruiting exam in 1918, he had practiced law in Japan but earned bad reputation 
among his peers (Classified Documents Pertaining to Lawyer Registration 1938 No. 25).  
The colonial government disciplined lawyers through the disciplinary committee where, 
similar to the Bar Examination committee, seven or eight judicial officials of the colonial 
government sat. There was no position reserved for practicing lawyers on this committee. The 
colonial government believed the attorney system to be evidence of the improved judicial system 
that they had brought to colonial Korea. As a result, the government was very sensitive to any 
misdemeanors by lawyers that threatened this system. By the early 1930s, most disciplinary 
actions against lawyers were for their misdemeanors. However, they were also used by the 
colonial government to restrict the activities of nationalist lawyers. For example, in 1931, one 
Korean nationalist lawyer, Hŏ Hŏn, was charged with conspiring to start a socialist organization 
and disqualified from the bar.  
 
Fragmented Bar Associations 
 
Aside from the oppressive colonial state, the fragmented bar associations also weakened 
the legal profession. Even though all practicing lawyers in colonial Korea were treated as part of 
the legal profession and entitled to practice law without institutional discrimination, they were 
partitioned into various subgroups divided by ethnicity and qualification. For instance, the Seoul 
bar associations, which comprised more than one third of the entire body of practicing lawyers 
during the colonial period, were divided into the Seoul bar association for Japanese lawyers and 
the First Seoul bar association for their Korean counterparts. The division of the bar association 
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into these two separate bodies was precipitated by the election of a Korean lawyer as its 
president for the first time in 1914. Japanese lawyers, who were upset by the result, boycotted 
the presidency (Korean Bar Association 1980). After that, with the Japanese empire entering the 
period of total war, the reunification of the two bar associations did not occur 1938. Even after 
its reunification, the bar association engaged in few political activities. As the country’s 
atmosphere increasingly turned hostile against the United States and United Kingdom, the 
colonial government portrayed the reunified bar association as symbolizing the joint efforts of 
Japanese and Koreans against the West. After its reunification in 1938, the bar association also 
engaged in such activities such as raising funds for soldiers in Manchu (Hōritsu Shimbun April, 
1938). 
Some Korean lawyers took for granted prioritizing ethnic equality over professional 
virtues in colonial Korea. With non-lawyer agents in Japan and Korea still helping people’s 
litigation practices, the colonial government allowed some Japanese non-lawyer agents to earn a 
lawyer license under particular conditions in the 1910-20s. After witnessing the granting of the 
lawyer’s license to Japanese non-lawyer agents, the Bar Association of Korean lawyers in Seoul 
in 1924 advocated for the granting of lawyer’s license to Korean non-lawyer agents (Dong-A 
Ilbo March, 29th, 1924). The colonial authorities’ decision was explicitly unfair in that no Korean 
agents were entitled to practice law for the same period. Such a claim by the Korean bar 
association, though grounded on ethnic equality, however, could damage lawyers’ 
professionalism and credentialism that all practitioners should hold the same qualifications. If the 
Korean lawyers had stressed professionalism over ethnic equality, they would have accused their 
Japanese counterparts of violating the qualification system. But it was not easy for the lawyers to 
advocate professionalism and their exclusive right in colony where Japanese were much favored 
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in most cases. Although some events required the collaborations of the two ethnic groups, neither 
the Japanese nor Korean lawyers recommended the reunification of the bar associations until 
1938. 
Despite the association’s ethnic division that divided Koreans from Japanese, not all 
Korean lawyers were united under the single banner of being “Korean.” A chief source of 
division among them was their political stance towards the colonial rule. Yi In, one Korean 
lawyer who was actively engaged in cause lawyering for nationalistic activists during the 
colonial period, stated that Korean lawyers were divided into pro-Japanese, anti-Japanese, and 
hermitlike groups (I. Yi 1974). Except for the nationalistic lawyers like Yi In, most Korean 
lawyers were not interested in the cause of Korean nationalism. In addition, with most Korean 
lawyers coming from the positions of resigned/retired judicial officials at the lowest branch 
courts until the 1930s, they practiced law in local cities rather than Seoul.  
Meanwhile, the conflict caused by qualification was much more serious for Japanese 
lawyers than it was for Korean lawyers. Lawyers in colonial Korea were governed by the 
executive ordinance decreed by the Governor-General of colonial Korea and not by the 
metropole law of Japan. The Governor-General’ ordinance on lawyers’ qualification 
promulgated in 1912 defined two types of lawyers eligible to practice law in Korea: 1) practicing 
lawyers in Japan or eligible candidates with Japanese qualification and; 2) practicing lawyers in 
Korea or eligible candidates with Korean qualifications. This meant that lawyers who obtained 
their qualification from the colonial government were limited in their jurisdictional activity to 
colonial Korea. For most Korean lawyers, regardless of the qualifications, the jurisdictional limit 
was not a problem at all, because they kept practicing law within colonial Korea. In contrast to 
the Korean lawyers, however, Japanese lawyers who had served in the colonial judiciary or had 
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passed the Korean Bar Examination were not entitled to practice law in mainland Japan. 
Ironically, it was Japanese lawyers qualified in colonial Korea who most actively and 
aggressively contested the ethnic division. In contrast to Korean lawyers who could take 
advantage of local networks for their practice and had few reasons to migrate to Japan, the 
Japanese lawyers who had obtained their license from the colonial government were not allowed 
to practice law in Japan. In order to ameliorate their disadvantaged status vis-à-vis the metropole 
lawyers, the Japanese lawyers used many forums including Hōritsu Shimbun to advocate for the 
unification of the Japanese and Korean legal systems. Among the main contributors to this 
journal was a Japanese lawyer, Miyazaki Tsuyoshi, who had passed the Korean Bar Examination 
in 1923. In 1929-30, he wrote several articles criticizing the underdevelopment of the colonial 
judiciary including “The Independence of the Judiciary in Colonial Korea (Hōritsu Shimbun 
September 1929),” “The Will of Governor-General Saito and the Application of the Court 
Constitution Law to Colonial Korea (Hōritsu Shimbun April 1930),” “The Shortage of 
Manpower in Keijō Local Court and the Prestige of the Judiciary.” 
 
Juristic Marginalization 
 
In addition to the oppressive colonial state and the fragmented bar associations, the 
lawyers in colonial Korea had few means to produce legal knowledge. Therefore, rather than 
lawyers, the colonial state and a handful of elite judges in the Higher Court exercised juristic and 
even legislative powers. While the colonization of the country in 1910 applied Japanese laws to 
the lives of residents in colonial Korea, the relationships among Koreans were governed by a set 
of executive ordinances decreed by the Governor-General. The ordinances promulgated in 1912, 
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which went through several revisions during the colonial period, dictated that civil relations 
among Koreans, including family affairs, be governed by Korean customs and not Japanese 
laws.41 The fact that the Korean customs were never codified during the colonial period thus 
became a critical issue. After an attempt to codify and enact civil laws in colonial Korea based 
on Korean customs became thwarted in the late 1900s, the judges in colonial courts used Korean 
customs but did not properly cite them.42 Moreover, the Japanese judges remained largely 
ignorant of Korean customs or distorted them. For instance, with many judges assuming that the 
Korean customs were the same as the Japanese ones,43 they either applied the Japanese concept 
of family to Korean cases or overgeneralized a custom particular to a certain village or town to 
other regions.  
With the judges in the High Court of Colonial Korea determining the validity of Korean 
customs to individual cases (M. S. Kim 2009), the lawyers in colonial Korea had little power to 
link native law and legal sources to colonial law. These lawyers were aware, however, that most 
interpretations by the High Court judges were either incorrect or too distant from accepted 
Korean customs to be effective. As a result, they suggested the need on the part of the colonial 
government and its judiciary to codify these customs into statuary laws (Daily Dong-A October 
                                                 
41 Instead, the indigenous Korean custom was inserted into a sub-section of the colonial legal order. According to 
the Ordinance on Civil Matters (j: Chosen Minjirei; k: Chosŏn Minsaryŏng) in Article 10 passed in 1912, civil 
matters involving only Koreans were to be governed by a Korean custom even if the specific custom differed from a 
law as long as the law was not related to public order. According to Article 11, Korean customs rather than the laws 
listed in Article 1 applied to the provisions for family and succession for Koreans. According to Article 12, except 
for the property rights stipulated in Article 1, the kinds and effects of real property rights were to be governed by the 
Korean custom. 
42 A recent study sheds light on the Protectorate period (1905-1910) as one in which a policy shift from Japan’s 
status as a protectorate to colonizer occurred as Japanese liberals and aggressive colonialists vied for power. A 
Japanese jurist, Ume Kenjirō, who studied Korean customs, tried to codify them into law. After the death of Korea’s 
Governor-General, Itō , in 1909, followed by the death of Ume himself in 1910, his efforts proved fruitless (Y. Yi 
2011). 
43 In particular, the notions of family and family head authority in Korea became translated into the concept of ie or 
Japanese family. In contrast to the Korean family, the head of the Japanese family was considered identical to the 
other family members and exercised absolute control over them. Japanese judicial officials also remained deeply 
confused about the different inheritance structures of Japanese and Korean families (Yuhokyokai 1966).  
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1st, 1928). However, neither the colonial state nor its judicial officials responded to these 
suggestions. 
Due to the marginalization of most lawyers, in general, and Korean lawyers, in particular, 
from discussions of native legal practices, they remained powerless to counter the 
misinterpretation of Korean customs by the colonial state and its judiciary. In contrast to lawyers 
in pre-colonial Korea who actively engaged in the construction of a colonial jurisprudence 
through diverse conferences and forums, the lawyers in Korea in the 1920s failed to engage in 
similar efforts. With an increasing number of lawyers originating from the positions of court 
clerks with expertise in litigation procedures than jurisprudence per se, the silence around the 
distortion of Korean customs intensified. Some lawyers intermittently submitted articles to 
journals or newspapers to discuss the difference of Japanese and Korean institutions. Among 
them was Kim Pyŏnu who contributed multiple articles to Hōritsu Shimbun in the late 1920s 
regarding the different tenant systems in Japan and Korea. Except for few lawyers such as Kim 
who had studied law in a Japanese college, the lawyers in colonial Korea remained reticent in 
discussing issues of jurisprudence. The task of publishing papers and organizing forums to study 
Korean customs fell upon the judges and prosecutors instead. According to a study (Hong 2009), 
one Japanese higher judge published more than two dozen papers on the Korean family system, 
decisively affecting the meaning and structure of the Korean family.44  
Despite the popularity of the Korean Bar Examination with the general public, elite law 
students shied away from it. In 1939, while the number of applicants who took the exam 
exceeded 250, most Keijō Imperial University students did not take the Korean Bar Examination 
nor its graduates seriously. Students from Imperial University, like many other imperial 
                                                 
44 In the same study, Hong (2009) pointed to one of the most critical misunderstandings of the Japanese judge, 
Nomura Chotaro, and the High Court of Colonial Korea—that the inheritance of service rituals for family lineage in 
the Korean family (chesa sangsok) had moral and ethical but no legal meaning.. 
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university students across the Japanese empire, aspired to become an official by passing the 
National Higher Civil Service Examination (j: Koutoubunkan shiken, Kodŭng munkwan sihŏm). 
Thus, it was rare for students at Imperial University to take the Bar Examination and start a law 
practice without applying for the Civil Service Examination. Of the 226 successful candidates of 
the Korean Bar Examination from 1922 to 1944, I was able to identify only four such cases. On 
the contrary, with the elite law students considering the Bar Examination in colonial Korea to be 
only a preliminary test to preparing for the Civil Service Exams in Tokyo, few successful 
candidates of the Korean Bar exam practiced law.   
For example, after passing the Korean Bar Examination in 1938, Ko Chaeho did not 
practice law but took the Civil Service Exam in 1939 instead. After passing this exam, he was 
appointed as a probationary prosecutor within a local court in Taegu in 1940. Later, Ko 
confessed that he had taken the Korean Bar Examination because he was unsure whether he 
would successfully pass the Civil Service Examination (Ko 1985). Until the end of colonial rule, 
nine Keijō Imperial University students, along with Ko, took the Bar Examination and the Civil 
Service Examination. No one, however, practiced law immediately after passing them. Another 
Keijō Imperial University student, Sŏnu Chongwŏn, who graduated in 1941 and passed the Civil 
Service Examination in 1943, recalled—somewhat disparagingly— the Korean Bar Examination 
as being much easier than the Higher Civil Service Examination (Sŏnu 2010).  
There were several reasons why few elite law students in colonial Korea took the Bar 
Examination seriously even though it was no easier than the Higher Civil Service Examination. 
Practically, the Korean bar exam was harder in a sense that it did not exempt the preliminary test 
for candidates who had successfully passed it in the previous year. Thus, examinees often 
complained about the Korean bar exam being harder than the Japanese exam. Aside from the 
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practical hardship in preparing and passing the examination, one reason for their sense of 
dismissal lay in the discrimination of the colonial government against the successful candidates 
of the Korean Bar Examination. The colonial government, even though it administered the exam, 
did not draw upon the pool of successful candidates of the Korean Bar Examination to fill in its 
vacancies within the judiciary. Suffering from a lack of applicants from Japan until the mid-
1930s, the colonial government either engaged in special campaigns to recruit the court clerks or 
invited applications from practicing lawyers in Japan. In the 1920s, more than 150 court clerks 
became appointed to judicial officials and in the 1930s, more than 50 lawyers qualified in 
metropole Japan were named as judicial officials. However, no practicing lawyers who passed 
the Korean Bar Examination were named to judicial officials during the colonial period. For 
example, a Korean lawyer, Pak Uyun, who had started to practice law from 1933 after passing 
the Higher Civil Service Examination in 1932, was appointed to a judge at the branch court in 
Chŏngŭp in North Chŏnra Province in 1940. His appointment was possible because he had not 
passed the colonial exam but the metropole exam.  
Despite the handful of lawyers engaged in civic movements, with the fragmentation of 
the legal profession and the dependence of the lawyers on the colonial state, the overall attitude 
of colonial lawyers was one of powerlessness and disengagement from juristic issues. As 
aforementioned, the lawyers’ conferences did not work as a forum for practicing lawyers to 
discuss and exchange their thoughts of law. A few newspapers engaged in jurisprudence by 
spreading and sharing new rulings at the Supreme Court in Tokyo and the High Court in Seoul, 
but most of all its aim resided in letting examinees to know those cases rather than discussing 
jurisprudence. In the face of these divisions, the national conference of lawyers proved 
ineffective in forging a common future for practicing lawyers in colonial Korea. Except for the 
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first national conference in 1925 joined by the higher judicial officials of colonial Korea, most 
conferences ended in fruitless debates. In 1925, both Japanese and Korean lawyers proposed a 15 
article resolution to the colonial government that advocated for the adoption of the Court 
Constitution Laws in order to improve human rights, improve equality between the Japanese and 
Koreans, and abolish other “evil” laws. However, these resolutions were met by the colonial 
government’s stony silence and had to be reissued every year. A young Korean lawyer, So 
Wankyu, who had passed the Korean Bar Examination in 1931, lamented that lawyers in the 
1932 conference were more interested in a Mt. Kŭmkang tour than the conference itself. 
Commenting on the overall atmosphere, one higher judge stated, “Compared to the commitment 
to jurisprudence of lawyers in Japan, those lawyers in colonial Korea are too reticent and, to be 
frank, too disengaged. I encourage you to be more engaged” (Hōritsu Shimbun April 20th, 1938). 
The juristic marginalization of lawyers in Korea had a negative impact on the drafting of 
the Constitution and other acts after the country’s independence. Among the ten members on the 
Committee for the Foundation of the Constitution and the Governmental Organization Law of 
South Korea on June 2nd, 1948,45 only three were practicing lawyers who had passed the bar 
examinations during the colonial rule (Kwŏn Sŭngryŏl, Han Kŭncho, and No Chinsŏl). The other 
six committee members were either graduates of imperial universities or the successful 
candidates of the Higher Civil Service Examination who had served as government officials 
                                                 
45 Yu Chino (Keijo Imperial University, a law professor at Posŏng School), Kwŏn Sŭngryŏl (Nihon University, 
Korean Bar Examination, practicing lawyer), No Yongho (Kyoto Imperial University, Higher Civil Service 
Examination, a judge), Yun, Kilchung (Nihon University, Higher Civil Service Examination, a county governor) Ko 
Pyŏngkuk (Tokyo Imperial University, Higher Civil Service Examination, practicing lawyer) Han Kŭncho (Meiji 
University, Japanese Bar Examination, practicing lawyer) Ch’a Yunhong (unknown), Im Munhwan (Tokyo Imperial 
University, Higher Civil Service Examination, County governor), No Chinsŏl (Meiji University, Korean Bar 
Examination, practicing lawyer) and Kim Yongkŭn (Keijo Imperial University, Higher Civil Service Examination, a 
county governor). 
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during the colonial period. Yu Chino, the president of the Committee, later confessed that he 
struggled to establish the Constitution since few committee members understood its nature.46 
 
Chapter Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have shown how individual lawyers became prominent in various social 
realms as well as the court during the colonial period while the collective body of lawyers 
remained largely inactive. Not only did the individual lawyers in colonial Korea earn an 
astronomically high income compared to other professionals but they also advanced into local 
politics, business and finance, and social organizations. While some Japanese lawyers conducted 
business across the Korea Strait, other Korean lawyers gained social esteem as nationalistic 
advocates that they later put to good use as judiciary leaders of the newly independent South 
Korean government. Behind the high prestige enjoyed by individual lawyers, however, the bar 
association remained largely silent to political and juristic issues in colonial Korea. Until the 
colonial government forcibly reunited the two associations divided by ethnicity, the bar 
associations of lawyers in Seoul remained split for a long time. Through the bar examination and 
strict registration processes, the oppressive colonial state tightly controlled the supply of 
practicing lawyers. The colonial state and its judiciary also became the privileged interpreters of 
native Korean customs and, therefore, served as a quasi-congress that codified them into quasi-
statuary laws. 
The ironic juxtaposition of “salient” professionals and a “silent” profession can be 
explained in terms of the juristic marginalization of the colonial state vis-à-vis the metropole. On 
                                                 
46 As many researchers have pointed out, unraveling intricately entwined customary laws that constitute both native 
customs and the processed customs of the colonial jurisprudence remains one of the major tasks of the South Korean 
judiciary (M. S. Kim 2009). 
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one hand, the colonial lawyers were relegated to consumers of imported legal knowledge from 
the metropole. Many lawyers in colonial Korea remained technical practitioners assigned with 
the task of applying existing legal knowledge to specific cases for their clients. On the other hand, 
the colonial government excluded the colonial lawyers from legal forums to discuss colonial 
laws and Korean customs. As a result, the lawyers remained passive bystanders who simply read 
and applied the verdicts reached by the High Court of Colonial Korea. The political 
marginalization of the legal profession can also be attributed to the oppressive colonial state and 
fragmented bar associations. With little political space for lawyers in colonial Korea, the bar 
association faced difficulty in mobilizing them for social action. 
As a result, the legal profession in colonial Korea, I have suggested, existed as a means 
for aspiring individuals to advance into social realms but was not a field in which individual 
lawyers turned into a collective body of a profession. Being a lawyer in colonial Korea became a 
nominal title representing a knowledgeable, intelligent, and likely influential figure within the 
local community. However, it said little about the political involvement of this individual in the 
development of colonial Korea’s legal system. The Janus-faced feature of the Korean Bar 
Examination is noteworthy in this regard. The examination became a popular channel for lower 
mid-ranked government officials and white-collar workers to climb the social ladder. With the 
new-found popularity of law education, the insufficient educational infrastructure of colonial 
Korea necessary to prepare for the bar examination also became a social issue that attracted 
much public attention. Not only that, in contrast to the deep interest that lower mid-ranked 
officials showed in the law examination, elite law students shunned it. Few students at Keijō 
Imperial University took the Korean Bar Examination seriously due to the limited jurisdiction of 
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the Korean Bar Examination. Instead, most aimed their sights higher on passing the Higher Civil 
Service Examination in Tokyo.  
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CONCLUSION: THE DIVORCE OF LAWYER AS A PROFESSIONAL FROM A 
PROFESSION 
 
 
In this dissertation, I have argued that the legal structures imposed on colonial Korea by 
the Japanese colonizers shaped the professionalization of lawyers to be instrumentally prominent 
but substantively disempowered actors. As a result of the Japanese colonial rule, procedural laws 
became unified across the Japanese Empire, legal professions were trained with the laws, and 
being a lawyer became a means both to gain exclusive authority within the courts and to advance 
into other social realms. Along with the establishment of the attorney system in 1905 and the 
subsequent reforms of the judicial system in the late 1900s, Korea was enforced to enter a novel 
field in which Western laws and court systems governed litigations among individuals. 
Individual practitioners’ prominence spawned out of this coercive change that resulted in high 
social prestige and socioeconomic compensation as well as popularity of law education. Not only 
was the title of lawyer a ticket to enter various fields including the local assembly, business and 
finance, and society during the colonial period, but the lofty prestige of its practitioners was also 
reflected in the popularity of law education for the socially ambitious and the rise of prominent 
families with legal connections in colonial and post-colonial Korean society.  
However, the rise of individual lawyers as prestigious professionals did not mean a 
similar rise in the power and prestige of the legal profession. On the contrary, the legal 
profession was not only tightly controlled by the oppressive colonial state but also fragmented by 
the different ethnicity and qualifications of its members. The colonial government and its 
judiciary censored lawyers by engaging in lawyers’ registration and dropout processes. In 
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addition to the authoritarian state, the bar associations that consisted of different ethnicities and 
qualifications did not play a pivotal role in establishing the profession’s autonomy and the rule of 
law in colonial Korea. Given the division between metropole Japan and colonial Korea, 
moreover, colonial jurisprudence was formulated by a handful of elite judges and law professors 
at the Keijō Imperial University but not by lawyers in colonial Korea. Rather, lawyers remained 
marginalized as technical practitioners who simply applied rather than produced new forms of 
legal knowledge, and the bar associations did few things to secure their position in discussing 
and formulating colonial jurisprudence. 
I conclude that colonization in general, the colonial legal structures in particular, shapes 
the legal profession to be substantively hallow despite the establishments of formal institutions 
including law education and exams, Western courts, and judicial systems in the colony. The 
implementation of the formal institutions by the colonizers radically brought colonies and 
subjects into the field of Western law. As seen in Chapter 2, lawyers, despite lacking a strong 
socio-cultural basis in the traditional Korean legal system, took advantage of the rearrangements 
of legal systems in earl twentieth century Korea by linking the Korean subjects to Westernized 
forms of litigation. The establishment of modern-yet-still-colonial courts and the appointment of 
Japanese judicial officials to Korean courts necessitated the lawyers’ knowledge of Japanese 
laws. In Chapter 3, I have argued that because of the radical political regime changes the ruling 
elites in Korea were less prepared than their less well-off counterparts to advance into the 
prestigious legal profession. In contrast to the preceding decades, from 1910 onwards, the legal 
profession became a means for Koreans to either change their social status or achieve upward 
social mobility. Showing the rise of lawyers as a powerful professional class in colonial Korean 
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society through Chapter 2 and 3, I have argued that lawyering became one expedient means for 
the previously marginalized members of the learned class to achieve social mobility. 
In contrast to the rising prominence of individual lawyers, however, the bar associations 
did not rise to an independent entity that regulated and protected practicing lawyers based on 
common experiences. As seen in Chapter 4, the different ethnicities of the Korean and Japanese 
lawyers and their diverse qualifications hindered the consolidation of the legal profession with a 
shared identity. That is, the status of colonial Korea in the Japanese empire as an annexed 
territory with a separate jurisdiction entitled all practitioners of law to enjoy the title of lawyer. 
However, this shared title hardly contributed to a collective stance against Japanese colonial rule 
that kept colonial Korea both separate and subordinate to mainland Japan. Moreover, the 
differences of ethnicity and qualification gave the lawyers a different status in the bar, 
determined where they could practice, and decided whether they could even transfer. In Chapter 
5, I suggested that the location of the lawyers’ first place to practice and their likelihood of being 
transferred were influenced by factors such as their in-office career, ethnicity, and origin of 
qualification. In particular, Korean lawyers who earned their law degrees in colonial Korea were 
likely to practice law in local cities. In Chapter 6, I showed how the oppressive colonial state, the 
fragmented bar association, and the juristic marginalization of lawyers contributed to the 
relegation of colonial lawyers to technical practitioners who simply applied existing legal 
knowledge to specific cases. 
Showing that the disjuncture between individual lawyers as influential professionals and 
lawyer as a relatively disempowered profession characterizes the professionalization process in 
colonial Korea, I suggest that to understand lawyers in the colony it is imperative to examine the 
legal structures that the colonizers imposed onto the colony. The roles of the colonial legal 
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structures are two-fold. On the one hand, it facilitates the rise of lawyers as influential 
professionals that resulted from the process of colonization that replaced the pre-colonial legal 
regime in Korea with modern law schools, courts, and other legal organizations. Regardless of 
whether the colonization process was voluntary or coerced, the Japanese colonization of Korea 
established an arena in which the legal knowledge of practicing lawyers became regarded as 
valuable. On the other hand, the process of colonization contributed to the marginalization of the 
lawyers as a collective. Although colonization created legal institutions in colonial Korea that 
were formally identical to those in metropole Japan, in fact, the field of law or jurisprudence 
became hardly established in colonial Korea. Insofar as the Japanese colonial state remained an 
apparatus for ensuring the stable rule of its colonial subjects, no lawyers—with the possible 
exception of a handful of nationalists—engaged in political mobilization. Lacking both the 
socio-cultural roots of lawyering in pre-colonial Korea and the statuary laws to regulate 
individual relations, the lawyers in colonial Korea were forced to rely upon the interpretation of a 
few elite judicial officials on Korean customs.  
By demonstrating the paradoxical aspect of professionalization of lawyers in colonial 
Korea—the salience of individual lawyers tied with the silence of their association, this 
dissertation contributes to three bodies of literature. First, the dissertation criticizes existing 
literature of profession study’s three assumptions; 1) professionals are members of a profession 
that shares a common identity; 2) they go through the same qualification system to become an 
expert; and 3) they formed under the aegis of the nation-states. That is, regardless of whether 
they draw upon inter-professional or intra-professional competition theories, scholars have 
assumed that a profession consists of a distinct field of experts who share similar behavioral 
codes in relation to the nation-state. The lawyers in colonial Korea challenge this understanding 
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in that overly-developed individual practitioners coexisted with relatively underdeveloped bar 
associations under the colonial rule. The divorce of legal professionals from the profession 
challenges existing assumptions about two key dimensions of the professionalization process. 
According to neoinstitutional theories on profession and professionalization in sociology, a 
profession emerges out of institutional adaptations such as schools and examination systems 
(Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). With the ability of such institutional 
arrangements to spread to another place, colonial expansion is one medium through which the 
formal process of professionalization can be brought about. Aside from such formal 
establishments which facilitated emulations at the superficial level, the professionalization 
concerned with a process in which actors engage in building a field should be seen separately. If 
the neoinstitutional theory seeks a better explanatory framework, then it delves into how adopted 
institutions actually work in a new context (see Fourcade 2006).  
Second, drawing attention to the complicated relationship between the traditional, 
modern, and colonial elements of legal professionalization, this dissertation critically reviews the 
concept of colonial modernity. The Japanese colonization of Korea dissolved the pre-colonial 
legal system that had discouraged agents from engaging in litigation. Instead, by replacing this 
antiquated system with Westernized courts, the Japanese colonization propelled legal 
practitioners to become prominent professionals. However, the inactive nature of the Korean bar 
association which emerged within these colonial conditions raises questions of whether and to 
what extent colonized Koreans were truly modern. Behind the formal implementation of modern 
courts and the attorney system, the colonial state constantly suppressed the lawyers’ activities. 
Because the bar association was not able to build a coherent identity, the lawyers barely 
advocated their autonomy from the state. Aside from the professional autonomy, the lawyers 
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were marginalized from producing and securing legal knowledge under the colonial politics 
where the colonial rulers nearly monopolized the interpretation of what the colony is. The 
relative disempowerment of the lawyers as a profession, on the contrary, draws attention to the 
modernized nature of coloniality. That is, these modern elements imposed by the Japanese were 
ultimately designed to perpetuate colonial rule. This disempowerment of the legal profession 
also sheds light on colonialism as a process that perpetuates a division of labor between the 
metropole and the colony in terms of knowledge production. From this perspective, we can view 
the shift in imperialism from direct to an indirect rule during the second half of the twentieth 
century as a continuation of the colonial relationship between the metropole and colony—albeit 
through a rearranged system of knowledge production.   
Finally, this dissertation contributes to the literature on legal history in East Asia by 
raising fundamental questions about the colonial foundations of the legal system in contemporary 
South (and North) Korea. From the qualifications of practicing lawyers to the codification of 
civil laws, the colonial rule exerted a large influence on the legal system in post-colonial Korean 
society. Recent scholarship has begun to address this issue of colonial legacy in raising questions 
about the continuity of colonial jurisprudence and the legal institutions over the twentieth 
century (M. S. Kim 2009; Moon 2010; Y. Yi 2011). My dissertation suggests that the legal 
system in twentieth century Korea be seen as transnational in the sense that pre-colonial, colonial, 
and post-colonial elements were inextricably linked. At least in terms of practicing lawyers, 
many were transnational in the sense that many studied and took their bar exams in Japan. In 
other words, these lawyers were produced within a transnational realm encompassing the 
Japanese Empire. With many of them continuing to practice their profession after liberation, 
some advanced to high positions within the administration and judiciary of South Korea, where 
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they contributed to the legislation of Korean civil and criminal laws. Keeping in mind the 
transnationality of both legal professionals and government officials, we can review the history 
of Korea in the second half of the twentieth century as one of transnationally-embedded elites 
engaging in the nation-building process. In contrast to the dominant historiography in South 
Korea that understands this period as one where nationalistic leaders recover the nation, this 
dissertation highlights the strong tension between transnational elites and nationalistic masses. 
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APPENDIX: THE 25 LAWYERS’ FAMILY BACKGROUNDS 
 
ID Name Date of 
Birth 
Family 
Clan 
(Ponkwan) 
Education Father’s name (or 
Grandfather’s) 
Father’s Rank or Title Chungin 
Status 
1 Kim, Chŏng-mok 1866.5.20 Kyŏngju Home (Kasuk) Kim, Kyo-sŭng  Yukp’um (Lower Echelon; 
6th rank at the bureaucracy) 
 
2 Cho, Kyŏng-ku 1875.7.16 P'ungyang Home (Kasuk) Cho, Tong-sŏk Kongcho Chongnang (Lower 
Echelon) 
 
3 Song, Chin-ok 1865.9.20 Yŏsang Home (Kasuk) ?   
4 P'yi, Sang-pŏm 1856.7.16 Hongch'ŏn Traditional Jurist 
Exam 
Pyi, Chong-yun Cholchung changkun (Upper 
Echelon) 
Chungin 
5 Hyŏn, Sŏk-kŏn ? Yŏnju Meiji Univ. Hyŏn, Kyŏng-un  Chungin 
6 Hong, Chae-ki 1870.12.26 Seoul Keio Univ. Hong, Chŏng-sŏp   
7 Yi, Myŏn-u 1897 Chŏnju Chuo Univ. Yi Hoe-rae  Chinsa  
8 Yi, Cho-wŏn 1884.11.24 ? Jurist Training 
School 
Yi Tu-pok   
9 Yi-, Yong-sŏng 1861.11.7 Ansan Jurist Training 
School 
Yi Kyŏng-chi T’ongchongdaebu (Upper 
Echelon) 
Chungin 
10 Pak, Sŭng-pin 1880 Pannam Chuo Univ. Pak, Gyŏng-yang Kagamyokkwan (Lower 
Echelon) 
 
11 Chang, To 1876.5.7 Tŏksu Chuo Univ. Chang, Hu-kŭn Sŏnryak Changgun (Lower 
Echelon) 
 
12 Yun, Pang-hyŏn 1875.1.30 P'ap’yŏng Keio Univ. Yun, Chŏl-kyu   
13 Song, T'ae-hwan 1868.3.5 Yasong Jurist Training 
School 
Song, Sang-ki Haksaeng  
14 T'ae, Myŏng-sik 1870. 3.14 Namwŏn Home T'ae, U-nam Yuhak  
15 Pyŏn, Yŏng-man 1889.6.23 Milyang Posŏng School Pyon, Chŏng-
sang 
Samhwa Puyun (Upper 
Echelon) 
 
16 Yu, Mun-hwan 1874.8.24 Kangnŭng Chuo Univ. Yu, Ton-sang   
17 Chŏng, Myŏng-sŏp 1864.3 Naju a private law school 
in Korea 
Chŏng, Tae-yŏng Haksaeng  
18 Hong, Myŏn-hŭi 1877.8.27 P'ungsan Jurist Training 
School 
Hong, Chae-sik   
19 Yi, Chong-u 1858.5.27 Tŏksu Jurist Training 
School 
Yi, Chu-yŏng Yuhak  
20 Yi, Hŭi-son 1865.7.4 Ugye Traditional Civil 
Exam, first stages 
Yi Chae-myŏng T’onghundaebu (Lower 
Echelon) 
 
21 Yi, Yong-sang 1884.10.17 Kwangju Jurist Training 
School 
Yi, Sŏk-rae Saengwŏn  
22 Yi, Chong-sŏng 1876.11.7 Tŏksu Traditional Civil 
Exam, first stages 
Yi, Sŏ-yŏng Yecho Ch’amp’an (Upper 
Echelon) 
 
23 Yi, Kŏn-ho 1865 Chŏnui Traditional Military 
Exam 
Yi, Kyo-rin Sŏnryak Changgun (Lower 
Echelon) 
 
24 Kwŏn Pyŏng-hun 1864 Andong Home (Kasuk) Kwŏn, Pang-hŏn Chŏngnŭng Ch’ampong 
(Lower Echelon) 
 
25 Kye, Myŏng-ki 1870.10.26 Suan Posŏng School Kye, To-hyŏng Yuhak  
Table 9 25 First Korean Lawyers' Family Backgrounds registered from 1906 to 1910 (Source: The Collections of Resumes of 
Officials of the Taehan Empire, The Information System on Figures in Korean History by the Academy of Korean Studies) 
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THE LIST OF PRIMARY SOURCES 
 
1. Governmental Documents 
 Classified Documents Pertaining to Lawyers Registration (1927-1940); Pyŏnhosa Kwangye 
Sŏryu 
 The List of Government Officials of the Colonial Government of Korea:  
 The Lists of Successful Candidates of the National Examinations from 1864 to 1894: Pangmok 
 The Official Gazette of the Taehan Empire: Taehanchekuk kwanbo 
 The Official Gazette of the Colonial Government (j: Chousēn soutokufu kampou; k: Chosŏn 
ch’ongdokbu kwanbo). 
 The Official Gazette of the Metropole Government  
 The Resumes of the Officials of the Taehan Empire: Taehanchekuk Kwanwŏn Iryŏksŏ) 
 The Diary of the Royal Secretariat: Sŭngchŏngwŏn Ilki) 
 The Sourcebook of Modern Laws and Acts in Late Chosŏn-Korea: Hanmal Keundae Pŏpryŏng 
Charyojip 
2. Private Documents 
 Who’s Who: Chosŏn Sinsataedongpo 
3. Newspaper 
 Daily Hansŏng: Hansŏng sunbo 
 The Imperial Gazette: Hwangsŏng Shinmun 
 Daily Dong-A: Dong-A Ilbo 
 The Independence: Toknip Shinmun 
 The Law Journal: Horitsu Sinbum 
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